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SUMMARY
The aim of this study mas to investigate relationships between 
children’s self-processes—  self-concepts and self-esteem —  on the 
one hand and their academic achievements on the other. The subjects 
largely comprised intact school classes and were aged eiqht, eleven 
and thirteen years. A battery of instruments, some standardized, 
some specially developed, was employed to obtain measures of self­
esteem, academic self-concept, achievement, intelligence, achieve­
ment value, academic locus of control, cognitive complexity, field- 
independence and popularity. Some of these measures were derived 
from repertory grids, a new technioue being devised for eliciting • 
personal constructs from children. In addition, ratings of academic 
achievement were obtained from both teachers and classmates.
The data revealed an age related trend towards increasing diff­
erentiation between general and specific self-processes. Thus, the 
youngest children evaluated themselves globally whereas the two older 
age groups made independent evaluations of their academic and social 
functioning. Moreover, with age, children’s academic self-concepts 
became increasingly accurate, corresponding more closely both with 
actual attainments and with ratings by others.
Self-processes were found to predict academic achievement indep­
endently of intelligence. General self-esteem bias not directly re­
lated to achievement, academic self-concept acting as an intervening 
variable. A comparison of the different approaches to measuring self- 
processes served to substantiate the construct validity of the repertory 
grid measures of academic self-concept and academic self-esteem, but 
not of the grid measure of general self-esteem. Further research with 
this approach is indicated.
The concepts of general self-esteem, academic self-esteem and 
academic self-conceot are re-evaluated in the Tight of the above findings. 
Implications for the measurement of self-processes and for educational 
practice are discussed.
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1.1 THE CONCEPT OF SELF-HOOD
1.1.1 Introduction
As Wells and Marwell (1976) point out, "Self seems to be one of those 
words which because of its ubiquity and indispensability is virtually 
impossible either to discard or to specify unambiguously" (p,39). Although 
an intuitively appealing construct, it can be too readily invoked to explain 
phenomena describable in simpler terms and thus tends to become diluted 
and discredited. Yet, as Epstein (1973) argues, "although there is 
disagreement about the value of the self-concept as an explanatory 
concept, there can be no argument but that the subjective feeling 
state of having a self is an important empirical phenomenon that warrants 
study in its own right" (p.405). Laing (1971) is another who has stressed 
the importance of this sense of self. He suggests that "most people feel 
that there is an area of experience which is private in an unqualified 
sense" (p.35) and quotes Gerard Manley Hopkins* description of this area: 
"••••• My self-being^ my consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste 
of myself, of I_ and jne above and in all things, which is more distinctive 
than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnut 
leaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man."
But, as Wylie (1974) points out, the fact that self-referring 
cognitions and feelings have an obvious, subjective validity is no 
justification for their inclusion in a scientific theory of personality.
To justify the usefulness of the notions of self-concept and self-esteem, 
one must argue that since antecedent conditions (such as intelligence and 
socio-economic status) have not proved sufficiently accurate in predicting 
either group trends or individual behaviour (such as academic achievement), 
one must ascertain what people perceive, know, or feel about the actual 
situation (including their own characteristics) in order to improve the 
accuracy of behavioural predictions. If we accept the validity of this 
argument, we are faced with the problems of conceptualizing people’s 
experience of themselves and of developing a model of how this experience 
is translated into behaviour.
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is this experience of self-hood to be understood or defined? Some have 
argued that defining the self is an impossibility. Gauld and Shotter (1977) 
point out that "The philosophical and the psychological literatures on the 
self are both extensive; but unfortunately from neither the philosophical 
nor the psychological side does much help come towards answering the 
question of what we ordinarily mean when we talk of ourselves or of others
i
as being or having ’selves* " (p.170). They conclude that the attempt to 
define self is fruitless, and argue that we should concentrate instead on 
describing what phenomenally the self is, that is, how we experience self­
hood. Gauld and Shotter argue that this is a valid approach even if we 
cannot ultimately define the self or even prove that we have selves: "If
the belief that we all cherish that we are persisting selves is an illusion, 
then it is an illusion which decisively influences much of our lives" (p.176).
This call for a more phenomenological approach to the study of self­
hood has been widely echoed in recent years and may even represent a paradigmatic 
shift in the psychological understanding of human behaviour. It is now 
becoming commonplace to argue that behaviour can only be understood in terms 
of the individual’s interpretation of events. Many have been influenced by 
the personal construct theory of George Kelly (1955) who argued that our 
behaviour is directed by the particular constructions we place upon events.
Thus, Mischel (1977) argues that our behaviour is guided not just by external 
events, but by our own internal representations of those events. Similarly,
Harre (1977) has proposed that our actions can be seen as determined by 
"templates of action", that is, by plans, scripts, rules, and scenarios 
which the person follows. These are constructed for specific occasions or 
kinds of occasions. Thus, instead of asking what traits a person possesses, 
we should ask what scenarios the person constructs and follows, and hence 
what meaning specific situations have for that person. Again, according to 
Meltzer et al. (1975), one of the three basic premises of symbolic 
interactionism is that "human beings act towards things on the basis of 
the meaning these things have for them" (p.1 ). In this view, behaviour is 
directed by the self, and is the product not of forces within us (needs, 
drives.and the like) or of external events,but of "what lies in between, a 
reflective and socially derived interpretation of the internal and external 
stimuli that are present" (p.2).
Other writers who take a phenomenological line include Loevinger (1976) 
and Soloman (1977). According to Loevinger, the essence of the ego (which 
she defines as "close to what the person thinks of as his self"), is 
"the striving to master, to .integrate, to make sense of experience ** (1976,
-4-
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at the most general level ego development refers to the framework of 
meaning which one imposes on experience, our own selves being included in 
this. And according to Soloman (1977), the self is "the point of reference 
from which we interpret or constitute our world" (p.90). Dust as we 
constitute our worlds, so we constitute our identities. To say that the 
self is a point of reference is not to claim that the self lacks dimensions 
or attributes, but merely that the self creates its own self-image and 
its public image out of the facts and the opinions that others have of us.
A number of writers have followed Kelly in viewing self-concepts as 
self-theories. Thus, Coopersmith (1967) talks of our attitudes towards 
ourselves as representing self-theories or, more specifically, "a set of 
hypotheses on how to anticipate, initiate, and respond to material tasks 
and interpersonal events" (p.64), Our self-evaluations may thus reflect 
"a cognitive style of adaption as well as a more particular and limited 
indication of personal esteem" (p.64). Again, for Horrocks and Dackson
(1972), an identity is how one defines oneself when circumstances demand 
a self-reaction: "In this sense, an identity is a self-hypothesis" (p.58).
In actual behaviour, identity takes the form of role behaviour. Identity 
is not the same as self-concept, but is a combination of various self- 
concepts resulting in an identity hypothesis which allows us to verbalize 
to ourselves and others who and what we are. Thus, "an organism is 
postulated as perceiving itself through its own self-concepts and 
expressing the perception as a series of identity hypotheses to be tested 
in the form of role behaviour" (p.60). These hypothesized identities may 
or may not be confirmed by reality, and hence may or may not become stable.
The fullest accounts of self-concepts as self-theories are given by 
Epstein (1973) and Brim (1975). For Epstein, the self-concept is "a 
theory that the individual has unwittingly constructed about himself as an 
experiencing, functioning individual, and it is part of a broader theory 
which holds in respect to the entire range of his significant experience"
(p.407). Epstein notes the similarity of this idea to Kelly's personal 
construct theory: both theorists view man as continually making, testing
and revising hypotheses about themselves and the world, and both view 
these hypotheses as hierarchically organized. In a similar view, Brim (1975) 
argues that the only reality we can ever know is the self in contact with 
reality: "What people learn during life are axioms, concepts and hypotheses
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snout tnemseives in relation to the world around them. u/e can think or the 
sense of self as a personal epistemology, similar to theories in science in 
its components and its operations, but dealing only with a specific person'1 
(p.l). Thus, we should think in terms of self theory rather than self 
concept, or of the self as a body of theory, "a segment of a human's whole 
theory about himself and the world around him” (p.2). (These theories 
include beliefs about causality and the degree of control pver events that 
one possesses). Brim notes that our self-theories depend upon the theories 
available in our culture about human nature and upon our place in that 
particular culture: "Each person will have some beliefs about himself
that are unique; some that are similar to what others in his social group 
believe about themselves; and some beliefs that are shared by all members 
of the culture" (Brim, pp.5-6). Brim also suggests that included in our 
theories about ourselves are hypotheses about the kind of person we might 
become in the future, that is, theories about the possibility of personal 
change.
The logical extension of this argument is that we can make of ourselves 
what we will, and that our constructions of ourselves can always be 
reconstructed. This has been put by Gergen (1977) who argues that the quest 
for self-knowledge is not a quest for some truth or reality, but is more a 
process of "fitting a conceptual template to experience". In fact, there 
is nothing to be "discovered" and the experience of insight or self- 
revelation is simply the realization that there is another way (an 
alternative template) for understanding the same experience. Similarly, 
Hamlyn (1977) argues that a necessary condition for self-knowledge is a 
kind of commitment to oneself (as a certain kind of person). Should one 
decide to alter that commitment (by becoming a different kind of person), 
then that decision will change one's understanding of what one is (and 
was), that is, it will change one's self-knowledge. As Hamlyn points out, 
this implies that "a central fact about self-knowledge is that there is 
nothing to be known" (1977, p.196). Berger (1966) makes this point even 
more graphically. He sees us as continually interpreting and reinterpreting 
our lives, reconstructing the past in accordance with our present ideas of 
what is important and what not. Not only are past events reinterpreted in 
this way, but we also constantly redefine who and what we are* This is not 
systematic, of course: "Host of us do not set out deliberately to paint a
grand portrait of ourselves. Rather we stumble like drunkards over the 
sprawling canvas of our self-conception, throwing a little paint here, 
erasing some lines there, never really stopping to obtain a view of the 
likeness we have produced" (p.75). Flajor reinterpretations of ourselves
-6-
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neutral term, alternations). Such a conversion may be very satisfying, 
in that it is ’’capable of ordering the scattered data of one’s biography 
However, the dawning recognition that this or any other conversion is not 
necessarily final, that one could be reconverted and re-reconverted, is one 
of the most terrifying ideas the mind can have. The experience of what we 
have called ’alternation* (which is precisely the perception of oneself in 
front of an infinite series of mirrors, each one transforming one’s image 
in a different potential conversion) leads to a feeling of vertigo, a meta­
physical agoraphobia, before the endlessly overlapping horizons of o n e ’s 
possible being” (p,77).
The assumptions on which the present study is based are in line with 
the broadly phenomenological theories just outlined, specially those of 
Kelly (1955), Epstein (1973), and Brim (1975), Thus, it is assumed that 
the way we behave is intimately connected with what we understand about the 
world and our own place in it. This is in contrast to the traditional 
behaviourist view which has dominated psychological thinking throughout the 
century. According to the latter view, behaviour is a product of events 
external to the person, so that our thoughts and feelings about ourselves are 
just as much products of those events as are our actions. Some behaviourists 
(for example, Bandura, 1974, 1978) no longer adopt such an extreme position, 
and we must similarly be wary of uncritically adopting an equally extreme 
phenomenological view, Meltzer et al, (1975) note Lichtman’s (1970) criticism 
of the phenomenological approach : "Human action can neither be understood
apart from or solely in terms of the interpretations of an actor.
Recognition of the category of false consciousness is necessary for the 
understanding of social acts. Activity has an objective structure that is 
very often discrepant with its intended meaning" (p.103), In other words, 
behaviour must be understood not only in terms of people’s understanding of 
who they are and of what is happening to them, but also in terms of what i_s. 
actually happening to them.
This is an argument for measuring both personal and situational 
variables when conducting research, behaviour being seen as emerging from 
the interaction between these two sets of variables. The study that follows 
will examine the relative contributions of person variables (such as self­
esteem, academic self-concept, and intelligence) and situation variables 
(such as the opinions of classmates and teachers) to children’s behaviour 
(academic achievements in particular).
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self, self-esteem and self-concept suggest entities that exist within the 
person and which control behaviour, rather than processes which constitute 
behaviour. As ItJells and Harwell (1976) point out, the self is not directly 
observable but is a hypothetical construct inferred or constructed from 
observable events. What we need to know is how real this construct is, 
whether it is a property of the world or of the explanation. Theorists vary 
on this point, the danger being that the construct becomes reified. Few 
definitions of self necessarily imply reification (by invoking a little-man- 
in-the-head who responds to events and directs behaviour), but in practice 
some writers about the self do tend to reify the construct.
Diggory (1966) has advocated dropping the definite article when 
describing self in order to rid ourselves of the tendency to think of it as 
an entity, with boundaries and a location. Other authors have tried to 
counteract the tendency to reify the self by insisting that it is a process, 
not an entity (for example, Berger, 1966; Cumming and Cumming, 1964;
Gordon, 1968; Hewitt, 1976; Horrocks and Dackson, 1972; and Loevinger, 1976). 
Thus, writing from a sociological background, Berger (1966) argues that the 
self is not a ”solid, given entity”, but rather"a process, continually created 
and recreated in each social situation that one enters” (p.124). Writing 
from a psychoanalytic background, Cumming and Cumming (1964) make a similar 
point, describing the ego as ”the point at which the person meets the 
situation” (p.12). Similarly, Loevinger (1976) argues that one of the most 
fundamental attributes of the ego is that it is a process, not a thing.
She compares it to a gyroscope (which remains upright as long as it spins), 
a concept similar to Piaget*s (1976) term mobile equilibrium (the greater the 
mobility, the greater the stability).
The problem that psychologists have in relating the construct of self 
to actual people and their behaviour is similar to the philosophical problem 
of relating mind and body. According to Royce (1973), the idea that man 
consists of body and soul (or mind) derives principally from Plato (via 
St. Augustine and Descartes). An alternative view deriving from Aristotle 
(via St. Thomas Aquinas) is that man is unified, if complex, and that the 
person or self is_ the behaving organism, the body and soul being 
inseparable. The two constitute the subjective and objective aspects of 
the same total reality. The merits of these two points of view have been 
thoroughly discussed by Greaves (1972) who agrees with the conclusions of 
most philosophers that the Cartesian idea of mind and body as distinct 
entities is untenable. Thus,Ryle (1949) dubbed the idea of the mind as an
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this separation is due to the mistake of regarding different aspects of 
the same phenomenon as different entities. Greaves suggests that we need 
two language modes (which he caU.s extrasentient and experiential) to 
describe these two aspects of ourselves. We use extrasentient language to 
talk about the world of objects (including ourselves as objects) and 
experiential language to talk about what it feels like to be an object 
(that is, to be ourselves). Yet just because we use two different kinds of 
language to describe ourselves does not mean we are describing two 
different things (that is, mind and body). It simply means that, depending 
upon the situation we find ourselves in, we choose different languages to 
describe what we are like. Two language modes are needed because we are 
incapable of being simultaneously in a subjective and objective orientation 
or frame of reference, that is, we cannot be both subject and object to 
ourselves at the same time. Yet clearly the organism that is oneself ijs 
simultaneously a subjective and objective being or thing, which each 
language mode can only describe incompletely. Greaves concludes that the 
organism (the self) is a primitive and ultimately undefinable concept and 
that we cannot escape this subject-object dichotomy: ”We are simultaneously
an object in a world of objects and an experiencing being” (p.768).
A number of recent writers on the self have followed .this line. Thus, 
Gauld and Shotter (1977) note that the self is not a perceptible object, 
something one can observe and characterize using the same framework one 
uses in understanding the world. It would be truer to say that the self is^ 
that framework and is thus ultimately unable to grasp its own nature.
(As Alan Watts has said, defining oneself is like trying to bite o n e ’s own 
teeth). A similar point is made by Soloman (1977): ”The Self is not
the faceless form that wears the masks of everyday life, a transendental 
Self that itself is never seen. But neither is the Self the sum of those 
masks, our appearance to other people and our objective roles in the world. 
Rather, the Self is the wearing of those masks” (p.91). Again, Hischel (1977) 
argues that ”the Self is not some entity other than the person”, while 
Hischel and Hischel (1977) propose that we equate such terms as ’self*, 11 *, 
and ’ego* and treat them all as synonymous with the whole person. Thus, 
behaviour is seen as being generated by the whole person rather than by any 
entity ’inside* or other than the person.
The relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness can be 
understood in the same terms as the relationship between mind and body, self
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bias no such thing as a self which is conscious of itself, a 'knower* who 
transcends all other aspects of the self. He argued that each moment of 
consciousness appropriates each previous moment with the knower thus being 
embedded in what is known: "The thoughts themselves are the thinker".
Since Dames, psychology has neglected the topic of consciousness, although 
Natsoulas (1978) has recently tried to develop a working definition, 
describing seven different types of consciousness. The argument put forward 
by Dames still holds good, however, and has been supported by Rose (1976) 
who suggests that the paradox of the infinite regress (who is thinking about 
the thinker) is more apparent than real. If consciousness is understood as 
a continuous interaction between the mind and the environment, then the 
infinite regress can be seen as a temporal sequence rather than a hierarchical 
one. Each self-observation is a particular brain state at a particular point 
in time in relation to other brain states at times just before or just after. 
Again, consciousness is seen as a process rather than an entity,
1.1*3 Self as subject versus self as object
The fundamental indivisibility of mind and body, self and person, 
self-consciousness and consciousness needs to be kept in mind when 
-considering the distinction that is often made between the self-as-subject and 
the self-as-object, the *1* and the ’me'. Kant, in his Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781) was the first to express the mind-body dualism in terms of self— 
as-subject vs. self-as-ob ject. Schopenhauer, in The World as Will and Idea 
(1819), labelled these two aspects of self-hood the Knower and the Known.
Dames (1890) suggested that we use the term * I* to designate our pure 
experience of ourselves (self-as-subject, self-as-knower) and the term ‘me* 
to stand for the contents of that experience (self-as-object, self-as-known). 
Read (1934) used the same distinction, but depicted the * I* as the initial 
impulsive, unorganized aspect of human experience, and the ’me* as the 
eventual controlling, organized aspect which develops through social inter­
actions as one internalizes the rules, attitudes, and definitions of o n e ’s 
society. In Blumer*s development of Read’s theory (summarised in Reltzer et 
al., 1975), each act begins with some aspect of the I and ends as some 
aspect of the me. The self is a continual process of internal conversation
between these two parts of the self, in the course of which the person may
come to view himself in a new way. Other accounts of the symbolic inter— 
actionist approach to self can be found in Becker (1972), Gauld and
Shotter (1977), Hewitt (1976), and Shotter (1973).
Authors outside the symbolic interactionist tradition who have 
distinguished between subjective and objective states of consciousness
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Duval and Wicklund (1972), and Soloman (1977), The latter sees these two 
states as complementary but considers that only the experience of 
subjectivity can provide us with a true sense of self and of meaning.
Both subjectivity and objectivity are ways of viewing the self, but neither 
is a natural standpoint but represent achievements, Soloman considers that 
objectivity is the perspective our society encourages us to adopt. Of the 
relationship between the two states he says: "Subjectivity without
objectivity is blind; objectivity without subjectivity is meaningless”
(p,64), Brooks-Gunn and Lewis (1978) consider that self knowledge has at 
least two aspects: the existential self (the self as separate from others)
and the categorical self (the categories by which one defines oneself).
Both develop in the first year of life and both are necessary for knowledge 
of others, Brooks-Gunn and Lewis believe that the social dimensions used 
to categorize the world are also used to categorize oneself.
In their account of personal construct theory, Bannister and Fransella 
(1971) use the term self-as-construct to refer to our experience of our own 
uniqueness. This is seen as being essentially inexpressible and seems to 
correspond to ZJames* idea of the self-as-knower. The self-as-construct is 
to be distinguished from the self-as-element which is the use of this 
construct of oneself as an element in the context of superordinate 
construct, i.e., when one begins to compare oneself with others on constructs 
which one has already developed. This self-as-element operates as any other 
construct in guiding one*s behaviour. Thus, the self-as-element is a 
construct or series of constructs about how one compares with others, whereas 
the self-as-construct is the experience of what one is as distinct from 
what one is not,
Duval and Wicklund (1972) have developed the most rigorous and 
extensive theory in this area. They distinguish between what they see as 
two mutually exclusive forms of conscious attention, objective and subjective 
self-awareness. They maintain that our attention alternates between focussing 
on ourselves and focussing on the external environment and that we cannot do 
both at once. Objective self-awareness is when o n e ’s self is the object of 
one’s attention, whereas in subjective self-awareness o n e ’s attention is 
focussed on events external to the self. One major difference between 
the two states is that objectively self-aware persons do not simply react 
to themselves neutrally but evaluate themselves according to certain personal 
standards of correctness (that is, according to an ideal self). Any 
discrepancy between the observed self and the ideal self produces a negative
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uncomfortable one. No such self-evaluation can occur when one is sub­
jectively self-aware since the self is not the object of attention and one 
is not aware of any discrepancies between one's observed 'performance1 and 
one's ideals, What characterizes the state of subjective self-awareness is 
the feeling of control and mastery over the environment. According to 
Duval and Wicklund, which state one is in at any particular moment is 
completely determined by one's environment, the decisive factor being 
whether one is aware of being observed by others or not. The longer one 
spends in a state of objective self-awareness, the more uncomfortable one 
becomes and the more one's self-esteem suffers (low self-esteem resulting 
from large discrepancies between observed and ideal self).
Despite the distinction they make between states of awareness, Duval 
and Wicklund see these as manifestations of a single self (which they call 
a causal agent self) under different circumstances. What is common to both 
states is the feeling of being the source of action and perception. This 
theory has the virtue of focussing on the dynamics of everyday interactions 
and avoids static concepts such as overall self-concept or self-esteem. 
However, they offer no model of how. our self ideals develop, nor how 
experiences modify behaviour. Canon (1974) is rightly critical of the 
mechanical nature of Duval and Wicklund's theory and its failure to grant 
the person any control over the switching between one state and another.
The theory also fails to allow internal perceptions and attitudes to play 
any part in how people respond to the different states Df awareness.
As shoCild be clear from the above account of the relationship between 
self-as-subject and self-as-object, the self— as-subject is not as open to 
empirical investigation as the self-as-object since the latter deals with 
one's conscious thoughts and feelings about oneself. Nevertheless, as 
Guardo and Bohan (1971) point out, both self-as-subject and self-as-object 
are hypothetical constructs which can be inferred from behaviour (including 
self-reports). The kind of investigation possible in each case is different, 
however. In exploring the self-as-object, one can ask people to comment 
directly on themselves, whereas exploring the self-as-subject requires a 
more indirect approach. Thus, when exploring children's sense of self- 
identity, Guardo and Bohen (1971) did not ask children to report directly 
on their experience of themselves but instead asked them if they could 
assume an identity different from their own (for example, a sibling or peer 
of the same or opposite sex) yet still retain their own personality.
Sense of self-identity was inferred from their responses, the 
assumption being that children would not recognize and could not 
handle the dilemma posed by the above questions unless they had 
developed some sense of self-identity.
The present study is an investigation of self-as-object only, 
children's conscious thoughts and feelings about themselves being 
inferred from their reports of themselves. Two aspects of self-as- 
object can be distinguished : one's perceptions of oneself (self- 
concepts) and one's feelings about oneself (self-esteem). These will be 
considered next.
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1.2.1 Introduction
Self-concepts and self-esteem are generally thought to be closely 
linked. Many theorists define self-esteem as the evaluative component
of one's self-concept or self-concepts (for example, Calhoun and Morse,
»
1977; Coopersmith, 1967; Farr and Kubiniec, 1972; Gergen, 1971; Germain, 1978; 
Rosenberg, 1965; Samuels, 1977). This definition is meant or implied by 
those who consider self-esteem to be one's attitude towards oneself 
(Coopersmith, 1967; Kaplan, 1971; Rosenberg, 1965). Thus, Kaplan 
distinguishes between self-concept and self-attitudes, the latter 
being the characteristic feelings aroused in the person by the consideration 
of his self— concept. These feelings range from self-acceptance and a sense 
of self-worth to self— rejection and self-derogation, Coopersmith (1967) 
argues that "attitudes towards the self, like other attitudes, carry 
affective loadings and have motivational consequences" (1968, p. 7).
And Rosenberg sees self-attitudes as similar to other attitudes in being 
classifiable along the same dimensions (content,intensity, stability, and so 
On), but different in being reflexive and in evoking unique feelings (for 
example, pride and mortification) not associated with other objects.
As the above quotes suggest, all these writers identify self-esteem 
as a feeling that is aroused when one contemplates one's self. This implies 
a distinction . between emotion and cognition, between the affective and the 
intellectual. Although these two processes may be distinguishable, many 
writers have argued that they should not be thought of as separate. Piaget 
for one regards the affective and the intellectual as inseparable : "all 
interaction with the environment involves both a structuring and an evaluation 
(so that) we cannot reason, even in pure mathematics, without experiencing 
certain feelings, and conversely, no affect can exist without a minimum of 
understanding or of discrimination" (1950, p.6 ). Others who support this 
view include Ellis (1962), Epstein (1973), McCoy (1977), Rychlak and Saluri 
(1973) and Soloman (1977). The latter rejects the notion that emotions or 
passions are irrational forces beyond our control. Instead, he proposes 
that "the passions are judgments, constitutive judgments according to which 
our reality is given its shape and is structure (p.xix). Furthermore,
"every emotion is a strategy, a purposive attempt to structure our world 
in such a way as to maximize our sense of personal dignity and self-esteem" 
(p.xx). Of reason, Soloman says that there is no ultimate distinction 
between reason and passion, and that together they are the means of 
'constituting', not merely understanding the world. According to Epstein
(1973), the link between thinking and feeling is such that people's personal
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for an emotion to occur a construct of some importance to the individual 
must be implicated.
Evidence to support these views comes from research by Schachter and 
his colleagues, reviewed by Kleinke (1978), on the labelling of physiological 
states. According to Schachter, what distinguishes between emotions such as 
anger, anxiety or elation is not the nature of the physiological arousal but 
what is happening in the environment. His research suggests that we use 
external clues in order to identify (or label) exactly what we are feeling.
In an analagous way, people form attitudes, interpreting their feelings in 
terms of past experience and present circumstances. Thus, cognitions 
(labelling) and emotions are inextricably linked.
1.2.2 The relationship between self-esteem and values
Equating self-esteem with the feeling aroused when one contemplates 
one’s self leaves unexplained why we feel good about ourselves on some 
occasions and bad on others or why some people never feel anything other 
than self— derogation. The answer is that attitudes involve values as well 
as feelings. As Rosenberg (1965) has pointed out, we can distinguish between 
self-estimates (how one rates oneself on a particular skill or characteristic), 
self-values (how much one cares about this skill or quality) and self-esteem 
(the feeling aroused when one succeeds or fails in a sphere one values 
highly). Rosenberg’s data, based on a large-scale study of 15 to 18 
year olds, supports his contention that, if one values a quality highly, 
then one*s self-estimate with regard to that quality will be closely related
to one’s self-esteem. Pioreover, his results clearly showed that those
adolescents who felt they excelled at a quality ( such as academic success) 
were more likely to value it and, correspondingly, those who valued it were 
more likely to believe they excelled at it. Coopersmith (1967) offers further 
evidence to support this idea.
As for the choice of values, Coopersmith (1967) argues that it is 
obvious from the very fact that some people have low self-esteem that we 
cannot alter our values at will in order to match our various achievements.
Our values are principally those of the community to which we belong and we 
are unlikely.-to use independently derived standards as a major basis for 
judging our own worth. If it is true that social norms generally function 
as self values, then failure according to a norm is more likely to be 
handled by an inflated estimate of o n e ’s performance than by a. rejection
of the valued activity itself.
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As has already been argued, self-concepts and self-esteem are 
complementary aspects of our experience of ourselves. However, it 
has been proposed by some that they possess distinct motivational 
properties that are contradictory and mutually exclusive. Associated 
with self-esteem is the drive for self-enhancement while associated withi ---------------------------
self-concept is the drive for self-consistency. We will consider each of 
these theories in turn.
According to self-enhancement theory, we have a basic need for 
positive self-esteem, preferring to view ourselves favourably whenever 
we can ( Argyle, 1967;‘Becker, 1972; Gergen, 1971; Rogers, 19515 Sullivan, 1953; 
Wylie, 1979). Both Sullivan and Becker claim that this need derives from 
the way favourable self-esteem protects us against anxiety. However, 
Sullivan’s explanation of the relationship between self-esteem and anxiety 
seems circular, with anxiety and low self-esteem being indistinguishable 
in his account. (Nevertheless, there is evidence that expressions of 
anxiety are associated with reports of low self-esteem).
Wylie (1979) provides the clearest statement of this theory : "common 
sense and numerous personality theories agree that human beings have a 
strong, lifelong need to maintain a favourable self-concept. In one 
sense, a favourable self -concept could mean simply that o n e ’s self- 
characteristics, acknowledged faults included, make one a person worthy 
of love and respect from self and others. But in our culture, at least, 
having a favourable self-concept clearly implies that one experiences a 
rewarding sense of competence in manipulating the physical environment and 
that one thinks one has relative superiority to others on a variety of 
salient traits (the particular traits which are salient differing from 
person to person). Unless the need to maintain a favourable self-concept 
in the latter sense is counteracted by some other typically rarer or weaker 
need (e.g., the need to reduce purely cognitive dissonance, or the need to 
expiate guilt through self-punishment, or the need to use self-denigration 
to avoid threatening an important other person), one would expect the need 
for self— enhancement to lead to a favourability bias in the self-concept and 
the corresponding self-reports" (p.665). Wylie reviewed the evidence for 
this occurring and reports that there is little or no self— favourability 
bias evident when people are asked to recall or estimate their previous 
attainments or grades. Since students will have been told their grades in
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self-favourability biases become more evident as the availability of 
realistic knowledge about o n e ’s achievements or abilities decreases.
Thus, a distinct tendency towards self-favourability bias becomes evident 
when students are asked to estimate their future performances on clearly 
described cognitive tasks (for example, an arithmetic test). And an even 
greater trend shows when students estimate their standings in more or less 
vaguely described abilities such as their abilities to do schoolwork. 1
(This is despite the fact that the same students give an accurate account 
of their past attainments). There is also evidence that self-favourability 
biases operate for self-reports of a variety of personality characteristics.
The same point has been made by attribution theorists. Thus, Dones and 
Nisbett (1971’) have shown that causal explanations for one’s own behaviour 
differ from our explanations of the same behaviour performed by someone else. 
The reason suggested for this is that actors and observers differ in their 
visual perspectives, in their motivations, and in the information available to 
them. Fisen (1979) has shown that,when actors and observers have the same 
information available to them, they tend to make the same causal attributions. 
Thus, the self-serving biases that typically characterize our explanations 
of our own behaviour are reduced considerably when we also know how our 
behaviour appears to others.
The first major formulation of self-consistency theory, the idea that 
we strive constantly to maintain consistency among our self-concepts, came 
from Lecky (1945). Numerous writers since have agreed that this is a 
pervasive feature of our behaviour (for example, Argyle, 1967; Berger, 1966; 
Festinger, 1957; Purkey, 1970; Rogers, 1951; Shaffer and Shoben, 1956).
Thus, Shaffer and Shoben (quoted by La Benne and Greene, 1969) claim that 
"Because the self-concept shapes new experiences to conform to its already 
established pattern, much behaviour can be understood as a person’s attempt 
to maintain the consistency of his self-concept, a kind of homeostasis at 
a higher psychological level" (p.94).This is in line with Festinger*s(1957) 
cognitive consistency theory which proposed that we are motivated to maintain 
consistency between our behaviours and our attitudes. Thus, if we behave 
in a certain way, we try to see our attitudes as consistent with this 
behaviour. And if we hold certain attitudes, then we try to behave (or at 
least interpret our behaviour) as being consistent with these attitudes.
Festinger’s theory is limited by its failure to specify the conditions 
under which dissonance is induced and the mechanisms by which it can be
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conclude that there is evidence that we are made uncomfortable by perceived 
inconsistencies in our behaviour and seek to eliminate them. This is 
especially so if we chose to behave thus (rather than being made to do so) 
and if we believe our actions to be of some consequence. The existence of 
a general drive toward self-consistency does not preclude the presence of 
certain inconsistencies between different parts of the self. However,
Gergen (1971) has listed three factors which can reduce the potential 
conflict. First, the drive towards self-consistency presumably can only 
operate when the person becomes aware of the inconsistency, which may never 
happen if the two manifestations of self remain widely separated by 
circumstances. (Duval and Wicklund, 1972, maintain that we can only 
recognize contradictions within ourselves when we are in a state of objective 
self-awareness, that is, aware of ourselves as objects). Second, the 
dissonance experienced may be greatly lessened if little value is placed 
upon one of the inconsistent manifestations of the self. And third, since 
we presumably learn to ,dislike inconsistencies (rather than instinctively 
avoid them), individuals can vary in the extent to which such dissonance causes 
them distress, suggesting that we may have been trained more or less to avoid 
inconsistencies. This point has also been made by Glass (1968) who notes that 
many studies have shown that people differ in their reactions to inconsistency- 
arousing situations and he speculates that people may differ in their tolerance 
of inconsistency. Some evidence suggests that people of chronic low self­
esteem tolerate inconsistency poorly and readily accept contrary information.
Accounts of the mechanisms we use to maintain self-consistency have been 
provided by Loevinger & Wessler (1970), Rischel & Mischel (1977), Rosenberg 
(1968), Secord (1977), and Wegner & Vallacher (1977). The fullest 
statement is given by Secord (1977) in summarizing the theory of interpersonal 
congruency. This is a version of cognitive consistency theory as applied to 
relations with others. It is based on the assumption that "people actively 
maintain their characteristic selves" (p.46), stabilizing their behaviour 
through the use of four principles or mechanisms. First, we selectively 
interact with others so as to maintain unchanged our attributes and 
behaviour patterns, choosing to mix with those who will support our existing 
characteristics as we view them, (in his brief summary, Secord does not 
mention the possibility that we may sometimes choose to alter our behaviour 
and our attributes for other reasons than inconsistency). If we cannot 
choose who to mix with, then we can always cognitively restructure the actions 
of others in order to maximize confirmation of our views of ourselves (that 
is, we misperceive what they say or do). We also selectively evaluate the
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some change on our part. Finally, tie learn ways of presenting ourselves 
and of acting that evoke particular behaviours from others which will 
support our characteristic behaviour patterns and selves. The principle 
underlying the operation of these four mechanisms is interpersonal 
congruency, "a consistency principle requiring compatibility between self- 
concept, behaviour, and the reflected views and actions of other persons" 
(Secord, 1977, p.47).
As previously stated, the hypothesized drives towards self-enhancement 
and self-consistency can be seen as incompatible, leading to rival 
predictions about people*s behaviour. Self— enchancement theory assumes that 
we are motivated to evaluate ourselves favourably at all times and predicts 
that we will respond positively to those who evaluate us favourably. Self- 
consistency theory predicts that we will accept the evaluations of others 
only when they are in accord with our existing self-evaluations, regardless 
of whether these evaluations are favourable or unfavourable. Some authors 
have come down firmly in favour of self-consistency theory. Thus, Webster 
& Sobieszek (1974) dub self-enhancement theory the 1 maximization myth*, 
claiming that their (highly.artificial laboratory) studies show no evidence 
that we consistently overlook or discount negative evaluations and accept 
positive ones. Nor did they find any evidence that some people at least 
distort information in this way or alter their choices in order to gain 
approval from those who are judging their performance. Despite preferring 
consistency theory, Webster & Sobieszek were unable to test its merits 
with their particular data.
Wylie (1979) reviewed studies which examined people*s reactions to 
others after being evaluated by them. Studies of this kind have usually 
attempted to manipulate self-esteem in the experimental situation rather 
than measure chronic self-regard. The majority of such studies show that 
attraction towards and/or evaluation of others is a positive function of 
manipulated self-regard. The results generally support self-enchancement 
rather than self-consistency theories. Although critical of this kind of 
study, Wells & Marvell (1976) report that people with high self-esteem 
do appear to react differently to such experimental manipulations than do 
people with low self-esteem. High self-esteem subjects have been shown 
in a number of studies (for example, Pepitone, 1964; Eagly & Whitehead,
1972; Colman & Olver, 1978) to be more receptive to positive information 
and less receptive to negative information (that is, showing fewer changes 
in self-esteem following the receipt of negative feedback) than low self­
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feedback forms of manipulation. The most likely explanation of this is that 
negative results are more congruent with existing evaluations of oneself 
held by low self-esteem subjects, and are thus more readily assimilated.
A number of studies have found support for both hypotheses depending 
upon the exact circumstances (Eagly and Acksen, 1971; Eagly and Whitehead, 
1972; Fitch, 1970; Dones, 1973; Maracek and Mettee, 1972). Thus, Oones (1973) 
found that when subjects estimated the evaluations of others for themselves, 
the self-consistency prediction was supported, but when evaluations of others 
were manipulated by the experimenter the self-enhancement prediction was 
fulfilled. With college students, Eagly & Acksen (1971) found that 
favourable information about oneself was only accepted when one does not 
anticipate being evaluated in the future. Thus, knowing that one is to 
undergo public scrutiny keeps one’s self-estimates modest and realistic.
In a related study, Eagly & Whitehead (1972) showed that undergraduates 
tended to raise their self-evaluations following favourable feedback after 
a task, but only if the favourable feedback seemed gratuitous. If they had 
chosen to be told how well they’d done, then they were less inclined to 
accept that they had done well and more inclined to believe it when told 
they had done poorly. Thus, taking responsibility for o n e ’s self-estimates 
also helps keep them modest and realistic. In a similar study, naracek & 
fiettee (1972) found that people with low self-esteem are actually made 
uncomfortable by successes that they can attribute to their own skills.
When the same people are led to attribute their successes to luck, they 
derive more satisfaction from their performances and stop trying to inhibit 
their efforts.
Attempts to sort out these complications have been made by 3ones (1973) 
and by Wegner & Vallacher (1977). Dones argues persuasively that self- 
consistency theory can be subsumed by self-enchancement theory. He suggests 
that people react to the evaluations of others in terms not only of its 
present but also its future implications for self-esteem enhancement. Much 
as the person of low self-esteem would like to believe a favourable 
evaluation from another, the implications of living up to this standard 
might be rather frightening. Hence, self-esteem needs may be forfeited 
at the time, especially when the person expects his actual successes and 
failures to be made public. Thus, an apparently self-consistent response 
can be construed in terms of the need to enhance (and protect) self-esteem. 
3ones offers evidence in support of this interpretation which is also in 
line with the argument, proposed earlier, that self-concept and self­
esteem are complementary.
Dones offers another argument showing how self-consistency 
interpretations can be explained in terms of self-esteem theory. The 
favourable evaluations of others are presumably more rewarding to a person 
if they can be attributed to his own characteristics ('he likes me because 
of the kind of person I a m 1) rather than to outside factors ( ’he likes me 
because h e ’s the kind of person who likes everybody'). Similarly, 
negative evaluations from others are all the more damaging to one’s self­
esteem when one sees oneself as the cause of the a/aluation. Presumably, 
when the evaluations of the other person are consistent with one's own, 
then one is more likely to attribute the cause of the evaluation to oneself 
than to outside factors. Thus, an apparently self-consistent reaction can 
be explained in terms of an interaction between causal attribution and self­
esteem needs. Dones hypothesizes that, when a person is accepted or liked 
by others, the more self-consistent their evaluations of his characteristics, 
the more he will be attracted to them; when a person is rejected or disliked 
by others, the more self-consistent their evaluations, the less he is 
attracted to them. To support this hypothesis, he cites evidence showing 
that people prefer self-consistent evaluations from others when they feel 
they are accepted or liked by them, but prefer inconsistent evaluations from 
those who dislike or reject them. Within the rather narrow limits Dones sets 
himself, his evidence is persuasive, with the enhancement of self-esteem 
being seen as the guiding factor in such social interactions (rather than 
maintaining stable self-concepts). Dones speculates that self-esteem is 
most involved in those studies where subjects are the direct recipients of 
evaluations from others, whereas self-consistency theory provides sufficient 
explanations in those studies where the subject merely observes.
Another interpretation of the evidence is offered by Wagner & Vallacher 
(1977). They see the type of reaction as being important. When a person’s 
cognitive reactions to failure are assessed,' consistency seems to be more 
important; when a person’s emotional reactions are assessed (as when 
feelings about the assessor are measured), then enhancement seems to be the 
dominant motive. Another important factor is whether the task is perceived 
as depending on skill or luck. When success is seen as depending upon 
luck, enhancement is dominant; when skill is seen as the crucial factor, 
consistency is more important. A third factor concerns how certain people 
are about their tendency to fail. Those who are certain they will fail 
operate according to consistency principles, whereas those who are less
certain will favour self-enhancement.
As is clear from the above account, there are a number of constraints
upon the views that we formulate about ourselves. Much as we would like
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to think of our behaviour and performances favourably, we can only do 
so when there is no contradictory evidence for others to see (for example, 
public examination results), when we ourselves can observe nothing 
inconsistent in our own behaviour and when we do not expect to have our 
self-evaluations put to the test. For those whose self-esteem is low 
anyway, there are even more constraints. It will not be possible to 
control all these factors in the present study, but there will be the 
opportunity to examine the extent of self-favourability biases in children 
of different ages when actual attainments as well as the opinions of 
others are known.
Ule turn next to an examination of some of the problems involved in 
measuring self-esteem.
-22-
1.3 THE MEASUREMENT OF SELF-ESTEEM
1.3.1 Introduction
The concept of self-esteem can be defined in several ways, each 
definition involving a different approach to measurement. Wells and Marwell 
(1976) describe three basic procedures whereby a person’s self-descriptions 
can be translated into an evaluative rating, that is, a self-esteem score.
In direct evaluation, we are asked to report our evaluation of our overall 
worth. In explicit derived evaluation, self-esteem is derived from the 
correlation or discrepancy between real self and ideal self ratings on the 
same set of items. And in implicit derived evaluation, the commonest 
approach, the self-esteem score is simply the sum of a series of self- 
descriptions. These three approaches will now be discussed in turn.
1.3.2 Direct evaluation
The direct evaluation approach to measuring self-esteem requires us 
to give an overall evaluation of our worth. Rosenberg's (1965) 10-item 
Guttman-type scale is perhaps the best-known example. The assumption 
underlying this approach is that self-esteem is a global feature of our 
experience of ourselves rather than a series of-specific features.
A number of writers are critical of this notion. Thus, Samuels (1977) 
maintains that our evaluations of ourselves in different areas are quite 
independent of each other, so that we do not accept or reject ourselves in 
a total sense. Overall self-esteem is thus no more than an averaging 
of our evaluations of ourselves in different areas. Each evaluation 
will correlate with the overall evaluation but not necessarily with other 
specific evaluations. Similarly, Harter (1978) defines self-esteem as o n e ’s 
perceived competence and suggests that this competence can manifest itself 
in at least three areas - cognitive, social, and physical. Presumably we 
evaluate ourselves differently in each of these areas, which means that 
self-esteem is not a uniform construct. Even Coopersmith (1967), one of 
((the champions of the notion of global self-esteem, has recognized that we 
may evaluate ourselves differently in different areas or roles, and 
accordingly included several sub-scales in his Self-Esteem Inventory to 
account for this. Other writers to criticize the notion of global self­
esteem include Bern (1972), Gergen (1971) and Wylie (1974). The latter 
considered the notion dubious, partly because of the difficulty of defining 
so broad a concept and partly because people may not be characterized by 
such wide behaviour-determining inferred states. Moreover, Wylie considers 
that the construct validity of measures of global self-esteem has never 
been properly established.
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The explicit derived evaluation approach to the measurement of self­
esteem identifies self-esteem as a function of the discrepancy between o n e ’s 
actual self— concepts and o n e ’s ideal self-concepts. Numerous writers have 
defined self-esteem in this way (for example, Argyle, 1967; Coopersmith & 
Feldman, 1974; Silber and Tippett, 1965; Turner, 1968; Wylie, 1968),
Although it is not always made explicit, presumably one’s ideal self-image 
represents the standards, one would like to attain in the activities one 
values. Self-esteem is presumably the feeling aroused when one 
contemplates the gap between one's self-perceptions and one’s ideals (rather 
than the gap itself), Most studies which have used such discrepancy 
measures haVB used the size of the discrepancy as an indication of the 
strength of feelings aroused and have not checked to see whether the actual 
feelings aroused matched the size of the discrepancy.
The reason why it may be important to check is that people may have 
different things in mind when they describe their ideal selves, Rosenberg 
(1965) has identified three possible kinds of ideal self : the fantasy self­
ideal (what it would be nice- to be like), the ego ideal (what one thinks one 
should be like), and the committed self-ideal (what one has more or less 
realistically staked oneself on becoming). Argyle (1967) makes a not 
dissimilar point, suggesting that efforts to attain the ’ego— ideal* may 
take two forms : one may make efforts to project a certain self-image 
(Rosenberg’s ego ideal), or one may ignore external appearances and 
concentrate on actual attainments that match one’s ideals (Rosenberg’s 
committed self-ideal). We might expect the feelings aroused by the 
discrepancy between one's actual self-image and one's ideal self-image to 
vary according to which kind of ideal.self is meant. The strongest feelings 
would be aroused when one perceives that one has fallen short of o n e ’s 
committed self-ideal.
Evidence for the construct validity of discrepancy measures of self- 
esteem comes from studies by Coopersmith (1967) and Silber and Tippett 
(1965). Strongest evidence comes from the thorough and thoughtful study 
of 17 to 20 year olds by Silber and Tippett who used several measures of 
self-esteem, including difference between actual and ideal self on a 
repertory grid. Using a multitrait-multimethod matrix as advocated by 
Wylie (1961, 1974), they found that the grid discrepancy measure 
successfully distinguished between those who were high in self-esteem and 
those who were low (although it failed to identify those who were 
inconsistent). Further evidence comes from a study by Coopersmith (1967) 
who got 10 to 12 year old boys to Q-sort the items of his Self-Esteem
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From this, he derived an ideal— self score which correlated at a 
statistically significant level (r = *59) with the normal SEI scores.
An examination of the discrepancies between these ideal-self scores 
and the SEI scores showed that boys with high SEI scores had low 
discrepancies whereas boys with low SEI scores had high discrepancies.
This means that boys with high self-esteem not only set themselves high 
standards but were also more likely to feel that they had approached 
those standards. Despite setting themselves lower standards, the boys with 
low self-esteem evidently felt that they fell well short of them.
There are reasons for thinking that a moderate discrepancy between 
o ne’s actual self-image and one’s ideal self-image might be preferable 
to no discrepancy at all, Argyle (1967) suggests that, even when we attain 
our ideals, often we proceed to upgrade them, "as if the very entertainment 
of fantasies, and the anticipation of the quest are a source of 
satisfaction” (p.119).
1.3.4 Implicit derived evaluation
The implicit derived evaluation approach to measuring self-esteem is 
the one most commonly used. It involves averaging a series of self­
descriptions or self-evaluations, thereby assuming that self-esteem manifests 
itself at both global and specific levels. This is the view proposed by 
Argyle (1967). He sees self-esteem as having ”a stable core, together with 
a series of peripheral esteems based on relationships with different 
groups of people” (p.12G) or on our performances in different spheres.
Evidence of the multidimensional nature of self-esteem comes from factor 
analytic studies_of measures of self-esteem. Reviewing such studies, Wells 
and Harwell (1976) note that it is rare for a single dominant factor to emerge, 
suggesting that self-esteem is not a unidimensional aspect of self-conception. 
Several studies have found self-esteem to be two-dimensional (positive self- 
evaluation and negative self-evaluation). Host factor analytic studies suggest 
that self-esteem is complex and multidimensional. Characteristically, Wylie
(1974) is stringent in her criticisms : "Factor analytic studies of instruments 
purporting to measure ’overall* self-esteem, self-acceptance, etc., lead one to 
believe that either there is no such measurable dimension as overall self-esteem, 
or at least some of the scales purporting to measure this construct are doing a 
poor job of it" (p.101).
Coopersmith*s (1959, 1967) 58-item Self-Esteem Inventory (SEI) is a 
good example of the implicit derived evaluation approach to the measurement
the present study, it will be quoted frequently in subsequent analyses. In 
her 1974 review of the methodological literature, Wylie cites only one 
study which factor analysed Coopersmith*s SEI (White and Richmond, 1970). 
Subsequent factor analyses have been reported by Bagley and Evan—Wong 
(1974), Kokenes (1974, 1978) and Richmond and White (1971). Much the 
largest of these is Kokenes* analysis of the scores of over 7500 subjects 
between 10 and 14 years. At each age level the main factor accounted for 
at least 50% of the variance, but it was not the same factor each time. 
Neither of the other studies obtained main factors as strong as this and 
all three studies confirm Wells and Harwell’s conclusion that self-esteem 
is multidimensional. This is not to say that the subscales of the SEI 
accurately reflect the multidimensional nature of self-esteem. None of 
the factors that emerged in the studies cited above can be matched 
convincingly with any of the subscales. And a study by Dyer (1964) (cited 
by Shavelson et al., 1976) confirms these doubts about their validity.
Dyer used the multitrait-multimethod approach recommended by Wylie (1974), 
matching the subscale scores of the SEI with semantic differential 
measures of the same four aspects (myself, family, friends,and schoolwork). 
Convergent validity for the^ four subscales was reasonable, but discriminant 
validity was not. Dyer concluded that the construct validity of the sub­
scales failed to be supported.
Analyses of other measures of self-esteem based on the implicit derived 
evaluation approach reveal similar problems of interpretation. Wells and 
Harwell (1976) have discussed the many problems associated with deriving 
a self-esteem score from a series of self— evaluative items by summing the 
responses. One problem is that one has to assume that the items are matched 
equally for every person, an assumption which is surely not justified. They 
discuss various ways of getting round this problem but conclude that, as yet, 
there is "little empirical evidence that more sophisticated systems for 
constructing self-esteem scores are appreciably superior to simple unit— 
weighting"(p.104). Despite the above problem, Wells and Harwell conclude 
that the evidence indicates that measures such as Coopersmith's SEI do 
measure something reliably,.even if it is not always clear what that 
something is.
The present study will attempt to clarify some of this confusion.
Two measures of self-esteem will be used, representing the second and third 
of the approaches described above. The main reason for not using the direct 
evaluation approach as well is that its validity with young children must be
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considered doubtful because of their relative inability to thirk of 
themselves as totalities, to integrate their various selves (Breger,
1974). The explicit derived evaluation measure will be similar to 
the repertory grid discrepancy measure used in the Silber and Tippett 
(1965) study cited above. As previously stated, the implicit derived 
evaluation measure will be Coopersmith*s SEI. Besides examining the 
relationship between these two measures of self-esteem, the study will 
also look at their respective relationships with two measures of academic 
self-concept and various measures of achievement, intelligence, popularity, 
etc. One of the aims will be to establish the relative contribution of 
each of the variables to self-esteem.
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1.4.1 Introduction
When we compare the hypothesized sources of self-concept and of 
self-esteem, it is clear that there is considerable overlap between 
them. Despite this, Argyle (1967) is the only author who states explicitly 
that the development of both self-concept and self-esteem depend upon the 
same factors. If we accept the definitions of self-esteem as the feeling 
aroused when one contemplates the discrepancy between one's actual self- 
image and one's ideal, self-image, then it is obvious that the development 
of self-esteem is linked closely with that of self-concept. In the 
following account, the two will be considered together, with any 
distinctions being made as necessary.
First, we must consider briefly the origins of self-hood. It is 
usually argued that the sense of self arises out of interactions with 
others. Brooks-Gunn and Lewis (1978) suggest that the initial 
differentiation of self from others depends upon the development of the 
awareness of the permanence of people. This occurs around the age of 
eight or nine months. According to the symbolic interactionists, 
subsequent learning about oneself takes place through interactions with 
others. Thus, Becker (1972) claims that "the self cannot come into being 
without using the other as a lever” (p.35). Thus, we can only become 
objects to ourselves by first being objects to others and then "taking 
the attitude of the other”, that is, viewing ourselves as others might 
view us.
The specific form of this argument, proposed by a number of writers, 
is that the constructs we form about ourselves are essentially the same as 
those we form about others (Bern, 1967; Coopersmith and Feldman, 1974; 
Flavell, 1977; Hastorf et al., 1958; Kelly, 1955; Taylor, 1977; Turner, 
1968). Thus, Taylor states : "We can assume that the categories and 
encodings which are used in forming concepts of the self are essentially the 
same as those used in forming concepts of others : both are based on the 
perceiver's 'implicit theory of personality*. Thus, self-perception may 
be viewed as a special case of person perception, and self-concepts may 
be viewed as a special class of person conceptsu (p.358). Again, in his 
account of cognitive development in children, Flavell (1977) does not 
give a separate account of the development of self-cognitions on the 
grounds that there is so much in common with the development of cognitions 
about others.
self and the similarities between self-concepts and concepts about 
others, there is still the question of precisely hour our ideas and 
feelings about ourselves are formed. There is general agreement that 
three main processes are involved : observing how others behave 
towards us (Argyle, 1967; Breger, 1974; Coopersmith, 1967; Franks and 
Marolla, 1976; Luck and Heiss, 1972; NcNichael, 1977; Sullivan, 1953; 
and Ulegner & Vallacher, 1977); observing how we ourselves behave and 
perform (Bern, 1967, 1972; Coopersmith, 1967; Franks and Marolla, 1976;
Hebb, 1972; McMichael, 1977; Nisbett and Valins, 1971; Nisbett and Wilson, 
1977; Uegner and Vallacher, 1977); and observing how we compare with others 
(Argyle, 1967; Gergen, 1977; McMichael, 1977; Pettigrew, 1967; and Wegner 
& Vallacher, 1977), Other relevant processes have been cited (for example, 
role-playing, identification with significant others), but these can be 
seen as covered by one or other of the above processes,
A plausible account of how these three processes might relate to 
one another is given by McMichael (1977): "Firstly, self-concepts are 
assumed to have developed out of the child*s experience of effectiveness 
in mastering developmental tasks. As White (1959) claims, mastery alone 
is not only pleasurable but motivating. Secondly, self-esteem is taken 
to be promoted by the praise and rewards received from the family for 
such mastery, and also by the general climate of affection which both 
demonstrates the value of the child to his family and leads to his own 
perception of personal worth. Thirdly, the picture that the child 
constructs of his own significance and worth is thought to grow out of 
the process of comparison with his siblings and peers - a'process much 
heightened in the confines of the school where definitions of value are 
continually present” (p,H6), In McMichael’s account, self-concept arises 
out of perceiving one’s own level of mastery over the environment and 
comparing this with what others achieve. Self-esteem arises out of the 
value that others place upon these achievements, the warmth with which 
they are greeted by significant others and the importance which the 
child consequently attaches to them, A conviction of overall self-worth 
therefore depends upon mastery of areas which are valued by significant 
others and the general climate of affection and tolerance which surrounds 
all the child’s attempts at mastery.
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\,Q.z upservinq now Diners oenave towards us
One of the most influential ideas in social psychology has been the
notion fchst our knowledge of ourselves is derived principally (or even 
exclusively) from what others say to us and how they treat us. This idea
has been espoused by many writers (for example, Cooley, 1902; Dinkme>fex^ 1965
Hewitt, 1976; Laing, 1971; Sullivan, 1953). In a famous formulation^ Cooley
(1902) talked of the reflected or looking-glass self which he saw as having
three principal elements : "the imagination of our appearance to the other
person; the imagination of his judgement of that appearance;and some sort
of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification” (p.152). Laing (1971)
expresses this view eloquently: ”The others tell one who one is. Later
one endorses, or tries to discard, the ways the others have defined one.
It is difficult not to accept their story. One may try not to be what one
‘knows1 one is, in one's heart of hearts. One may try to tear from oneself
this 'alien* identity one has been endowed with or condemned to, and create
by one's own actions an identity for onself, which one tries to force others
to confirm. Whatever its subsequent vicissitudes, however, one's first
social identity is conferred on one. We learn to be whom we are told we are
(pp.93-95). Laing.suggests*that it is something of ah achievement to
realise that one is not necessarily who others take one to be.
Moreover, this is an uncomfortable experience: "There is a strong tendency
to feel guilt, anxiety, anger, or doubt if self-attributions are disjunctive
with attributions made about self by others" (p.152).
In Hewitt's (1976) account, symbolic interactionism takes the extreme 
view that we do not learn about ourselves or experience ourselves directly: 
"The person does not define himself as object 'from the inside out*. Rather 
we see ourselves as others see us: In the simplest sense, we learn to use 
the name given us by others; more subtly, all of the terms of value, respect 
hatred, liking, hope, social location, and definition that people apply to 
themselves, they learn from members of their families and the other groups 
to which they belong". Again, "The child does not learn to hate or respect 
himself by responding directly to his own conduct. Rather, he learns both 
the terms of reference he should use and their specific application to him 
from others who are significant to him as he grows up" (p.55). Hewitt 
acknowledges that we do not completely comply with others' expectations, 
but explains this in terms of partial failures in the socialization process 
rather than in terms of internally directed behaviour.
Meltzer et al. (1975) criticize this view :"If we are simply what
we believe each other to be, the self-fulfilling prophecy becomes the
major paradigm of social life: though this is true in some cases, it
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idea that we are what other people think of us. Others are often wrong, 
even unfair, seeing us more as they would like us to be than as we are.
It is what we make of their opinion that matters. Nevertheless, Soloman 
agrees that self-consciousness begins with our consciousness of others 
and of how we appear in their eyes. Since we learn our first self- 
conceptions in childhood, the more primitive structures of our sense of 
self are based on dependence and fear of rejection. The respect and 
opinions of others always remain the most central and entrenched of all 
our values and the key to our strongest passions.
Coopersmiti and Feldman (1974) have also rejected the notion that we 
become what others think of us. They note that, whatever the influences on 
us, we are ourselves responsible for the lessons we learn from them. Thus, 
although teachers can influence the development of a child’s academic self- 
concept, ultimately it is the child who constructs it. The teacher may 
provide the learning experiences and the encouragement, but the child's 
reaction to these depends upon his or her interpretation of what the 
teacher is offering. Children do not absorb things in a passive way:
"children sift, reject, seek and avoid information, they interpret 
experiences in the light of the concepts they have already formed; they 
do not accept information from adults they do not trust or who have 
rejected them as readily as they do from adults who they feel have accepted 
them and are trustworthy" (p.201). Attribution processes are also relevant : 
"Although teachers can attempt to provide children with success experiences, 
unless the child believes he is responsible for the successes and can 
attribute them to himself, they do not become part of the self-concept"
( p p . 2 0 0 - 1 ) .
A study by Thompson (1974) challenges the notion that our perceptions 
or evaluations of ourselves are simply reflections of how others see or 
evaluate us. Using semantic differential scales Thompson sampled the self- 
evaluations of 11 and 14 year olds and found little or no difference between 
those nominated by their teachers as maladjusted and those seen as well- 
adjusted. When the same children repeated the semantic differential 
according to how they thought others (parents, friends and teachers) saw 
them, it became clear that the 'maladjusted' group were well aware of the 
unfavourable views others held of them, yet (especially in the case of 
the 14 year olds) were able to maintain favourable evaluations of them­
selves despite this. This is in line with evidence reported by Nash (1973). 
He found that friendship cliques in both junior and secondary schools were
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composed ot pupi-is wno were uniTormxy regaroeo in  a Tavouraoie or 
unfavourable light by their teachers. Following the transition from 
junior to secondary school, new cliques were formed in accordance with 
the views of the particular children held by the new teachers.
This suggests that the peer group plays an increasingly important 
role in influencing children's self-evaluations, a point which Sullivan 
(1953) has made. He used the term 'reflected appraisal' to describe the 
W3y the evaluations of significant others are internalized by the child.
The importance of close friends during later childhood is in realizing 
that one's ideas can be shared by another, a process which Sullivan called 
'consensual validation*.: Mannarino (1978) found evidence that such
close friendships lead to more favourable self-concepts in 11 year olds.
There is also evidence that consensual validation is an important factor 
in one's choice of friends. Duck (1973) based his studies of the 
development of friendships on the assumption, derived from Kelly (1955), 
that the friends we choose are those who construe events in similar ways 
to ourselves, and that these similarities facilitate the formation of 
friendships by easing communication.
What the above studies suggest is that as children get older they 
learn to discriminate between the opinions held of them by different 
groups of 'significant others* and pay more attention to some opinions than 
to others. Thus, their self— conceptions are not simply reflections of 
what others say about them or how others treat them. This is true even 
when one considers the impact of the opinions of a single group of others, 
as can be seen from the research into the effect of teacher expectations 
on children's academic performances. Popularized by Rosenthal and 
Oacobson (1968) as the 'Pygmalion effect*, this has proved to be a more 
subtle phenomenon than was first envisaged. Reviews of the many attempts 
to replicate and extend Rosenthal and Dacobson's original findings can 
be found in Braun (1976), Dusek (1975), Entwistle and Webster (1973), Good 
and Brophy (1974), Grieger (1971), Leigh (1977), Martin (1977) and Nash (1976). 
Grieger (1971) suggests that experimenter bias has invalidated many studies, 
while Entwistle and Webster (1973) point out that few studies bothered to 
establish whether the children concerned placed any value on academic 
achievement or whether they were actually capable of achieving the levels 
artificially set for them. The above reviews agree that studies which used 
teachers* existing expectations have had better results than those that 
tried to manipulate them by providing false information about the 
children. Thus, a study by Seaver (1973) found that naturally occurring 
expectancies on the teacher's part (in this case, based upon performances
Dusek (1975) has made a useful distinction between 'teacher bias* 
and 'teacher expectancy', both referring to teachers' expectations of 
pupils* performances but derived from different sources. Teacher biases 
are based on impressions and information irrelevant to academic success, 
such as the child's appearance or name, or the reputations of their older
i
siblings. Teacher expectancies are based on sound, objective data 
regarding the child's abilities, such as the child's past attainments.
There is evidence that both teacher biases and teacher expectancies are 
related to children's achievements. Thus, it has been shown that 
children's achievements are affected by the expectations teachers form of 
them on the basis of such non-academic qualities as their physical 
attractiveness (De Meis and Turner, 1978), the reputations of their elder 
siblings (Seaver, 1973) and even the desirability of their first names 
(Garwood, 1976). Teachers* evaluations of children can be formed almost 
immediately they start school. Rist (1970) followed a group of children 
from kindergarten through to grade two and found that the teachers' 
subjective evaluations of the children in the second week of schooling 
led to differential treatment of different children and eventually resulted 
in the favoured children achieving higher scores on achievement tests.
A test of the respective strengths of teacher biases and teacher 
expectancies has been carried out by Crano and Mellon (1978) who re- 
analysed the data from Barker Lunn's (1970) major longitudinal study, 
using a cross— lagged panel correlation analysis. There was some evidence 
that teachers' evaluations were based upon accurate observations of the 
children's past attainments, but there was even stronger evidence of a 
tendency for children to bring their performances into line with the 
expectations their teachers had of them on the basis of other factors.
r"
Thus, we must accept that there is some substance to the 'Pygmalion 
effect*, at least as far as the naturally occurring biases and 
expectations of teachers are concerned. Leigh (1977) has pointed out 
that teacher expectations only have an effect when the child receives the 
'message'. Sometimes the wrong message is received and acted upon, a 
phenomenon which Hargreaves has dubbed the 'autistic self-fulfilling 
prophecy*. What this implies is that personal constructs act as 
intervening variables between teacher expectations (whether ‘biased or 
not) and actual performance. There is certainly evidence that teachers' 
evaluations influence children's opinions of themselves. Thus Nash (1973)
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used repertory grids to establish houi favourably teachers viewed their 
pupils and found that these evaluations were related to the teachers' 
estimates of both how clever and how academically successful the children 
were. More importantly, he found a correlation of *54 between the teachers* 
evaluations and children's estimates of their own academic standing in the 
class. This was despite the fact that the teachers were not evaluating the 
children's achievements specifically. Other evidence of the link between 
teachers* evaluations and their pupils' opinions of themselves comes from 
studies by Davidson and Lang (i960) and Goldschmid (1968). In a study of 
9 to 11 year olds, Davidson and Lang found that children with favourable 
self-images were more likely than not to perceive their teachers' feelings 
towards them as being favourable. Moreover, the children who perceived 
their teachers* feelings towards them as being positive had higher academic 
attainments and were rated more favourably by their teachers. And a study 
of 6 and 7 year olds by Goldschmid (1968) found that the more accurate their 
view of themselves (as indicated by the. degree of agreement between their 
self-concepts and their teachers' ratings of them) the more favourably they 
were viewed by those same teachers and the more popular they were with their 
peers.
Children's self-concepts are affected by their classmates* opinions of 
them as well as their teachers* opinions of them. A study by Brown and 
Cleary (1973) (quoted by Samuels, 1977) found significant agreement between 
teachers' ratings of children and their classmates* rating of them. A study 
by Phillips (1963) suggests that there might be a tendency for self-ratings to 
become increasingly congruent with the ratings of both teachers and peers 
as children get older. Dust as teachers* opinions of their pupils* 
academic potential may be based on relevant or irrelevant information, so 
might children's opinions of each other. Dion and Berscheid (1974) have 
shown that the physical attractiveness of children affects their classmates* 
judgments of them just as it does their teachers* evaluations.
We have seen that naturally occurring biases and expectations of 
teachers influence their pupils' academic performances. And we have also 
seen that the opinions and evaluations of both teachers and fellow pupils 
influence children's opinions of their academic capabilities. These 
opinions and evaluations will presumably be based upon observations of 
children's actual performances, thereby completing what we may think of 
as the third 'side* of a triangular relationship between children's 
attainments, their academic self-concepts, and the opinions of others.
The present study will enable us to examine the relationships between 
these three variables and to establish whether academic self-concept does 
act as an intervening variable between the other two. In addition
affect self-esteem, and whether these too act as intervening variables.
As yet, no study has examined both academic self-concept and self-esteem 
of children in the context of the opinions of teachers and fellow pupils.
In the present study, teachers* evaluations of their pupils will be measured 
according to the repertory grid technique used in the study by Nash (1973) 
cited above. Pupils* opinions of each others* academic abilities will be 
sampled according to the ranking technique also devised by Nash.
1,4.3 Observing how we ourselves behave and perform
The second process involved in forming self-concepts and self-esteem 
concerns what we learn from observations of our own behaviour, a process 
sometimes called self-attribution. Some writers take an extreme line on 
this issue. Thus, Bern (1967, 1972), Hebb (1972), Nisbett and Valins (1971) 
and Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have all argued that we cannot directly acquire 
beliefs about our internal * conscious* states but must make inferences about 
them based on our awareness of something else, that is, our observations 
of our own behaviour. Natsoulas (1977) has raised important objections 
to this point of view, but these are too closely argued to be summarized 
here. (Natsoulas does not deny that we use external cues in learning about 
our internal states, but argues that we have direct access to these internal 
states as well). The fullest account of self-attribution theory is given by 
Bern (1967). He proposed that our knowledge of ourselves derives from 
inferences we make after observing our own behaviour. Thus, we need to act 
in order to fully understand what our action is and who is acting. By our 
behaviour we define ourselves, both for our own benefit as well as for 
others. By doing, we become. Bern is not denying that we are capable of 
making subtle discriminations in describing our attitudes, but suggests 
that these are largely based on the kinds of cues potentially available 
to outside observers as well. In a later account (1972), he notes that 
neither the outside observer nor the individual himself is solely
dependent upon the individual’s overt behaviour but may also base inferences
on the circumstances in which the behaviour occurs. Thus, we interpret our 
own behaviour differently if we see that we are forced to do something
than if we see ourselves as having chosen to do it - we may infer that we
did not really brant to engage in this activity and do not really ’believe* 
in it.
Nisbett and Valins (1971) develop Bern’s thesis, suggesting that we
not only infer our beliefs and feelings from our own behaviour, but also
from our own autonomic behaviour. Such inferences act as hypotheses which
we then seek to confirm. Whether or not our beliefs or attitudes change
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of this theory is given by Nisbett and Wilson (1977). They agree that we 
do not have direct access to higher order cognitive processes and suggest 
that we are sometimes quite unaware of the existence of an event which has 
had an important influence on our behaviour. When we try to report on our 
cognitive processes, we do not do so on the basis of true introspection 
but instead rely on a priori, implicit, causal theories or judgments about 
the extent to which the particular event is a plausible cause of a given 
response. Smith and Hiller (1978) consider this too strong a statement, 
arguing that under certain conditions we are able to report accurately on 
our cognitive processes and that research should concentrate on 
identifying those conditions.
Modifications of Bern’s theory of self-perceptions have been put 
forward by Bandura (1977), Kleinke (1978), flarkus (1977) and Taylor (1975). 
Kleinke (1978) suggests that Bern would argue that all behaviours are 
caused by factors in the environment but that we only recognise these 
factors some of the time. If there is no obvious external factor 
explaining our behaviour, we infer that the cause lay in some attitude 
or intention of our own. Kleinke notes that it has been shown that self- 
perceptions change to match behaviour that has been altered through operant 
conditioning. Taylor (1975) argues that Bern’s formulation only applies when 
our decisions or attitudes have no clear implication for our future 
behaviour. When we have to live with the effects of our decisions and 
attitudes, we engage in a more time-consuming appraisal of various 
sources of information, just as Danis and Mann (1968) have suggested..
Taylor offers experimental evidence in support of his proposal. Harkus 
•(1977) suggests that we use information about our own behaviour to make 
inferences about our own internal states or dispositions or attitudes only 
when the behaviour seems to us to be related to the self-characterizations to 
be made and when they do not run counter to existing generalizations about 
ourselves* When we lack such generalizations concerning the behaviour in 
question, then our self— characterizations will undoubtedly be influenced 
by our observations of our own behaviour. Bandura (1977) points out that 
our actual performances, while a major source of information about our 
effectiveness, are by no means unambiguous. Depending upon what we expect 
to achieve, contradictory results ( even favourable ones) may be 
discounted and attributed to factors beyond our control.
The issue we have been discussing is whether we have direct access 
to our internal states or must infer them from our behaviour. What all 
the theorists cited above would agree on is that we can and do learn
number of authors have argued that these observations form the basis for 
our sense of personal efficacy and competence (Breger, 1974; Brisset, 1972; 
Coopersmith and Feldman, 1974; Franks and Harolla, 1976; Harter, 1978; 
McMichael, 1977; and Quandt, 1972). These writers suggest that self-esteem 
has two aspects, a sense of self-worth (derived from observing how others 
behave towards us) and a sense of competence (derived from observing how 
we ourselves behave). The notion of sense of competence as central to 
one’s sense of oneself is the specific form of a more general notion : that 
self— hood resides in agency. As Shotter (1974) puts it, "what seems to 
anchor me as a person in reality is the sense of responsibility that I 
can have for my own actions" (p.54). Elsewhere, Shotter makes an even 
more important point when he argues that our knowledge of both what is 
’inside* us and ’outside* us comes from action, not from thought.
The first writer to point out the importance of sense of competence 
was Robert White (1959, 1960). He defined competence as "an organism’s . 
capacity to interact effectively with its environment" (1959, p. 297) and 
sense of competence as "the cumulative product of one’s history of 
efficacies and inefficacies" (i960, p.104). White suggests that 
incompetence is always accompanied by a feeling of shame so that our self­
esteem suffers when we fail to accomplish some goal we think we should be 
able to achieve.
However, there are differences of opinion about the respective 
contributions of sense of competence and sense of self-worth to self-esteem. 
Brisset (1972), Franks and Marolla (1976) and Harter (1978) see sense of 
competence as the major source of self-esteem whereas Quandt (1972) credits 
the approval of others with greater influence. He argues that those self- 
concepts which are learned purely through self— observation and self- 
evaluation are usually limited to specific competencies and do not lead to 
evaluations of overall self— value. However, the majority of theorists 
reckon that sense of oompetence is a more stable and fundamental source of 
self-esteem than is sense of self-worth. In support of this contention, 
Harter (1974) has shown that the subjective sense of mastery does not always 
coincide with competence or success as defined by others. From a 
developmental point of view, sense of competence is seen as becoming 
increasingly independent of social approval. Evidence of this developmental 
trend comes from studies by Harter (1975) and Settles and Ham (1973).
In the present study, no attempt will be made to measure these two 
aspects of self-esteem separately. However, there will be an opportunity 
to examine the hypothesis that sense of competence becomes increasingly
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children’s academic self-concepts should match the opinions of teachers and 
classmates closely, while the academic self-concepts of older children 
should become less closely linked to the opinions of others.
1.4.4 Observing how we compare with others
I
The third major process involved in the formulation of self-concepts 
and self-esteem involves the constant comparisons that we make between our­
selves and others. As we have seen, theorists such as Kelly (1955) would 
argue that all our constructs involve such comparisons. As Watts (1969) puts 
it : "I define myself in terms of you; I know myself only in terms of what 
is ’other*, no matter whether I see the ’other' as below me or above me in 
any ladder of values” (p.106). Much earlier, this point had also been made 
by Stout (1904). In discussing the importance of others for the individual’s 
understanding of himself, he says : "Every advance in his knowledge of them 
is also an advance in his knowledge of himself; and conversely, every advance 
in his knowledge of himself is an advance in his knowledge of others"
(p.539). Pettigrew (1967) has brought together these ideas under the heading 
of social evaluation theory.’ One basic tenet of this theory is that "human 
beings learn about themselves by comparing themselves to others". A second 
tenet is that "the process of social evaluation leads to positive, neutral, 
or negative self-ratings which are relative to the standards set by the 
individuals employed for comparison" (p.243). Henderson, Long and Gantcheff
(1970) and Ziller (1973) would all accept this view, seeing the self as 
being progressively distinguished from others in terms of similarities and 
contrasts on various dimensions (for example, opinions, abilities).
Evidence of this comes from a major study by Livesley and Bromley 
(1973) of children’s descriptions of themselves and others. They report 
that there are marked similarities in content between children’s self- 
descriptions and their descriptions of other children whom they like. In 
addition, children seem to find it easier to say how others are similar to 
them rather than dissimilar. This suggests a close link between liking and 
perceived similarity and ties in with Rodin’s (1978) suggestion that liking 
and disliking are separate judgments based on distinct criteria rather 
than being reciprocal, that is, opposite ends of a single continuum.
Livesley and Bromley conclude that children's understanding of themselves 
and their understanding of others are reciprocal processes in development, 
each facilitating the other. There is a developmental trend observable 
in that, when young, children make few explicit comparisons between themselves 
and others but do so more and more frequently as they grow older.
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it becomes important who we choose to compare ourselves with or who is 
available for comparison. As Gergen (1977) puts it : "In the presence of 
the devout, we may discover that we are ideologically shallow; in the 
midst of dedicated hedonists, we may gain an awareness of our ideological 
depths" (p.153). The term reference group, which Samuels (1977) credits to 
Hyman (1942), is sometimes used to designate the group with whom we 
compare ourselves. Wylie (1979) argues that too little attention has been 
paid to the question of who makes up the reference groups for different 
people. Thus, do men always compare themselves with other men, and women 
with other women? Do people differ in the number and variety of others 
they use as reference points?
Wilson (1973) suggested that we form broad estimates of our abilities 
by comparing our performances with those of all others. However, knowing 
that those who are older or better educated than we are have surpassed us 
will not be a cause of despondancy. The comparisons that really matter 
are with a much smaller group of people whom we judge to be our peers in 
age, educational level, and so on. In a study of adolescents and under­
graduates, Wilson found some support for this argument. Similarly,
Samuels (1977) hypothesized that the position or status of one's 
reference group in society is not as important for self-esteem as is one's 
standing within the group. Confirmation of this comes from studies by Luck 
and Heiss (1972) with adults, and by Rogers et al. (1978) and Lewis (1972) 
with school children. Luck and Heiss found that the self-esteem of adults 
was not related to socio-economic status but was related to how they 
compared to similar others (on educational level). Rogers et al. (1978) 
found that correlations between children's self-concepts and their actual 
attainments were greater when calculated on a class— by— class basis than 
when the scores of children from a number of classes were analysed together. 
This was taken as evidence that it is one's immediate environment (such as 
one's class) that is relevant for one's self-concepts* Further evidence 
of this from an English study by Lewis (1972) who found that adolescent 
boys attending day ESN schools had more favourable self-concepts than a 
matched group attending normal schools. Moreover, the longer the boys 
had been attending ESN school, the more favourable their self-concepts were. 
Lewis' finding is in line with American studies which have shown that 
educable mental retardates integrated into normal schools had higher 
academic attainments but lower levels of self-regard than those who 
attended special schools. These studies confirm the idea that self- 
evaluations are based on comparisons within the immediate peer group 
rather than on wider social comparisons. And another study which makes 
a similar point comes from Barker Lunn (1970) who found that junior school
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boys of belouf-average ability had poorer academic self-concepts in 
non-streamed schools (where they would be comparing themselves with 
children ranging widely in ability) than in streamed schools (where they 
would be comparing themselves with children of more or less the same 
ability as themselves).
Further.clarification of the role of* reference groups comes from 
a study by Strang et al. (1978) which showed that children may use more 
than one comparison group and that their self-concepts vary according to 
which group they use. Strang et al. studied a group of belou»-average- 
ability underachieving, junior school children attending special classes 
for the educationally handicapped. Some were integrated experimentally 
into normal classes for half of each day and the whole group were re­
assessed at the end of a year. When the integrated children completed 
the Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale with their 'special* 
classmates in mind, their scores showed a substantial increases over the 
year, suggesting that they interpreted their integration into normal 
classes as a promotion. However, when they responded to the same 
questionnaire with their 'normal* classmates in mind, their scores showed 
a small drop over the year, suggesting that regular contact with more 
able and more successful children had highlighted some of their own 
deficiencies.
All these studies support the argument that comparing oneself with 
one's, peers is an essential part of the process of knowing and defining 
oneself. With respect to children's knowledge of their academic abilities, 
both Bloom (1974) and Nash (1973) claim that this is derived inevitably 
from comparisons with classmates. Nash argues that it is impossible to 
prevent children from learning their general position in class : "Whatever 
else children may learn or fail to learn at school, they learn this — to 
measure themselves against their classmates. It is just possible for a 
child to leave school unable to read. But is in inconceivable that > he 
should be unaware that this puts him at the bottom of the list. There 
is a sense, therefore,, in which it can be said that schools teach 
hierarchical levels of personal worth more successfully than anything else" 
(p.16). Bloom (l974) paints a similar picture. He distinguishes between 
explicit and implicit curricula in the school, the latter being the 
unspoken curriculum that teaches each student "who he is in relation
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to others" (pp.46-7). This lesson is learned more slowly than those 
taught in the explicit curriculum but is less easily forgotten. What 
happens is that the student continually judges himself against the 
standards set by himself, his teacher, his peers and his family.
Relative rather than absolute norms are the basis for most of 
these judgments. Longitudinal studies (for example, Bloom 1964) have 
shown that academic performance becomes increasingly stable with age.
Bloom argues that this is because the student, always comes to know 
more or less how well he has done on a task and that this information 
has a cumulative effect on his interest in particular tasks, his 
attitudes towards school in general and his perceptions of 
himself. Bloom suggests that by the end of their primary schooling, 
most children will have clear academic self-concepts,especially if 
they have been in the top or bottom third of the class for some years-
. Support for Bloom's claim that children's academic self-concepts 
become more definite with age comes from a study by Nicholls (1979).
He found an increasing congruence between children's estimates of 
their class rank in reading (with younger children overestimating their 
position) and their teacher's gradings of their reading attainments.
Thus, for 6 year olds, the correlations between childrens* and teachers* 
rankings were negligible, while for 8, 10 and 12 year olds, the 
correlations were *30, *37 and *76 for girls and *44, *55, and *67 for 
boys. •
There is also evidence to support the idea, proposed by both Nash 
and Bloom, that children learn how they compare with others in the class. 
Thus, Nash (1973) got the teachers and pupils of three classes (8, 10 
and 11 year olds) to independently rank all children in the class according 
to their abilities in number, writing and reading. The correlations
between the teachers* and the pupils* perceptions were highly significant 
at all three age levels. Although the teachers never told the children 
of their positions in class the correlation between the pupils* own 
estimates of their positions and the teachers' estimates of their ability 
was 0*71. Nash later extended this work to children in their first year 
at secondary school, also including pupils' estimates of each other's 
positions in class. He found correlations of 0*72 between a pupil’s 
estimate of his own position and his classmates' estimates of his 
position, Bnd of 0*69 between the teacher's perception of a child's 
position and his classmates' estimates of his position. Thus, there is 
clear evidence of an unspoken consensus of opinion concerning the.
relative standing of children within a class.
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The source of this consensus springs from the way each of the
variables concerned derives from, or is influenced by, one or more of
the other variables. Thus, as we have seen already, children's academic 
self-concepts are influenced by the opinions of both teachers and fellow 
pupils as well as by the direct observation of their own attainments as 
compared with those of their classmates. Similarly, children's opinions 
of each other will be influenced by the opinions of the teacher as well 
as by direct observations of the relative attainments of their classmates. 
The role of the teacher in all this is of obvious, but not over-riding , 
importance. Although the teacher defines the tasks and assesses the 
children's mastery of them, there is still a good deal of school work 
which is open to direct inspection and evaluation by the children 
themselves. (Thus, they can observe what level reading book a classmate
is using, or what page he or she has reached in a maths text book). As
for the opinions and evaluations that teachers express directly about 
their pupils, these may not carry as much weight as they ,might because 
they are not truly objective, often being partly based (as we have 
previously seen) on non-academic characteristics rather than academic 
performance (which is what the children themselves focus on). The present 
study will enable us to establish quite how dominant an influence the 
teacher is on the final consensus reached in each class room .
We have established that children's opinions of themselves are 
based partly on comparisons with an immediate peer group. At least 
as far as their opinions of their academic abilities are concerned, the 
peer group consists of their classmates. The evidence suggests that it is 
important to restrict analyses of the impact of such comparisons to 
individual classrooms in order to prevent valuable data being lost.- 
An important feature of the present study is that it deals with complete 
classrooms, examining each child's academic standing in the class and 
what relation this bears to his or her academic self-concepts and self­
esteem. The evidence cited by Nash (1973) and Bloom (1974) suggests that 
the opinions that children form about themselves on the basis of these 
classroom comparisons blend with the opinions formed by others till a 
consensus is reached on how each child compares with every other child.
The present study will enable us to examine the strength of this consensus 
in classes of different ages.
1,4.5 Other sources of self-concept and self-esteem
In this section, we will briefly consider three other hypothetical 
sources of self-concept and self-esteem : socioeconomic status, sociometric
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status, and identification with significant others. Concerning the 
first of these, it is sometimes argued that self-esteem is affected 
by the status of the social group to which one belongs. In extreme 
cases, there seems to be some evidence of this. Thus, Rosenthal (1974) 
studied all the children of a small American Indian tribe and found that 
they viewed white children much more favourably than themselves and took 
much longer than white children to form accurate racial identities. In 
another study, this time of 11 and 12 year old South Africans, Momberg 
and Page (1976) found clear differences between different racial groups 
in scores on Coopersmith1s SEI. Afrikaans children (from the dominant 
social group) had significantly higher scores than black children, the 
mean scores being 66 and 57 respectively. Non-Afrikaans white children 
had a mean score of 62. (These differences were not found among under­
graduates).
The above studies involved widely-divergent cultural groups. When 
socioeconomic (rather than racial) group differences are examined, self­
esteem does not appear to be implicated. In her major review of the 
literature, Wylie (1979) concludes that there is no good evidence of a 
relationship between socioeconomic status and scores on any of the 
standardized measures of self-esteem (including Coopersmith1s SEI).
However, Kaplan (1971) has argued that research in this field has usually 
been based.on the assumption that certain conditions existed at the 
different socioeconomic levels without any attempt being made to ensure 
that such conditions did exist in fact. Kaplan proposed four general 
conditions under which a relationship between self-esteem (or self- 
denigration) and social class would be observed : (l) social class 
would need to be a personally relevant criterion for self-evaluation,
(2) the person would need to be able to contradkhis own social class 
position with others, (3) exposure to positive or negative evaluations 
from others because of one's class, and (4) the failure of one's controls 
and defences to protect one's self-esteem. By carefully ensuring that all 
these conditions were met, Kaplan was able to demonstrate that lower socio­
economic status was significantly associated with feelings of self-derogation
The second hypothetical source of self-concept and self-esteem is 
sociometric status or popularity. Again, Wylie (1979) has provided 
the most thorough review. She reports that, in those studies which used 
standardized measures of self-concept or self-regard with normal (as 
opposed to disturbed) children, most found small but positive associations 
between sociometric status and self-regard. Thus, among older adolescents 
(15 to 18 year olds), Rosenberg (1965) found that reports of low self-
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situations, based on doubts about whether others really liked one 
or not. He also found that those low in self-esteem were less likely 
to be active participants in peer group situations and much less likely 
to be leaders. Both Gergen (1971) and Hoffman (1978) cite similar 
findings. However, the relationship between popularity and self-esteem 
is not always as clear-cut as these results suggest. Three studies which 
have used Coopersmith*s SEI and sociometric measures of popularity quote 
inconsistent results. In a study of 10 and 11 year old boys, Coopersmith 
(1959) found a correlation of *29 but failed to replicate this in a later 
study (1967). Smith et al. (1973) quote correlations of • 39 ( p C*05) 
for boys but *13 (n.s.) for girls.
Despite the inconclusiveness of the above results, Uylie (1979) 
recommends that, along with IQ and achievement, sociometric status is 
a variable for which one should control when studying self-esteem and 
self-concept.
Another hypothetical source of self-concepts in one's identification 
with significant others (Bandura, 1969; Gecas et al., 1974). Gecas et al. 
attempted an empirical test of the rival merits of two hypothetical 
sources of self-concepts : identification with significant others (which 
they called *modelling* theory) and the symbolic interactionist view that 
self-concepts are products of the reflected appraisals of others (which 
Gecas et al. call *mirror' theory). There is research evidence supporting 
both these views. Gecas et al. generated rival hypotheses from the two 
theories. From *mirror* theory, they hypothesized that parents* evaluation 
of the child should be positively related to the child*s self-concept.
From *modelling* theory, they hypothesized that the parents* self-concepts 
would be positively related to the child*s self-concept. The results 
favoured *mirror* theory, but the study suffers from methodological 
weaknesses that make the test inconclusive. Moreover, the hypotheses 
derived from *mirror* theory hardly does justice to the complexity of 
this process.
Of the three sources of self-concept and self-esteem touched upon in 
this section, only the second will be dealt with in the present study. 
Wylie*s argument for measuring sociometric status has been mentioned 
already, but the case for the relevance of the other two variables is 
much weaker, hence their omission.
-44-
1.5 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN1S SELF-CONCEPTS AND SELF-ESTEEM
1*5,1 Developmental changes in childrens descriptions of others
As already suggested, there are important similarities between the 
concepts we form about ourselves and those we form about others. Before 
examining studies of the development of children*s self-copcepts, we need 
to look .briefly at studies of the development of children*s concepts of 
others. Such studies have been conducted by Barenboim (1978), Brierley 
(1967), Livesley and Bromley (1973), Peevers and Secord (1973) and 
Scarlett, Press and Crockett (1971), All except the first of these have 
been reviewed by Rogers (1978) who considers the consensus among them to 
be impressive. As children mature* tl\ere is a general tendency for their 
descriptions of others to become increasingly abstract, increasingly 
differentiated and increasingly non-egocentric.
First, there is the tendency for children*s descriptions of others 
to move from the concrete to the abstract. Young children describe 
others in terms of physical characteristics, possessions, family back­
ground, and so on, As they get older, they refer increasingly to typical 
behaviours (always fighting, good at his work) and eventually to abstract 
qualities which summarize these behaviours (aggressive, intelligent).
Second, there is a tendency for children*s descriptions of others to 
become more differentiated as they get older. Young children tend to 
describe others in simple, global terms dividing them into good and bad, 
liked and disliked. As they get older, they are less inclined to evaluate 
others as totally good or totally bad and recognize that good and bad 
qualities may co-exist in the same person. One such distinction is that 
made between being intelligent and being good at schoolwork. Young 
children equate these two qualities whereas older children recognize that 
an intelligent child may do poorly in schoolwork through lack of effort 
or interest.
Third,there is the tendency for children*s descriptions of others 
to become less egocentric as they grow older. Young children refer to 
themselves a great deal when describirg others (for example, she is a 
friend of mine, he hits me) whereas older children give more *objective* 
accounts (for example, she is friendly to others, he*s always hitting 
people). Livesley and Bromley (1973) report that most of the terms used 
by 7 to 9 year old children indicate that they are not so much describing 
particular people as describing their own reactions to them. Livesley
-45—
1*5,2 Developmental changes in children's descriptions of themselves
The available research suggests that the developmental changes in 
children’s descriptions of others are matched by developmental changes in 
their descriptions of themselves. Evidence that children’s self- 
descriptions become less concrete and more abstract with age comes from 
several studies (Dersild, 1952; Livesley and Bromley, 1973; Secord and 
Peevers, 1974; Mohr, 1978; Montemayor and Eisen, 1977), Typical are 
the results obtained by Livesley and Bromley (1973) from a large sample 
of children between the ages of 7 and 15. They found that, as children 
got older, they use fewer statements referring to objective information 
about themselves (such as appearance, possessions), but more statements 
referring to personality characteristics and typical behaviours. Older 
children also made greater reference to their interests and hobbies, and 
to their beliefs and values. There was also evidence that the older 
children compared themselves more frequently with others and became more 
detached and dispassionate in their descriptions of themselves. These 
developmental trendswere similar to those observed in children’s 
descriptions of others, the main difference being that they made greater 
reference to preferences and aversions when describing themselves. Dersild 
(1952) found that intellectual abilities were only rarely referred to as 
a source of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, while greater reference was 
made to special talents (for example, in music or art) and to ability 
in sport and play.
There is also evidence that children’s self-descriptions become 
increasingly complex and differentiated with age (Leahy, 1976; Long et 
al., 1968; Mullener and Laird, 1971). Mullener and Laird found a 
significont increase with age (from 12 to 17 to 28) in the variability 
with which people evaluate themselves in different areas (for example, 
intellectual skills, social skills, physical skills). Thus, the younger 
children tended to rate themselves similarly in different areas. Moreover, 
they found that within each age group those with more uniform (less 
differentiated) ratings of themselves had more favourable total self- 
evaluation scores. (However, the measures used in this study were not 
standardized or validated in any way). Other evidence of the increasing 
moderation of children’s self-concepts comee from Leahy (1976) and Long 
et al. (1968). Using the semantic differential technique to assess 
the self-ratings of children between the ages of 6 and 13, Long et al. 
found a correlation of -*59 between mental age and the tendency to rate
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children’s judgments of themselves (and others?) tend to be less 
subtle, more black and white. Similarly, in a study of adolescents 
and young adults, Leahy (1976) found that ratings of self and of liked 
others became less extreme with age (although ratings of disliked others 
did not).
i
The above research indicates that children’s descriptions of them­
selves develop in the same way as do their descriptions of others. Llhen 
discussing the sources of self-concepts (section 1.4.4), we considered 
the argument that these two sets of constructs should be considered 
identical, in that we define ourselves in exactly the same terms in which 
we define others. This argument has been most cogently expressed by 
George Kelly (1955): a basic tenet of his personal construct theory is 
that we construe our own behaviour in exactly the same terms as we construe 
the behaviour of others. This is one of the major assumptions to be made 
in the present study as well. In this study, no sharp distinction will 
be made between description of self and description of others, the 
children's personal constructs being derived from their descriptions of 
others, -
Since some of the data are in the form of descriptions of others, 
we can examine these for evidence of the developmental changes suggested 
above. We can expect that, when older children describe others, they 
will (a) use a greater number of constructs, (b) use more abstract (as 
opposed to concrete) constructs, (c) have more differentiated construct 
systems, (d) make fewer references to themselves, and(e) be less inclined 
to see others as totally good or totally bad.
1.5.3 Cognitive development and the development of self-concepts 
and self-esteem
A number of writers have argued that the development of the self is 
linked to general cognitive development (Adams, 1976; Parnham-Diggory,
1966; Horrocks and Jackson, 1972; Kagan, 1967; Mohr, 1978). Kagan (1967) 
suggests that the interpretation that children place upon the way others 
behave towards them varies according to level of cognitive development. 
Thus, the parental behaviour that convinces an infant that he or she is 
a l/alued person will be insufficient to convince a four year old and a 
ten year old will need yet another set of experiences.
Several writers (Breger, 1974; Looft, 1972; Okun and Sasfy, 1977) 
have focussed on the implications for one's theory of oneself of thg
thinking, Okun and Sasfy (1977) argue that if, as Epstein 11973) and 
others have suggested, the self-concept functions as a self-theory, then 
the self-concept of the child at the concrete operational level of thought 
will differ in kind from that of the child at the formal operational level 
of thought. In fact, true self-concept in Epstein’s sense could not emerge 
until the development of formal operation thought when the capacity to 
handle abstractions and to develop theories first manifests itself. 
According to Breger (1974), young children may have various selves 
but will not be bothered by inconsistencies between them. The wish to 
unify one’s various selves only arises when the child reaches the stage 
of formal operational thought and can reflect upon his or her self- 
concepts and how they are related to one another.
Associated with this development are changes in the relationship 
between actual self and ideal self. According to Bannister and Fransella
(1971), the real self (as measured on repertory grids by the construct 
’like me in character') is less stable over time than the ideal self 
(as measured by the construct ’like I'd like to be in character'). They 
do not produce evidence for this, merely mentioning it as an ’observation*. 
The available evidence suggests that the opposite is the case, at least 
when a reasonably wide age range is considered. Thus, in a study of 
children between the ages of 6 and 15, Koocher (1974) found that the gap 
between real and ideal self Widened with age, with the ratings of real 
self staying much the same while ratings of ideal self rose steadily.
Among the youngest group (average age 7-j), ratings of ideal self varied 
considerably more than did those of the older children. These findings 
have been confirmed by Zigler et al.(l972) and Katz et al. (1975). Zigler 
et al. offer two possible reasons why the gap between real self and ideal 
self should increase with age. First, children learn higher standards of 
conduct for themselves as they grow older and have a greater capacity for 
feeling guilty when they fall short of these standards (that is, they 
judge themselves more harshly). Second, cognitive differentiation 
increases lith age, thus increasing the probability of a greater disparity 
between two such complex judgments as actual self and ideal self. Support 
for the latter suggestion comes from a study by Manaster et al. (1977) 
who found that developmental changes in the ideal self (what kind of person 
adolescents said they would like to be) were linked with their level of 
cognitive development (whether they were at the formal or conrete 
operational level of thought).
Apart from measuring general intelligence no attempt will be made 
in the present study to assess the children's level of cognitive
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development. Nevertheless, there will be opportunities to test some 
of the hypotheses just discussed. In particular, age differences in 
the relationship between actual self and ideal self will be examined 
for evidence of increasing discrepancies.
Having considered the nature, the measurement, the origins, and 
the development of general self-concepts and self-esteem, we now turn 
to the more specific question of how these two variables influence 
academic achievement. The next section will review what is known of the 
relationship between self-esteem and achievement. Subsequent sections 
will be devoted to the relationship between academic self-concept and 
achievement and to the contribution of attribution theory.
-49-
Wylie (1979) argues that the link between self-esteem and one's 
measured abilities and/or attainments is not a direct one, but depends 
upon one's perception of one's abilities and/or achievements. There are 
therefore two reasons why measures of self-esteem should correlate 
imperfectly with measures of ability and attainment. First, academic 
self-concepts themselves do not match either achievements or abilities 
exactly, being subject to a variety of distortions.’ Second, academic 
self-concepts will not match self-esteem exactly either, being more 
narrowly based. Moreover, not everyone values academic achievement to 
the same extent.
There is evidence to support Wylie's argument. Torshen (1969) has 
summarized studies of the relationship betwem self-concept and 
achievement and concludes that total self-concept and achievement correlate 
at about the *25 level, while academic self-concept and achievement correlate 
at about the *50 level. Similarly, UJylie (1979) reports that academic self- 
concept correlates more highly with attainments than does overall self­
esteem. However, some studies using measures of general self-concept and 
self-esteem have reported higher correlations. With underachieving 11 
year olds, Black (1974) found correlations ranging from *46 to *56 between 
scores on the Piers-Harris Children's 'Sel'f— Concept Scale and various 
achievement test scores. And Youngblood (1976) found correlations of 
between *40 and *45 between self-esteem (as measured by Rosenberg's 10- 
point scale) and achievement in various subjects. More typical are the 
findings of Brookover et al. (1967) who compared their Self-Concept of 
Ability Scale with Rosenberg's (1965) measure of general self— esteem in 
predicting academic grades among 17 year olds. The correlation of academic 
grades with self-concept of ability was *49.while with general self-esteem 
it was only *20. Moreover, the relationship between self-concept of ability 
and academic grades was scarcely affected when variation in self-esteem was 
controlled, the partial correlation being *46. On the other hand, the 
correlation between self-esteem and academic grades dropped dramatically 
to *06 when variation in self-concept of ability was controlled.
With one exception, studies which have used Coopersmith's Self-Esteem 
Inventory with children between the ages of 7 and 15 have found that 
correlations between SEI scores and achievement test scores range from 
•20 to *45 (Bridgeman and Shipman, 1978; Coopersmith, 1959, 1967;
Rubin, 1978; Rubin et al., 1977). The exception is a large-scale study 
of 11 to 13 year olds (Prawat, 1976) which found no significant 
correlations between SEI scores and achievement (-*03 for boys, *10 for
(Behrens and Vernon, 1978; Kifer, 1975; Kunce et al., 1972) have also 
yielded statistically significant results, with the exception of one 
study (Williams, 1973) which attempted to adapt the SEI for use with 
6 year olds. Kunce et al. (1972) tried to improve the ability of 
Coopersmith1s SEI to predict academic achievement by using only those 
15 items that correlated highly. However, in a study of 14 to 16 year olds 
they still found a correlation of only *20, statistically significant but 
accounting for little of the variance. Longitudinal studies reported by 
Rubin (1978) suggest that scores on Coopersmith's SEI correlate more 
highly with achievement test scores as children get older. One group 
of children tested when 9 and again when 12 showed increases from *21 
(for reading) and *24 (for arithmetic) to *28 and *31. Another group 
tested when 12 Bnd again when 15 showed increases from *30 (for reading) 
and *33 (for maths) to *42 and *41. For the 9 year old boys, SEI scores 
did not correlate significantly with either reading (*12) or arithmetic 
(•15), but the corresponding correlations for girls were much stronger 
(•32 for both subjects).
Less clear-cut are tbe results of studies by Kifer (1975) and 
Rosenberg and Gaier (1977). Kifer studied 7 to 13 year olds who had been 
in the top or bottom 20% throughout their school careers. Using an 
abbreviated form of Coopersmith1s SEI he found that the unsuccessful 
students had consistently lower scores than the successful group, but 
there was no progressive increase in this difference as he had hypothesized 
However, Rosenberg and Gaier (1977) found that when.the unsuccessful 
students attended special classes, their SEI scores were no different from 
those of their successful peers in normal classes.
Further evidence of the link between achievement behaviours and 
measures of self-concept or self-esteem come from studies by Bridgeman 
and Shipman (1978) and Shiffler et al. (1977). In a study of 9 year olds, 
Bridgeman and Shipman found that scores on Coopersmith*s SEI correlated 
well (between *24 amd *5B) with teachers' ratings of the children's 
perseverance and concentration in class. Similarly, Shiffler et al.
(1977) observed the classroom behaviour of 6 to 11 year olds and 
found that the more favourably children rated themselves, the more time 
they spent on legitimate classwork (r=*28, p . < *05) and the less time on 
irrelevant activities (r= -*35, p.< * 0 5 ) .
Only a few studies have taken account of intelligence when examining 
the relationship between measures of overall self-esteem or self-concept 
and achievement (Naylor and Gaudry, 1973; Rubin et al., 1977; and
self-esteem and self-concept do predict achievement but that their 
contribution is slight.
In the only one of these studies to use Coopersmith*s SEI, Rubin et al. 
(1977) found correlations with various achievement scores ranging from *22 
to *31. SEI scores correlated with IQ scores (obtained some yehrs previously) 
at the *31 level. Both IQ and socio-economic status correlated more highly 
both with attainments and with teacher ratings of various classroom behaviours 
than did SEI scores. To assess the independent contribution of self-esteem to 
school achievement, multiple correlation coefficients were calculated, using 
a step-wise multiple regression procedure. SEI score was found to make a 
statistically significant contribution to the prediction of achievement 
scores, but its contribution was slight. On. their own, IQ score and 
socio-economic status had multiple correlations with achievement measures of 
between *42 and *59; when SEI score was added to the equation, these 
correlations went up to *44 and •60. Rubin et al. argue that these findings 
suggest that both self-esteem and academic attainments should be seen as 
reflecting a common set of prior causes. A similar picture emerges from a 
study of 11 year olds by Stenner and Katzenmeyer (1976), They found that 
self-concept correlated best with verbal IQ (*50) and least with non-verbal 
IQ (*39), while correlations with various achievement measures ranged from 
•42 to *48. Both verbal and non-verbal IQ accounted for a greater proportion 
of the variance in achievement scores than did self-concept. Together, self- 
concept and non-verbal IQ accounted for between 29 and 38/6 of the variance in 
achievement scores.
The fact that measures of self-esteem and overall self-concept are so 
indirectly linked with actual achievement would explain why remedial 
programmes directed at students* self-esteem have been so unsuccessful.
Zirkel (1972) reviewed programmes which attempted to enhance the self- 
concepts or self-esteem of students who were failing academically on the 
assumption that improving self-esteem would lead to improvements in school 
work. The results have been largely disappointing. Best results were found 
in those programmes which were based on the regular curriculum (rather than 
on withdrawal sessions) or which used significant others (parents and 
teachers) as the agents of change.
None of the studies quoted establishes whether there is a one-way 
causal link between self-concepts or self-esteem and academic achievements.
As Wylie (1979) points out, it is intuitively plausible that academic 
success (or failure) should lead to approval (or disapproval) from
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significant others, and that this should in turn lead to increases (or 
decreases) in overall self-regard. It is also plausible that academic 
success should increase the sense of self— potency, which should in 
turn increase overall self-regard. However, the relationship could also 
function in the other direction, with unfavourable self-concepts 
producing a lack of confidence, a sense of helplessness when tackling 
academic tasks, with the result that achievement suffers. What is more 
likely is that, rather than a undiie ctional causal link, there is a 
continual two-way traffic between academic achievements and self-concepts 
or self-esteem, each influencing the other.
Whatever the nature of the causal link between self-esteem and 
achievement, it seems clear that we cannot expect the relationship to 
be a strong one. It is also clear that both academic self-concept and 
intelligence act as intervening variables between self-esteem and 
achievement and need to be taken into account (along with the evaluations 
of teachers and classmates). It may be that the present study will show 
that, when all these hypothetical intervening variables have been allowed 
for, self-esteem contributes relatively little to the prediction of 
academic achievement.
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1.7 ACADEMIC SELF-CONCEPT AND ACHIEVEMENT
1.7.1 Introduction
Academic self-concept is one of a number of variables which 
influence our approach to academic tasks* Phares (1976) has identified 
three such variables: achievement behaviours (actual attainments!, approach 
to study), achievement needs (desire to succeed, value placed on success), 
and achievement expectations (people’s estimations of the probability of 
achieving their goals, academic self-concept). The distinction between 
the value one places on success and one’s expectations for success is 
similar to the distinction that is sometimes made (for example, by 
Coopersmith, 1967) between aspirations (what one would like to achieve) 
and expectations (what one expects to achieve). UJe will now consider in 
turn the three variables identified by Phares.
1.7.2 Achievement needs
Phares* notion of achievement needs has two aspects : general 
attitudes to achievement (striving for success, avoidance of failure) 
and attainment value (what value we place upon success in particular 
spheres).
Concerning general attitudes towards achievement, Covington and 
Beery (1976) distinguish between striving for success and trying to avoid 
failure both being strategies for protecting one's self-esteem (that is, 
for protecting oneself from the awareness of a gap between o n e ’s actual 
performances and o n e ’s ideals). Each enables one to interpret failure 
as having nothing to do with one's ability. Students who strive for 
success typically have a history of success, deducing from this that 
they possess high ability and attributing any failures to other factors, 
such as lack of effort. Students who concentrate on avoiding failure 
typically have inconsistent experiences of success and harbour grave 
doubts about their abilities. Rather than put this to the test, such 
students use a variety of tactics (such as not trying) to ensure that 
their indifferent performances or actual failures can be attributed to 
something other than lack of aeMidbfeys, qbUiTy .
The second aspect of attainment, needs is the notion of attainment 
value, the value we place upon succeeding in particular spheres. As has 
been argued already, the value one pieces upon being a certain kind of
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person affects one’s self-esteem when one is shown not to be that kind of 
person. Similarly, there is evidence that the value that children place 
upon academic achievement affects their whole approach to schoolwork.
Stein and Bailey (1973) review studies of various age groups which show 
positive correlations between attainment value for a particular area of 
achievement and both competence and persistence at tasks in that area. 
Covington and Beery (1976) have tried to argue that there is not any 
area in which the need to achieve can be denied or devalued. They claim 
that ’’the individual’s sense of worth is threatened by the belief that his 
value as a person depends upon his ability to achieve, and that if he is 
incapable of succeeding, he will not be worthy of love and approval” (p.6). 
Their assumption that there is a pervasive tendency for people to equate 
the ability to achieve with human value is possibly more true of American 
society (or the American school system) than of English society. However, 
the argument is weakened by the failure to acknowledge that people might 
not value academic achievement equally, so that they will vary in the 
extent to which their self-esteem is dependent upon success. Nevertheless, 
there is some evidence to support their claim. In a study of English 
children, Livesley and Bromley (1973) found that ability and achievement 
were important values for children, particularly between the ages of 7 
and 10. Evidence from this study and from an earlier (American) study by 
Dersild (1952) suggests that academic achievement is less important for 
most adolescents.
1.7.3 Achievement expectations
In discussing o n e ’s expectation of achievement, Bandura .(1977) has 
distinguished between outcome expectations (one’s estimate that a given 
behaviour will produce a certain outcome) and efficacy expectations (one’s 
conviction that one can successfully execute the behaviour required to 
produce this outcome). All the studies cited below define expectations 
in the latter sense. Battle (1966) found that adolescents* expectations 
of success in specific subjects correlated with their actual attainments 
in both maths (*76) and English (*84). These correlations remained 
statistically significant even when intelligence was controlled. Rotter, 
Chance and Phares (1972) claim that children's expectancies of success 
correlate with their actual academic success at about the same level as 
IQ does, (that is, around *5). Children’s expectancies of success are 
more highly predictive of achievements when the children have a hi±ory 
of success and attribute this to such internal factors as effort or 
ability.
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achievement expectations and can be understood as the generalized 
expectation of success in schoolwork. It is assumed that our expectations 
of success are based upon estimates of our ability to succeed (rather than 
on the anticipation of good fortune). Influenced by symbolic interaction 
theory, Brookover et al. (1962, 1965, 1967) have developed a theory of 
learning which deals with the evaluations people make of their general
i
academic abilities compared with others. They argue that "a student’s 
self-concept of academic ability results from his perception of the 
evaluations significant others hold of his ability. The student’s self- 
concept of academic ability in turn functions to limit the level of 
academic achievement attempted. Self-concept of academic ability is 
therefore hypothesized as an intervening variable between the expectations 
and evaluations of significant others and school achievement. The 
relationship of perceived evaluations of significant others is 
conceptualized as a necessary and sufficient condition, i.e., a change 
in the perceived evaluations of others will be reflected in a change 
in self-concept. The relationship of self-concept of ability for academic 
achievement, on the* other hand, is hypothesized as a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the occurrence of a particular level of academic 
performance” (1967, p.140).
To test this theory, Brookover and his colleagues conducted a large- 
scale longitudinal study of high school students between the ages of 12 and 
17. They found statistically significant correlations at all age levels 
between self-concept of academic ability and academic achievement. The 
correlations ranged from *49 (at age 17) to *58 (at age 12), and tended to 
be somewhat higher for boys. There was a noticeable trend (not always 
statistically significant) for changes in self-concept of ability to be 
associated with parallel changes in attainments. The evidence showed that, 
although favourable self-concept of ability was a necessary condition for 
academic success, it was no guarantee : many students with good opinions 
of their ability did poorly, but very few who thought poorly of themselves 
got good marks. Using partial correlations to control each variable in 
turn, Brookover et al. examined the relationships between self-concept of 
ability, academic grades, and the perceived evaluations of others.
They found that self-concept of ability was more closely linked with 
perceived evaluations by others than with measured intelligence. They 
interpreted this as evidence that self-concept of ability acts as an 
intervening variable between the perceived evaluations of others and 
actual achievements.
There are both theoretical and empirical grounds for questioning
this conclusion. \ rom a theoretical point of view, we can object that 
self-concepts are not simply reflections of the opinions of others, but 
are also based on comparisons with others and on self-observations as 
well. From an empirical point of view, Calsyn & Kenny (1977) have 
reanalysed Brookover et a l ’s. data, using a cross-lagged panel 
correlation technique to establish causal links between different factors. 
Their analysis suggested that grade point average was causally predominant 
over both self-concept of ability and perceived evaluations of others.
Thus, adolescents derive their judgments of their ability more from 
observations of their actual achievements than from what they take to 
be the opinions that others have of them. However, it is difficult to 
decide finally which of these rival interpretations of the data is 
to be preferred until greater consistency among the meausres is achieved. 
.The Brookover study did not include any measures of the actual opinions 
of others, the assumption being that it is the person’s perceptions 
of the opinions of others that really matter for behaviour. However, 
if this is true of the opinions of others, then it should also be true 
of other factors such as attainment and intelligence. Thus, there 
should be no need to measure these directly (as Brookover and his 
colleagues did) since what matters is the person’s perceptions of how 
well he has done and how clever he is rather than what his actual 
attainments and ability are. One of the features of the present study 
will be that all the variables (including the opinions of others) will 
be measured directly. This will permit a more valid test of whether 
children’s academic self-concepts derive more from observations of their 
actual attainments (as suggested by Cavlsyn & Kenny), from the opinions 
of others (as suggested by Brookover et al.), or from some other factor 
(such as intelligence).
The influence of intelligence on academic self-concept was another 
question explored by Brookover and his colleagues. They examined the 
relationships between self-concept of ability, academic grades and 
measured intelligence, again using partial correlations to control 
each variable in turn. In their first analysis of the children at 
the age of 12 (Brookover et al#J1962), they found that self-concept of 
ability was significantly related to school achievement (r =*57 for 
both boys and girls). UJith measured intelligence partialled out, these 
correlations dropped to *42 for boys and *39 for girls, still statistically 
significant. The correlation between self-concept of ability and 
intelligence bias *46 for boys and *48 for girls. These correlations 
dropped to *17 when school achievements were partialled out, suggesting 
that self-concept of ability was more closely linked with achievement
repeated with more or less the same children at the ages of 14 and 16 
(Brookover et al., 1965, 1967), the picture was less clear cut, with 
measured intelligence having an increasingly direct influence on self- 
concept of ability, independently of academic grades. Perhaps this 
reflects a developmental trend for self-concept of ability to become 
increasingly based on an inner sense of competence (and hence to be more 
closely linked with measured intelligence) than on actual achievement.
This development is presumably parallelled by the progressive 
differentiation between the concepts of intelligence and academic 
achievement (which young children tend to think of as identical).
The present study will be examining the relationships between academic 
self-concept, attainments and intelligence, but with younger groups of 
children. In keeping with the developmental trend just described, 
we will expect to find academic self-concept more closely linked with 
actual attainments than with measured intelligence.
1.7.4 Developmental changes in achievement expectations
Studies by Clifford (1975, 1978), Cooper (1978), Entwistle and 
Hayduck (1977), Nicholls (1978, 1979), and Parsons and Ruble (1977) all 
show that children become increasingly accurate in both their reports of 
and their predictions of their academic achievements as they get older.
In a unique study, Entwistle and Hayduck (1978) measured children’s 
expectations of academic success before they entered school and followed 
their progress (and their changing expectations) for the first two years 
of schooling. They found that children were unable to predict their 
achievements in reading or maths with any accuracy before they started 
school. Most children overestimated, with children of lower socio­
economic status overestimating grossly. Children clearly differentiated 
between their expectations for reading and arithmetic,expecting to do better 
at reading. Children’s expectations of success only started to become 
truly accurate by the end of their second year at school. Entwistle and 
Hayduck found evidence that the actual marks children received tended to 
conform to their expectations rather than vice versa. However,they found 
that the expectations for academic success formed by children in their 
first two years in school were simply too inconsistent to allow for 
accurate long-term predictions. This study offers no evidence that 
children’s academic self— concepts crystallize early and remain more or 
less fixed,
Both Clifford (1975, 1978) and Cooper (1978) studied children
with age. Clifford found that inaccurate expectations were more often the 
result of overestimation than underestimation. Nicholls (1978) also 
found that younger children were less accurate in their perceptions of 
their attainments and tended to overestimate. Parsons and Ruble (1977) 
found that girls were typically more accurate in their self-predictions 
than boys. In an attributional study, Uortman, Costanzo and liiitt (1973) 
have shown that when we anticipate having to perform a task again we 
become more modest in our explanations of our performances, attributing 
less ability to ourselves and exaggerating the difficulty of the task.
Thus, life protect ourselves against the more demanding implications of 
possible failure, as well as guaranteeing greater satisfaction if we succeed.
Further evidence of the increasing accuracy of children's predictions 
comes from a study by Kifer (1975). He identified children between the 
ages of 7 and 13 who had been in the top or bottom 20% of the class 
throughout their school careers (which thus ranged from one to seven 
years). Using Brookover et al's. (1967) Self-Concept of Ability Scale,
Kifer found that there were no differences in self-concept of ability 
between the successful and the unsuccessful 7 year olds. After the age 
of 7, however, the gap between the two groups widened steadily with age, 
mainly because those children who were consistently unsuccessful reported 
lower and lower academic self-concepts the longer they attended school.
(The only problem with this study is the way it confounds age and years 
of academic success/failure, thereby preventing us from positively 
identifying which of these two variables is primarily responsible for 
the changes in academic self-concept).
If children become more accurate in their assessments of themselves 
as they get older, then we. can expect to find a closer association between 
academic self-concept and actual attainments among older children.
This will be one of the predictions, to be tested in the present study.
Other related predictions are based upon the question of self-favourability 
biases which was discussed earlier. It is anticipated that younger children 
will tend to overestimate their academic standing in class, and that 
children who are more accurate in self-assessments will have both higher 
self-esteem and higher attainments.
One cannot study the phenomenology of achievement without discussing 
the considerable contribution made in recent years by attribution theory.
This is our next topic.
1.8 ATTRIBUTION THEORY
1.8.1 Introduction
Attribution theory links naturally with those theories that see us 
as continually striving to make sense of our worlds. This was what Heider 
(1958) meant by 1common-sense1 or ’naive1 psychology (also called 'implicit' 
psychology by Wegner and l/allacher, 1977). According to- Heider, we need 
to impose meaning and order on our world which would otherwise be totally 
unstable and confusing, Uie develop our own personal psychologies as a way 
of providing meaning and continuity to the actions of others and ultimately
to ourselves. According to Stryker (1977), what attribution theorists are
really developing is a theory of the development of the self, albeit a 
fragmentary one.
A similar'argument is put forward by Weiner (1979) who sees the
search for understanding as one of the prime notive in human behaviour. In
a school setting, this translates into such questions as, 'Why am I 
doing poorly in reading?', and 'Why did so-and-so get better exam results
than I did?'. Weiner suggests that the attributional answers to these
questions "often are quite retrospective, summarize a number of experiences, 
take place below a level of immediate awareness, and are intimately tied 
with self-esteem and self-concept" (p.4).
Weiner et al. (1971) proposed thd: attributions about success and
failure can, be understood in terms of the two dimensions of stability and
locus of control. Tests of this hypothesis indicate that we tend to try 
and maintain our self-esteem by taking the credit for our success and 
blaming our failures on factors beyond our control. Thus, in a study of 
undergraduates, Gilmor arid Minton (1974) found that those who were 
internally-oriented tended to atttribute success to ability and failure 
to luck more than those who were externally oriented. Similarly, those 
whose initial confidence was high tended to attribute success to ability 
and failure to luck to a greater extent than those whose initial confidence 
bias low.
The fullest account of the notion of locus of control of reinforcement 
is given by Rotter (1966, 1975). General reviews of the locus of control 
literature can be found in Lefcourt (1976), Phares (1976), and Strickland
(1972), while reviews of the literature relating locus of control to 
academic achievement have been provided by Bar-Tal and Bar-Zohar (1977) and 
Soloman and Oberlander (1974). According to Phares (lg76), "belief in
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personal control (or lack of it) is both a general disposition that 
influences individuals1 behaviour across a wide range of situations and 
a rather specific belief that may apply to a limited number of situations”
(p.25). He claims that those who are internally oriented are more active 
in coping with and gaining mastery over the environment than those who are 
externally oriented. He also concludes that internally oriented people are 
more independent and more reliant oni their own judgments than externally 
oriented people, while externally oriented people are more anxious.
Despite the theoretical appeal of the attributional approach,
Mischel (1968, 1973) h as suggested that generalized expectancies (such as 
locus of control expectancies) have bsen shown to suffer the same 
limitations as generalized personality dispositions and have relatively 
little predictive value. Mischel advocates translating expectancies 
into more specific hypotheses. This was the approach used by Crandall, 
Katkovsky and Crandall (1965) in devising the Intellectual Achievement 
Responsibility Scale (IAR) which is designed to measure children's 
expectations of control in academic or intellectual situations. Because of 
its relatively narrow focus., this measure has recommended itself to many who 
have studied the relationship between children's self-perceptions and their 
attainments, and is one of the measures used in the present study. Studies 
of the relationship between locus of control and academic achievement ‘will 
now be reviewed with particular attention being paid to those that have 
used the IAR scale.
1.8.2 Locus of control and academic achievement
Reviews by both Bar-Tal and Bar-Zohar (1977) and Phares (1976) conclude 
that most of the research suggests that internal locus of control is 
associated with higher academic achievement. However, this picture needs 
qualifying. A study by Naditch (1973) found that locus of control was 
related to academic achievement only for those students who valued such 
achievement (r=*40). And another reviewer of the literature on locus of 
control (Lefcourt, 1976) is less convinced of the link with academic 
achievements. He notes that studies which have used the Crandall et al.
IAR Scale (for example, Chance, 1972; Chapman and Boersma, 1979; Crandall 
and Lacy, 1972; Kifer, 1975; McGhee and Crandall, 1968; Reimanis, 1973) 
have produced inconsistent results, particularly as far as the subscale 
scores are concerned. Thus, studies by Chapman and Boersma (1979) and 
Reimanis (1973) both found that underachievement was associated with lower 
internality scores on the success subscale only, while McGhee and Crandall 
(1968) found that boys' academic achievements were more consistently
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related to internality on the failure subscale but girls* achievements 
were related to internality on both scales equally.
On the positive side, there are studies by Chance (1972) and Kifer (1975). 
The latter studied children betwee 7 and 13 who had been in the top or bottom 
20% throughout their school careers. Using a slightly abbreviated form of 
the Crandall et al. IAR Scale, he found that there was no difference between 
the tu/o groups at the 7 year old level’, but there was a significant tendency 
for the gap to widen with age (or with repeated experience of failure/success). 
This was mainly the result of an increase in the internality scores of the 
successful students (up to the age of 11 at least). In the only study to 
control for intelligence, Chance (1972) found statistically significant 
correlations between internality on the IAR Scale and achievement test 
scores in reading (*50 for boys, *45 for girls) and arithmetic (*46 and 
•51). These correlations remained significantly significant even when IQ 
was controlled (although Chance does not give details of the partial 
correlations). However, the children in this study were unusually 
intelligent, having an average IQ of around 125.
After reviewing the relevant literature, Bar-Tal and Bar-Zohar (1977) 
concluded that there is evidence that internally oriented children show more 
task-oriented motivation and less anxiety than externally oriented children. 
Thus, studies by Andrews and Debus (1978), Dweck and Repucci (1973), and Gordon, 
□ones and Short (1977) have found that children who persevere in their 
attempts to master a task attributed previous failures to lack of effort, 
whereas those who give up blame factors outside themselves, such as the 
difficulty of the task or their own lack of ability. Andrews and Debus (1978) 
found that children*s persistence in tackling tasks could be increased by 
training them to attribute previous failures to lack of sufficient effort.
In addition, it has been shown that having a generally internal locus of 
control is associated with children*s ability to delay gratification 
(Mischel, Zeiss and Zeiss, 1974; Strickland, 1972). Another relevant finding 
has been reported by Clifford (1973) who found that, among 11 and 12 year 
olds, ohildren*s interest in a task is a function of their commitment to 
the task and their feelings of internality in academic settings.
Despite all this suggestive evidence, the value of measures of locus 
of control in predicting achievement has yet to be conclusively established, 
mainly because of the lack of studies which matched locus of control against
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intelligence, socioeconomic status). A study by Felker (1972) 
exemplifies this problem. He examined factors influencing the evaluations 
10 year old children made of themselves after completing a task in which 
they were asked to spell ten words. After each word, they were told 
whether they were correct or not and were asked to choose which of nine 
self-evaluating sentences applied to themselves. In addition, they were 
given the Piers-Harris Childrens Self-Concept Scale (1964) and the 
Crandall et al. IAR Scale (1965), among other questionnaires. A step-wise 
multiple regression programme revealed that the factors contributing 
most to the child*s subsequent self-evaluations were actual performance 
(r=»49), followed by overall self-concept (multiple r=*60). However, 
the failure to measure both intelligence and academic self-concept makes 
Felker*s findings difficult to interpret.
One study which claims to have proven the usefulness of the locus of 
control construct in predicting achievement is the so-called Coleman 
report (Coleman et al., 1966). They found that, among black students, 
a sense of control over the environment was more strongly related to 
academic achievement than any other variable. Kleinfeld (1970) criticized 
this conclusion on the grounds that the measure of locus of control used 
contained ambiguous items that were more likely to reflect academic self- 
concept. What is even more likely is that intelligence will be a better 
predictor of task success than locus of control, which one study at least 
(Holloway, 1978) has confirmed. As Lefcourt (1976) has pointed out, if 
locus ofcontrol is linked with both intelligence and achievement, then it 
might be no more than an epiphenomenon, "a mere diagnostic indicator of a 
person’s natural capacities for achievement5 that is, the more intelligent 
and achieving a person is, he more likely he will perceive himself as an 
active, effective person" (p.66). As yet, there is insufficient evidence 
available to settle this question.
One of the aims of the present study is to establish the usefulness of
the locus of control construct (as measured by the Crandall et al. IAR Scale)
in predicting academic achievement when other relevant factors are controlled.
First, studies of the relationship between measures of locus of control and 
such variables as academic self-concept and self-esteem will be reviewed.
1.8.3 Locus of control and academic self-concept
There have been few studies of the relationship between academic self- 
concept and locus of control. Entwistle and Hayduck (1978) argue that these 
two variables are not necessarily related to one another and that it is
put>siuj.E tnerei ore iu nave niyu auauumn; expeu ua n u n s  yev j.uw -i11 uti i ia.i 
locus of control. However, Strickland (1972) reports a large scale study 
by Martin which found that scores on the Nowicki-Strickland Internal- 
External Scale were associated with a measure of academic self-concept 
among 12 and 13 year olds. Moreover, a study by Reimanis (1973) suggests 
that internal control is a necessary condition for the development of 
achievement motivation in the school situation. Thus, when children believe
7 i
that academic success (with its attendant self-satisfactions and praise 
from others) depends upon their own efforts, then they will make that 
effort. For the ,externall child, such striving has no meaning. In 
another relevant study, Midgley and Abrams (1974) found that fear of 
success (as manifest by undergraduate females) was associated with 
external locus of control.
1•8•4 Locus of control and self-esteem
Studies of the relationship between self-esteem and locus of control 
have been more frequent and suggest a definite, if modest, link between 
favourable self-esteem and an internal locus of control orientation (for 
example, Clayman and Ryckman, 1977; Fitch, 1970). A study by Maracek and 
Mettee (1972) found that students low in self-esteem were made 
uncomfortable by successes that they could attribute to their own skills.
When the same students were led to atrribute their successes to luck, they 
dervied much more satisfaction from their performances and stopped trying 
to inhibit their efforts. Two studies with children (Elkind and Bowen,
1979; Nowicki and Strickland, 1973) have reported significant correlations 
between scores on the Nowicki-Strickland Locus of Control Scale for Children 
and Coopersmith*s SEI. In the Elkind and Bowen study, the correlations 
were quite substantial (greater than *60). A third study (Prawat, 1976' ) found 
that scores on Coopersmith*s SEI were significantly correlated with scores 
on Bialer*s Locus of Control Scale («40 for boys and *41 for girls). Three 
further studies (Seidner, 1978; Smith, 1978; Smith et al., 1973) have 
found moderate correlations between scores on the IAR Scale and the SEI. 
However, *in one study (Seidner, 1978) the correlation was only significant 
for girls and in another (Smith et al., 1973) only for boys,
1.8.5 Developmental chanoes in locus of control
Reviewing studies of the predictive efficiency of generalized 
expectancies for internal control (as measured by such scales as the 
Crandall et al. IAR Scale), Rotter, Chance and Phares (1972) conclude that 
such generalized expectancies are well developed by the age of 8 but
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in internality as children get older comes from studies by Beebe (1970), 
Crandall and Lacy (1972), Cromwell (1967), Gordon, Dones and Short (1977), 
Lifshitz (1973), and Nowicki and Duke (1973). Several of these studies 
used total internality score on the IAR, but Rotter, Chance and Phar®(l972) 
have suggested that the developmental pattern for the two subscales of the 
IAR might differ. Thus, in their original report, Crandall, Katkovsky and 
Crandall (1965.) found lout correlations between the two subscales of the IAR 
Scale, suggesting that children might learn responsibility for success and 
failure separately. Correlations rose with age, suggesting that the degree 
of internality becomes progressively more generalized.
However, none of these studies considered the possible contribution of 
intelligence. The importance of controlling for intelligence has been 
demonstrated by both Bialer (1961) and Penk (1969). These two studies found 
that measures of general locus of control were correlated with both 
chronological age (*37 and *27 respectively) and mental age (derived 
from the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) (*56 and *26 respectively).
Bialer found that the correlation between chronological age and locus of 
control dropped to *02 when mental age was controlled, whereas the correlation 
between mental age and locus of control remained high (*47) when 
chronological age was controlled. This suggests that developmental 
increases in internd. locus of control parallel increases in mental age 
rather than chronological age.
However, studies of the relationship between locus of control and 
intelligence suggest that measures of general locus of control are not 
significantly associated with intelligence (for example, Rotter, 1966; Nowicki 
and Strickland, 1973), but that scores on the IAR Scale do tend to be 
moderately linked with IQ scores (for example, Chance, 1972; Crandall,
Katkovsky and Crandall, 1965; Crandall and Lacy, 1972; Cromwell, 1967; 
Reimanis, 1973; Rotter, Ihance and Phares, 1972). Thus, summarizing studies 
which have used measures of locus of control with both normal and retarded 
children, CromweU (1967) concluded that internal locus of control for both 
success and failure increases with both mental and chronological age. 
Accordingly, when the present study comes to examine the relationship between 
locus of control and such variables as self-esteem and academic self-concept, 
it brill be necessary to control for both intelligence and chronological age.
The last three sections have dealt with what is known about the way 
children’s academic achievements are influenced by their self-esteem, 
academic self-concepts and locus of control. Before leaving this topic 
the evidence relating to sex differences on these variables will be reviewed.
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Wylie (1979) has reviewed the literature dealing with the relationship 
between sex-role ideology and actual self-concepts. She concludes that 
there is no doubt that certain traits are differentially ascribed to the 
typical male and the typical female, at least by college students. Females 
are typically described as warm and sensitive, socially skilled, and inclined 
toward interpersonal and artistic interests, Wales are described as 
competent and logical, possessing self-confidence, direct in manner, and 
dominant. Although it is agreed that both sexes possess favourable 
qualities, males are regarded more favourably than females by both sexes.
There is also evidence that there is considerable overlap between individuals' 
self-concepts and the generally-held sex-role stereotypes. Thus, males not 
only subscribe to the view that men are typically competent, logical and so 
on, but they also describe themselves in those terms.
If college students view males more favourably than females, one 
might expect to find sex differences in self-esteem. This does not appear 
to be the case. Wylie (1979) reports that most studies of the relationship 
between sex and overall self-regard (including studies using standardized 
measures such as Coopersmith*s SEI) have found no significant differences 
between boys and girls (or men and women). Because of the difficulty in 
interpreting such null results, Wylie concludes that the question of the 
exact relationship between these two variables remains unresolved.
With regard to academic self-concept, the evidence clearly suggests 
that boys have more favourable academic self-concepts than girls, even when 
their actual performances are inferior (Barker Lunn, 1970; Calsyn and 
Kenny, 1977; Crandall, 1969; Kokenes, 1978; Parsons and Ruble, 1977;
Stein and Bailey, 1973). Moreover, this is regardless of any differences 
in their history of success or in parental expectations (Crandall, 1969).
Confirmation of this pattern comes from attributional studies 
(Bar-Tal and Darom, 1979; Dweck and Bush, 1976; Nicholls, 1979). Thus, 
Nicholas found that’gi^ls between the ages of 6 and 12 were more likely 
to attribute failure in reading to lack of ability than were boys, despite 
the fact that the girls* actual attainments were rated higher than boys' by 
the girls themselves and their teachers. According to Dweck and Bush
(1976), findings from numerous investigations of achievement behaviour
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failure to factors beyond their control (such as lack of ability), to 
avoid situations where failure is likely, and to give up more Easily when 
failing or when being evaluated.
Still further confirmation of this pattern comes from studies of 
locus of control. Stein and Bailey (1973) report that girls tend to have 
higher internal scores than boys on the failure sub-scale of the Crandall 
et al. IAR scale and that the gap between boys and girls widens during 
adolescence. This matches other evidence that girls tend to be more 
worried about failure in schoolwork than boys, this tendency increasing 
during the junior school years. Studies reported by Dweck et al.(l978) 
suggest that these differences are the result of pervasive differences 
in the way teachers respond to the academic efforts of boys and girls.
Thus, they observed teachers interacting with their 10 and 11 year old 
pupils and found that boys were more likely to be praised for the 
intellectual quality of their work and criticized for their behaviour (such 
as lack of effort), whereas girls were more likely to be praised for their 
behaviour and criticized for the intellectual inadequacies.
These sex differences in academic self-concepts and self-attributions 
are translated eventually into performance differences. As already stated, 
girls tend to perform better at schoolwork than boys, at least during the 
junior school years. The evidence suggests that a change occurs at the 
secondary level with girls appearing to inhibit their academic performances 
to bring them in line with general expectations. Evidence that younger 
girls resist these expectations comes from a study by Koff and Mokros 
(1978). They found that 10 and 11 year old boys credited academically 
successful girls with less ability than successful boys. However, the 
girls in this age group evidently had not yet succumbed to this cultural 
stereotype, crediting all successful pupils with the same ability. In a 
follow-up of Barker Lunn's (1970) major longitudinal study, Ferri (1972) 
found that girls of above-average ability developed poorer academic 
self-images after a couple of years at secondary school whereas boys of 
above-’average ability ^developed more favourable self-concepts. Another 
instance of this shift comes from a study by Shaw and. HcCuen(1960) who 
looked at the academic careers of adolescents who were above average in 
intelligence but below average in achievements. When they traced 
their academic records back, they found that the boys had a longer history 
of underachievement than the girls. The boys were already significantly 
behind their above average IQ peers at the age of 8 and fell progressively
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further behind from then on. The girls who later became underachievers 
actually did better in the early years than their peers who later became 
high achievers, and only began to fall significantly behind at the age of 
11, that is, around puberty. In a similar study of girls only, Fitzpatrick 
(1978) confirmed these findings. She also found evidence suggesting that 
the failure of these bright adolescents, particularly in the stereo-
i
typically masculine field of mathematics, bias related to the relatively 
traditional views they held of the woman's role in society and their 
greater susceptibility to the opinions of others.
Further evidence of this developmental trend comes from studies of 
what Horner has called 'fear of success'. In her original formulation,
Horner (i960) saw fear of success as an enduring and stable personality 
trait that was linked with the development of sex-role identity. This 
means that it should be observable in quite young children, and certainly 
ip 8 year olds. Condry and Dyer (1976, 1977) argue that fear of success 
is better thought of as a situational variable rather than as a 
personality trait, only manifesting itself in girls (or women) when they 
are in direct competition with boys (or men). In a (cross-sectional) 
study of 10, 13 and 15 year olds, Condry and Dyer (1977) found evidence 
that, once girls reached puberty, there was a sharp increase in the 
tendency to inhibit their efforts when competing with boys. Similarly, 
both Romer (1975) and Dalsimer (1975) found some evidence of an increase 
in 'fear of success* in girls during adolescence, although there were 
no differences between boys and girls at the ages of 12 or 13.
Further evidence that achievement behaviours might be linked to the 
development of sex-role identity (or at least sex-role stereotypes) comes 
from a study by Etaugh .and Brown (1975). They found that children as young 
as 10 saw certain tasks as more appropriately done by men than by women. 
Accordingly, female success at these tasks (such as mechanics) bias 
attributed more to unstable factors (such as effort) than stable factors 
(such as ability); .‘for male success in the same tasks, the pattern bias 
reversed. ,In a major review of the literature on achievement motivation 
in females, Stein and Bailey (1973) conclude that females try harder and 
have higher aspirations in those areas which are culturally defined as 
appropriate for females. The most important of these areas, particularly 
for biomen, is social skill. One can only conclude that academic 
achievement is not seen^ as appropriate for girls, at least during adolescence.
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In the light of the above findings, the present study can be 
expected to reveal sex differences in attainments, academic self-concept, 
and locus of control, but not in self-esteem. Age differences can 
also be anticipated, with girls becoming progressively less assertive 
of their academic abilities as they grow older.
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Another variable which commends itself to anyone interested in 
p e o p l e d  thoughts and feelings about themselves is that of psychological 
differentiation (Witkin et al., 1962, 1974), otherwise known as the field- 
dependence/field independence dimension. The two poles of this dimension 
describe contrasting ways of processing information, differing cognitive 
styles that logically should result in distinct ways of viewing oneself 
in relation to others. According to Witkin et al. (1977), "field- 
independent people are more likely to bo aware of needs, feelings, 
attributes, which they experience as their own and as distinct from those 
of others". Thus, to a greater extent than field-dependent people, they 
experience themselves as ’segregated1 (that is, distinct from others) 
and as ’structured* (that is, having clearly-defined internal frames of 
reference). Elsewhere (Witkin et al., 1962 1974), these differences in ways
of experiencing the self are summarized as differences in the extent of ’sense 
of separate identity*.
Despite the considerable research activity generated by these ideas 
(see reviews by Goodenough,• 1976; Witkin and Goodenough, 1977; Witkin et 
al., 1974, 1977), there are problems to do with the exact nature of what 
is being measured. In reviewing Witkin et al. ’s 1962 book, Zigler (1963) 
conceded that the sheer number of significant correlations reported indicated 
that something was being measured, but he suggested that the formulations 
proposed by Witkin and his colleagues were inadequate. According to Zigler, 
the most likely explanation of all these correlations is that the measures 
used share a common relationship with measures of intelligence. Witkin et 
al. (1977) claim that positive correlations between measures of intelligence 
and field-independence have been found, but not consistently, and anyway 
tend to be small. The correlations found in some studies with children have 
not been so small, however. Statistically significant correlations between 
both Group and Children’s Embedded Figures Tests (GEFT and CEFT) and 
intelligence have been reported by Bigelow (1971), Crandall and Lacy (1972), 
Hoffman (1978), -Satterly (1976, 1979) and Weisz et al. (1975). With 10 and 
11 yegr olds, Satterly. (1979) found a correlation of *49 between scores on 
the CEFT and scores on the NFER Verbal Reasoning Test, while Weisz et al. 
(1975) found that the scores on the CEFT obtained by 9 and 12 year 
old children correlated at -12 with Mental Age(derived from the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test).
-70-
Vernon (T972) is another who has argued that tests such as the 
EFT do not measure a factor which is distinct from general intelligence 
and spatial ability. However, Satterly (1976) has produced some 
evidence that, although there is a considerable overlap between field 
independence (as measured by the EFT) and verbal intelligence (as 
measured by the NFER Verbal Reasoning Test), there is a small factor 
of cognitive style distinct from both intelligence and spatial ability.
Oust as measures of field independence are related partially to 
intelligence test scores, there is some evidence that they are also 
related to achivement test scores. Thus, according to Witkin et al.
(1977), measures of field independence are 'definitely* correlated with 
grade-point averages at junior school level, 'somewhat* correlated at 
hgih school level, and negligibly correlated at college level. 
Statistically significant correlations between CEFT scores and 
measures of achievement have been found by Buriel (1978), Crandall 
and Lacy (1972), and Satterly (1979).
The present study provides an opportunity for examining the 
relevance of the field independence dimension for self-concept.
(The term 'field independence' will be used henceforth to refer to 
this dimension, mainly on the grounds that success in the tasks used to 
measure this quality requires one to be field independent rather than 
field dependent). Two hypotheses will be tested. The first derives 
from the suggestion that field independent people experience themselves 
as distinct from others and predicts that children who are field 
independent (as measured by the Children's Embedded Figure Test) will 
see greater differences between themselves and others (as measured by 
repertory grids) than will children who are field dependent. The 
second hypothesis derives from the suggestion that field independent 
people depend more upon internal cues than field dependent people.
Thus, it is predicted that the self-estimates of field dependent 
children will match the opinions of their classmates and teachers more 
closely than will the iself-estimates of field independent children.
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1.11.1 Introduction
The review of the theoretical and empirical literature has high­
lighted a number of key issues to be explored as well as suggesting a 
number of specific hypotheses. These will now be stated. Where there is
i
insufficient evidence to allow a specific hypothesis to be formulated, a 
statement of the area to be explored is given. After each aim or hypothesis, 
the number of the section (or subsection) from which it has been derived is 
given in brackets.
1.11.2 Measures of self-esteem
Aim 1 : To factor analyse the items on Coppersmith’s SEI in order to
clarify what this test actually measures (1.3.4).
Aim 2 : To establish whether factor scores can be used as additional
or alternative measures of self-esteem (1.3.4).
Aim 3 : To compare the nomological networks of the two measures of
general self-esteem in order to establish whether they measure the same 
construct or not (1.3).
Aim 4 : To compare the nomological network of the measure of
academic self-esteem with those of the two measures of general self-esteem 
in order to establish whether similar methods of measuring self-esteem have 
more in common than measures which purport to be similar in content(1.3).
1.11.3 Developmental changes
Hypothesis 1 : In their descriptions of others, older childre will
tend to (a) use a greater number of constructs overall, (b) use a higher 
proportion of abstract constructs, (c) make fewer references to themselves, 
and (d) be more inclined to attribute both good and bad qualities to 
others (1.5)*
Hypothesis 2 : Older children will have more complex personal construct 
systems than younger children (1.5).
Hypothesis 3 : Younger children will be more extreme in their self- 
rankings than will older children (1.5.3).
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will decrease with age (1.5.3).
1.11.4 Sources of self-concept and self-esteem
Hypothesis 5 : Children's self-esteem will vary according to
the opinions held of them by others (1.4).
r
Hypothesis 6 : Children's academic self-concepts will vary according
to the opinions held of them by others (1.4).
Hypothesis 7 : The self-esteem of older children will be more closely
linked with the opinions of their peers while that of younger children will 
be more closely linked with the opinions of their teachers (1.4.2).
Aim 5* : To see whether self-esteem and/or academic self-concept act 
as intervening variables between the opinions of others and actual 
attainments (1.4.2 and 1.7.3).
1.11.5 Academic self-concepts
Hypothesis 8 : The academic self-concepts of older children will
match the opinions of others more closely than will'those of.younger 
children (1.4.2 and 1.4.4).
Hypothesis 9 : The academic self-concepts of older children will
match their actual attainments more closely than will those of younger 
children (1.7.4).
Hypothesis 10 : Younger children will tend to overestimate their
attainments to a greater extent than will older childre (1.2.3 and 1.7.4).
Hypothesis 11 : Children who are more accurate in their self­
estimates will be viewed more favourably by both their classmates and 
their teachers (1.4.2).
1.11.6 Self-esteem and achievement
Hypothesis 12 : Measures of attainment will be more highly correlated
with measures of academic self-concept than with measures of self-esteem 
( 1 . 6 ).
Hypothesis 13 : Academic self-concept acts as an intervening variable
between self-esteem and attainments (1.6),
Hypothesis 14 : Self-esteem will be more closely linked with
perceived attainments than with actual attainments (1.6).
1.11.7 Self-processes and intelligence
i Hypothesis 15 : Among older children, academic self-concepts will
be more closely linked with intelligence than with attainments whereas 
the opposite will be true of younger children (1.7.3).
Hypothesis 16 : The correlation between academic self-concepts and
ability will be reduced when attainments are held constant (1.7.3).
Hypothesis 17 : Self-esteem will be more closely linked with
perceived ability than with measured ability (1.6).
1.11.8 Achievement values
Hypothesis 18 : For students who value academic success, those
who do well will have highef self-esteem than those who do poorly; for 
those who do not value success, there will be relatively little difference 
in self-esteem between successful and unsuccessful students (1.2.2).
Hypothesis 19 : Children who value being academically successful
and/or intelligent will tend to be more academically successful than 
those who do not (1.7.2).
1.11.9 -Academic locus of control
Hypothesis 20 : Internal locus of control will increase with age
(1.8.5).
Hypothesis 21 : Self-esteem scores will correlate positively (if
modestly) with internal locus of control (1.8.4).
Hypothesis 22 : Academic self-concepts .will be linked with internal
locus of control (1.8.3).
Aim 6 : To see if the correlations between academic locus of control
and both self-esteem and academic self-concept are altered when both 
ability and attainments are held constant (1,8.3 and 1.8.4).
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1.11.10 Popularity
Aim 7 : To explore the relationship between children's popularity
and their self-esteem and academic self-concepts (1.4.5).
Aim 8 : To explore the relationship between children's popularity,
the opinions held of them by others, and their actual attainments (1.4.5).
1.11.11 Sex differences
Hypothesis 23 : There will be no significant sex differences in
self-esteem (1.9).
Hypothesis 24 : Boys will have more favourable academic self-
concepts than girls, even when their actual attainments are inferior (1.9).
Hypothesis 25 : Boys will have higher internality scores on the
success subscale of the IAR while girls will have higher internality scores 
on the failure subscale (1.9).
1.11.12 Field independence
Hypothesis 25 : Field independence will increase with age (1.10).
Aim 9 : To explore the relationship between field independence and
both ability and attainments (1.10).
Hypothesis 27 : The academic self-concepts of field dependent
children will match the opinions held of them by others more closely 
than will the academic self-concepts of field independent children (1.10).
Hypothesis 28 : Field independence will be related to the size of
the average distance of the element 'self' from other elements on the 
repertory grids (1.10).
1.11.13 Additional aims
Aim 10 : To use multiple regression analyses to identify those
variables that best predict self-esteem and academic self-concept.
Aim 11 : To use factor analyses to identify major groupings among
the variables and to see whether these include the key variables of 
self-esteem and academic self-concept.
CHAPTER 2 : T H E  STUDY
2.1 First pilot study
2.1.1 Introduction 77
2.1.2 Aims 77
2.1.3 Measures 77
2.1.4 Sample and procedure 79
2.1.5 Results . BO
2.1.6 Conclusions 81
2.2 Second pilot study
2.2.1 Aims
2.2.2 Measures
2.2.3 Repertory grid analyses
2.2.4 Sample and procedure
2.2.5 Results
2.2.6 Discussion
2.2.7 Conclusions
.2.3 Final study : measures
2.3.1 Intelligence 92
2.3.2 Attainments 92
2.3.3 Self-esteem 93
2.3.4 Academic self-concept 93
2.3.5 Peer evaluations 94
2.3.6 Teacher evaluations 95
2.3.7 Popularity, field-independence and locus of control 96
2.3.8 Measures derived from children’s descriptions of
their peers 96
2.3.9' Cognitive complexity 97
2.3.10 Value placed upon being clever and/or good at
schoolbiork 98
2.4 The sample 99
2.5 Procedure 102
82
82
84
86
87
89
91
-76-
2.1 FIRST PILOT STUDY
2.1.1 Introduction
The original focus of this study was the relationship between children's 
self-esteem and their academic behaviour and attainment. Working as an
i
educational psychologist, the present author had sen many children whose 
ideas and feelings about themselves were at variance with their measured 
ability and seemed to interfere with their capacity to master the tasks 
reguired of them. For these underachieving children, low self-esteem seemed 
to lie at the heart of their learning difficulties, so that they could not 
hope to become competent in their schoolwork until their evaluations of 
themselves became more favourable. This intuitively plausible formulation 
seemed to be supported by the studies of Stanley Coopersmith as reported 
in his book The Antecedents of Self-Esteem (1967). Nevertheless, Coopersmith's 
work was not without its faults (liiylie, 1974, 1979) and further exploration 
seemed justified. In particular, there bias the question of whether self­
esteem really did play such a fundamental causal role in children's 
behaviour as suggested abovq. In addition, it bias not clear how self-esteem 
related to other variables of apparent relevance, particularly self-concepts.
The original aim of the study, therefore, bias to explore these issues.
In the process of arriving at a final format, two pilot studies were conducted.
2.1.2 Aims
The aims of the first study were threefold : to assess the viability
of using Coopersmith's (1959) Self-Esteem Inventory as the key measure with 
junior school children; to explore the relationship between self-esteem and 
the theoretically relevant variables of field-independence and locus of 
control; and to establish what modifications (if any) needed to be made to 
adapt the American measures of the above variables for English usage.
•2.1.3 Measures
The variables measured in this study were self-esteem, field- 
independence, locus of control, reading ability and popularity. As 
mentioned, the measure of self-esteem chosen bias Coopersmith's Self-Esteem 
Inventory (SEl), a widely- used scale consisting of 58 items (including 
an 8-item Lie Scale). The child is asked to say whether statements such 
as 'I'm pretty sure of myself', 'I'm proud of my schoolwork',' and 'I 
often feel ashamed of myself' are 'like me' or 'unlike me'. For the
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total score, Coopersmith (1959) quotes test-retest reliabilities of 
•88 (over 5 weeks) and *70 (over 3 years) for 10 year olds. Besides 
the Lie Scale, the SEI includes three 8-item sub-scales, dealing with 
the peer group, schoolwork, and the home respectively. These sub-scales' 
have not been used in the present study as their discriminant validity is 
suspect. This appears to be a common finding with measures of general 
self-concept and self-esteem (Winne et al., 1977). Despite its American 
origin, no rewording of the SEI proved necessary.
To measure children's field-independence, the Children's Embedded 
Figures Test (CEFT) (Witkin et al., 1971) was used. This is the junior 
form of the Embedded Figures Test (EFT). Both the EFT and the CEFT are 
described in the manual (Witkin et al., 1971) as perceptual tests in which 
one is asked to locate a previously seen simple figure within a larger 
complex figure. Thus, strictly speaking what the EFT and CEFT measure is 
'competence at perceptual disembedding*. As discussed earlier, Witkin and 
his colleagues (1962, 1974) claim that such competence manifests itself in 
many non-perceptual areas of behaviour as well, so that field independent 
people have a greater sense of separate identity than field dependent 
people. The CEFT differs from the EFT in length (25 items as against 12) 
and timing (being untimed) but has been judged by at least one reviewer 
(Weintraub, 1972) to be a satisfactory downward extension of the EFT.
The measure of locus of control used was the Intellectual Achievement 
Responsibility Scale (IAR) (Crandall, Katkovsky and Crandall, 1965). This 
34-item scale was designed to assess 7 to 16 year old's perceptions of 
locus of control in academic situations. A forced-choice format is used. 
The children are asked to explain hypothetical results in terms of two 
sets of options, one attributing the results to their own efforts or 
abilities, the other blaming outside circumstances. They have to indicate 
which of the two would probably explain the result in their own case. For 
example:
If you solve a puzzle quickly, is it -
(a) because it was ncft a very hard puzzle, or '
(b) because you worked on it carefully?
When you forget something you heard in class, is it -
(a) because the teacher did not explain it very well, or
(b) because you did not try very hard to remember?
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a puzzle quickly, remembering something heard in class) and half with 
failure (failing to solve a puzzle, forgetting something learned in class). 
Thus, the IAR yields three scores : number of successes attributed to 
'internal' factors (effort, ability), number of failures attributed to 
'internal' factors, and total number of outcomes attributed to internal 
factors. These will be designated as IAR (Success), IAR (Failure), and 
IAR (Total) respectively. For 8 to 10 year olds, Crandall et al. (1965) 
quote test-retest correlations of between *66 and *74 over a two-month 
interval. Rewording was necessary to render some items into idiomatic 
English (for example, 'checkers' was altered to 'draughts', 'particular' 
was altered to 'fussy'), as suggested by Manning and Rowe (1976) who adopted 
the scale for Australian usage. The content of two items had to be 
altered : these referred to promotion to the next class which is automatic 
in England, but not so in the United States. The items substituted were :
If a teacher gives you a good mark in your report, is this
(a) because he or she liked you, or
(b) because of the work you had done?
If a teacher does not give you a good report, is this
(a) because he or she had it in for you, or
(b) because your work was not good enough?
Popularity was assessed by asking each child to name his or her three 
closest friends in the class and to identify anyone they disliked. A 
popularity score was arrived at by allotting 3 points for each reciprocated 
friendship choice, 2 points for each unreciprocated friendship choice, and 
subtracting 1 point for each indication of dislike. The advantage of this 
system is that it results in a normal distribution, whereas many other ways 
of weighting acceptance and rejection by peers yields markedly skewed 
distribution (for example, Cohen, 1976).
2.1.4 Sample and procedure
The children involved in this study, were randomly drawn from the 
third and fourth year classes of a junior school in an outer London Borough. 
There were thirty children in all, their ages ranging between 9 years 9 
months and 11 years and 4 months (average age 10 years 7 months). The Self-
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(IAR), and the popularity questionnaire were all administered in the class­
room with the class teacher present, Each child was then seen individually 
and given the Children’s Embedded Figures Test (CEFT) and the Neale 
Analysis of Reading Ability,
2,1,5 Results
i
Statistical analyses in this study were limited to the computation 
of Pearson product moment correlation co-efficients between the various 
variables. These are given in Table 2.1,
Table 2,1 Correlation matrix of variables used in the first pilot study
Aqe R. Aqe CEFT SEI IAR(T) IAR(S) IAR(F) Pop.
Age
Reading Age
*
•51
CEFT
*
•55
*
•49
SEI •04 *06 •02
IAR (Total) -•11 •07 •16 •29
IAR (Success) -•14 •17 -•05
*
•52
*
•66
IAR (Failure) -•01 -•06 •26 --•18 •56* *16
Popularity •15 •21 •17 •07 •17 *18 *06
*
P < •01
Despite the limited age range involved, there were statistically
significant correlations between age and both field independence and reading 
attainment, just as one would expect. Otherwise, none of these variables 
were strongly linked with any of the other variables (although reading age 
and field independence were related to each other).
As for self-esteem, scores on the SEI correlated at a statistically 
significant level with only one other variable, internality on the success 
scale'.of the IAR, Thus, those who viewed themselves favourably also tended 
to feel that their academic achievements were the result of their own efforts, 
whereas those with low self-esteem felt that any success they had was due 
to forces beyond their control. However, self-esteem was not linked with 
actual attainment in reading or with popularity (although the literature
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would lead us to expect only moderate correlations at best). Precisely 
how self-esteem might be related to these factors can only be explored in 
a more detailed study which also measures self-concepts and the opinions 
of others.
Regarding the suitability of the measures used, no problems were 
experienced in administering the Self-Esteem Inventory, the Intellectual 
Achievement Responsibility Scale, or the Children's Embedded Figures Test, 
All three were readily understood and completed by the children involved.
The only test to be less than satisfactory bias the Neale Analysis of 
Reading Ability which proved to have too low a ceiling. The norms only 
extend to 12 years 11 months which bias not sufficient to test the competence 
of (and hence discriminate between) some of the more able children. A test 
with a higher ceiling would be needed in the final study.
2.1,6 Conclusions
These results suggested that further work with Coopersmithrs SEI bias 
warranted although they left unclear exactly what the SEI bias measuring.
The problems involved in interpreting the scores derived from such self­
esteem questionnaires has been discussed already as have other ways of 
measuring self-esteem. One of the questions to be answered bias whether 
these other ways of measuring self-esteem would be related in a similar 
way to locus of control measures. Also unclear bias how self-esteem, 
however measured, was related to more specific perceptions of onself 
(such as how clever or academically successful one believed onself to be) 
or how such perceptions relate to actual behaviour (such as how successful 
one is academically), A second‘pilot study was undertaken in order to 
develop a way of measuring children's general and academic self-concepts 
that would enable these relationships to be explored further.
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2.2 SECOND PILOT STUDY
2.2.1 Aims
As just stated, the main aim of the second pilot study was to develop 
a way of measuring children's general and academic self— concepts. It was 
decided to use the repertory grid technique devised by Kelly (1955) for this 
purpose. Repertory grids can be analysed in a variety of ways (Fransella 
and Bannister, 1977; Ravenette, 1975, 1977; Salmon,1976; Slater, 1976,
1977) and a second aim of this pilot study was to identify which of these 
analyses would best meet the needs of the overall study. A third aim bias 
to establish whether the measures derived from grids were related in a 
meaningful way to self-esteem as measured by Coopersmith*s SEI.
2.2.2 Measures
Before describing the use made of repertory grids, brief mention will 
be made of the other measures used in the second pilot study. Two of the 
questionnaires used in the first pilot study (Coopersmith's Self-Esteem 
Inventory and the Crandall et al. Intellectual Achievement Responsibility 
Scale) were retained, but the measures of reading attainment, field- 
independence and popularity were omitted in order to save time.
We turn now to a consideration of repertory grid technique and the ways 
in which this approach might be adopted for our present purposes.
Several studies (for example, Applebee, 1976; Brierley, 1967) have 
shown that repertory grid technique can be used successfully with children and 
useful summaries of this work can be found in Ravenette (1975, 1977) and 
Salmon (1976). However, there are still some unresolved problems in using 
this approach with young children, particularly concerning the most 
appropriate way of eliciting constructs. Any measuring technique which 
depends upon supplied constructs (such as the questionnaires used in the 
present study) risks forming a distorted picture of the respondent's view 
of the world by imposing an alien framework on it. According to Lemon and 
Warren (1974), elicited constricts are to be preferred to supplied constructs 
because they are more salient and meaningful for the person concerned. What 
makes them more meaningful is that they 'fcarry more information and/or 
psychologically mare important information" (p*119). Proof of this comes
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elicited constructs than with supplied constructs (Landfield, 1971) 
and that adults at least differentiate more between elicited constructs 
than between supplied constructs (Caine and Smail, 1967). However, eliciting 
constructs from children presents particular difficulties. With adults,
Kelly (1955) used a triadic elicitation technique in which one bias required 
both to abstract and manipulate the differences between three people 
simultaneously. Salmon (1976) suggests that this may be too difficult for 
young children and that less structured methods of elicitation produce a 
different balance of constructs, with a greater proportion of psychological 
constructs. However, there is nothing magic about the number three, and the 
first step toward simplifying the task for children bias to reduce the 
number of people to be compared to two (as suggested by Landfield, 1976). 
According to theories referred to in the last chapter, we can assume that 
constructs used in comparing others also apply to oneself. Indeed, as we 
have seen5many theorists would argue that all our constructs are derived 
in the first instance from comparisons between ourselves and others. In 
order to maximize the chances of eliciting constructs that were truly central 
to children's conceptions of themselves, it bias decided to make one of the 
tbio people being compared the child himself. And on the assumption that 
classmates form children's natural reference group, it bias decided to get 
the children to compare themselves only with children in the same class as 
themselves.
In accordance with the above reasoning, the children were asked to 
describe some of their classmates and then to say in what ways t h ^  themselves 
differed from the children they had just described. Thus, each child bias 
asked to nominate seven classmates of the same sex, four of whom he or she 
liked and three of whom he or she disliked. The child bias then asked to give 
verbal descriptions of five of these classmates (three liked and two disliked 
children) and their accounts were recorded. In their major study of 
developmental changes in children's descriptions of others, Livesley & Bromley
(1973) used written rather than spoken descriptions. They suggest that 
written descriptions give a better idea of the cognitive organization of 
descriptions of others while spoken descriptions give a better idea of the 
associated affective and motivational processes.' Since the primary interest 
of the present study is in affective and motivational processes, spoken 
descriptions were preferred. The instructions encouraged descriptions couched 
in terms of personality rather than physical features. The wording used 
was : "Describe so-and-so for me; tell me what he/she is like, what sort of
-83-
asked two further questions about the child being described: "How is he/she
different from you? Is there anything you dislike about this child?" (asked 
of liked classmates) /"Is there anything you like about this child?" (asked of 
disliked classmates). Only rarely did this question elicit any further 
constructs, thereby supporting the assumption that each construct used in
describing others is also used to describe oneself.
I . ■
The children’s descriptions were inspected and those constructs which 
appeared to be of greatest significance for each child formed the basis of 
his or her repertory grid. (This intuitive method of selecting constructs 
proved unsatisfactory and more systematic criteria, described later, were 
used in the final study). In order that all the children’s grids should be 
comparable with each other, it was necessary to make them a uniform size, 
and an 8 x 8 format was arbitrarily chosen. Thus, the children were asked 
to rank themselves along with the seven classmates they had named on eight 
of the constructs they had used. Salmon (1976) has suggested that such rank 
ordering is within the grasp of most children of seven and over, while 
Slater (1977) recommends ranking in preference to rating for children of 
this age, being just as reliable as rating yet easier to do. No particular 
attempt was made to identify both poles of each construct, for, as Chetwynd 
(1973) has pointed out, it is not necessary for people to label the 
constructs they use in grids, only for them to be able to rank or rate people 
on these constructs.
As will be described shortly, measures can be derived from the 
above grid which indicate to what extent the children see themselves as 
being similar or dissimilar to those they like and dislike. This can be 
used as a measure of general self-concept, but in order to measure academic 
self-concept a second grid is needed. Accordingly, after the first grid 
(hereafter referred to as the general qrid) was completed, the whole process 
was repeated in a modified form, resulting in a second grid (hereafter 
referred to as the academic grid). This time, the children were asked to 
identify four classmates whom they regarded as good at their schoolwork and 
three »whom they thought were poor at schoolwork. They were then asked to 
say why five of these children (three successful and two unsuccessful) were 
good (or bad) at their work. These descriptions or explanations were again 
recorded and the eight most important constructs used as the basis for 
another 8 x 8  grid.
2.2.3 Repertory grid analyses
Having devised a method for eliciting constructs from children, the
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repertory grids. One can analyse grids according to content (that is, 
by examining the relationships between different constructs) or according 
to structure (that is, by examining the relationship between elements 
or by assessing the complexity of the grid). For the purpose of the 
present study it is the latter kind of analysis that is needed since the 
childrens grids have common structural properties but differ in content. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive structural analyses of grids • have been 
developed by Patrick Slater (1964, 1972) and it is his INGRID 72 programme 
which is used in the present study. This programme analyses grids in 
terms of their principal components. Bieri (1955) used this kind of analysis 
to assess the 'cognitive complexity1 of people's construct systems. Thus, 
the extent to which a person's construct system is simple or undimensional 
is indicated by the percentage of the variance accounted for by the first 
principal component of a repertory grid : the larger the variance, the more 
that person will tend to interpret events in terms of a single over-riding 
dimension.
The INGRID 72 programme expresses the various relationships between 
elements and constructs in terms of angular distances. The greater the 
angular distance between the two elements (or two constructs), the more 
dissimilar the person perceives them to be. Thus, Ryle and Breen (1972) 
have suggested that the positioning of the element 'self' relative to 
other elements in the construct space gives us a direct indication of the 
person's conscious view of himself or herself, closeness implying perceived 
similarity and distance implying that the other elements are seen as 
dissimilar. Expressing such relationships in the form of angular distances 
has the great advantage of enabling several relationships to be summed and 
averaged, something which is not possible with the correlation coefficients 
which are derived from these distances. Thus, a measure of academic self- 
concept can be obtained from the academic repertory grid by averaging the 
angular distances between the element 'self' and those classmates the child 
considers to be academically successful. And an indication of general self- 
concept can be got from the general grid by averaging the angular distances 
between 'self' and classmates for whom the child has expressed a liking.
The INGRID 72 programme also expresses the relationships between 
constructs and elements in the form of correlation coefficients (or their 
mathematical equivalent, cosines). These provide a useful way of 
summarizing the relationships between pairs of elements or between an element 
and a construct. Thus, the academic self-concept can be estimated from the
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correlation between the element ’self’ and such constructs as 'clever' 
or 'good at schoolwork'.
Another part of the INGRID 72 output deals with the sum of squares 
for each element and construct. A low sum of squares is the result of a 
particular element being ranked neither high or low but near the mean on 
allithe constructs. According to Slater, this implies that the person's 
attitude towards that element is indifferent, though moderate might be a 
better way of putting it. By examining the sums of squares for the element 
'self', we can get an indication of how moderately or otherwise children 
view themselves.
The complete list of measures based on the two repertory grids was as 
follows :
General grid :
Variance accounted for by first principal component 
Average distance of the element 'self.', from liked classmates
Average distance of the element 'self* from disliked classmates
Sum of squares for the element 'self'
Academic grid :
Variance accounted for by first principal component 
Averange distance of the element 'self* from successful classmates 
Average distance of the element 'self' from unsuccessful classmates
Correlation between the element 'self* and the construct 'clever*
Sum of squares for the element 'self*
2*2.4 Sample and procedure
Like the children in the first pilot study, the children for this 
second study were randomly chosen from the third and fourth year classes of 
a juni'or school in an-outer London borough. • Again, there were thirty
children in the sample, their ages ranging from 9 years 9 months to 11 years
7 months (average age 10 years 8*3 months).
Both the Self-Esteem Inventory and the Intellectual Achievement
Responsibility Scale were completed by the children in the classroom with
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the teacher present. Each child bias then seen individually on three 
occasions. In the first session, the descriptions of liked and disliked 
classmates were obtained. In the second session, the general grid bias 
administered and the descriptions of successful and unsuccessful 
classmates were recorded. And in the third session, thfe academic grid 
bias completed.
2.2.5 Results
As in the first pilot study, statistical analyses were limited 
to the calculation of Pearson product moment correlations between the 
different variables. These are given in Table 2.2 (on next page).
From this table, it can be seen that age did not correlate at a 
statistically significant level with any of the other variables, presumably 
because of the restricted age range of the sample. Some of the variables 
(such as the percentage of the variance accounted for by the first 
principal component on both grids) might be expected to be linked 
with age if a wider range were used.
Self-esteem (as measured by scores on Coopersmith's SEI) bias 
related to several other variables at statistically significant levels.
As in the first pilot study, SEI scores correlated with scores on the 
success subscale of the IAR (r = *53, p O O l ) ,  indicating that those 
who feel favourably about themselves tend to view their academic successes 
as being the results of their own efforts rather than of forces beyond 
their control. This finding suggests a link between children’s self­
esteem and their feelings about their schoolwork. Further evidence of 
such a link.can be found when we examine the results relating to the 
various academic grid measures. SEI scores were correlated with the 
average distance of the element 'self1 from both successful and 
unsuccessful classmates on the academic grid (r =-*56, p < * 0 1  and 
r = *45, p<L*05 respectively). In other words, those who feel good 
about themselves overall tend to view themselves as successful 
academically, whereas those whose self-esteem is lower see themselves 
as failing academically. SEI scores also correlate with the 
percentage of variance accounted for by the first principal
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component on the academic grid (r = *43, p<« 0 5 ) ,  indicating that 
children with high self-esteem tend to have a simpler set of constructs 
for dealing with academic matters, distinguishing more sharply between their 
successful and unsuccessful classmates. This is an interesting finding that 
awaits confirmation and amplification from the more extensive final study.
SEI scores also correlated with one of the variables on the general grid, 
the average distance of the construct! ’self' from disliked classmates 
(r= *47, p < / 0 l ) .  Thus, children with high self-esteem saw themselves as 
having less in common with those they disliked than did children with low 
self-esteem.
The correlation between the measures . of locus of control and self­
esteem have been mentioned already. There were no spectacular correlations 
between scores on the IAR scale and any of the measures derived, from the 
repertory grids, although two reached the *05 level of significance. 
Internality on the Failure subscale of the IAR correlated negatively .with 
the size of the correlation between the element ’self1 and the construct 
’clever', indicating that those who accept that their academic failures are 
the result of their own lack of ability or effort also tend to view themselves 
as not being very clever. This is just as one would expect.
2.2.6 Discussion
It will be remembered that the first aim of this study was to develop 
a way of measuring children’s general and academic self-concepts. The 
repertory grid technique was chosen as offering considerable potential in 
this direction. However, certain problems in using this technique with 
children had to be resolved first and one purpose of this study was to 
devise a satisfactory way of eliciting and identifying children's key 
personal constructs.
In general, the technique devised for eliciting constructs worked well. 
The children had little trouble producing sufficient constructs and shouted 
remarkably little hesitation in ranking themselves and their classmates 
according to these constructs. However, certain'problems emerged. Some of 
the constructs produced by the younger children were so black-and-white that 
no ranking was possible. For example, a child might say of a classmate that 
he stole things but would be unable to rank others on this construct, 
except to state that they did not steal things. The few constructs of this 
kind had to be omitted. Another problem was that occasionally a child
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failed to produce enough constructs to make up the required number and 
the extra constructs then had to be supplied. This applied particularly 
to the second grid which, because of its narrower focus, tended to produce 
fewer constructs. When this was the case, the constructs supplied were 
’clever1, ’good at English' and 'good at Maths'. When it was necessary 
to supply extra constructs for the first grid, those used were 'good at 
schoolwork' and 'good at games*. (In the final format, greater uniformity 
was achieved by including all the abov.e constructs in the relevant grids).
A more serious problem was how to select constructs when more than 
the required number had been elicited. This was a particular problem 
with the older children. Indeed, as Woolfson (1979) has pointed out, neither 
Kelly or later construct theorists have provided guidelines for identifying 
people's constructs from everyday speech. Yet when Woolfson shouted the 
transcript of a psychologist's interview with a child to other psychologists, 
the same group of constructs utas identified by 75/u of the raters. This 
suggests that it should be possible to specify criteria for selecting those 
constructs uthich are of greatest personal significance to the child. In 
the format that was eventually devised (and uihich is used in the main study), 
the selection of constructs is based on two criteria. First, constructs 
which were used repeatedly in describing different children were selected, 
the assumption being that these play a more central role in the child's 
personal construct system. Evidence that such repeated constructs are of 
particular importance for people comes from a study by Shubsachs (1975).
Second, the children were asked to rank the constructs in order of their 
importance for themselves, and those ranked highest were used to complete 
the list. Although such an instruction may be open to personal interpretation, 
the children seemed to have little difficulty in nominating and ranking 
constructs uihich were important to themselves.
Having devised a satisfactory uiay of obtaining grids from children, 
uie can turn back to our original question as to whether any of the 
measures derived from these grids can serve as indices of the children's 
general and academic self-concepts. From the results, it would seem that 
the mbst likely candiSates for these roles are those measures obtained by 
averaging the distance of the element 'self' from liked/disliked and 
successful/unsuccessful classmates. These measures have a face validity 
which is not possessed by the other grid measures uiith the exception of 
the correlation between the element 'self' and the construct 'clever'.
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concept directly, it did not seem to perform this function as well as did 
the average distances of ’self’ from successful and unsuccessful classmates. 
However, the true worth of any of these measures cannot be properly 
established until they have been used in a study which measures a number 
of key variables (such as attainments, intelligence, opinions of others) 
not used in this preliminary study.
2.2.7 Conclusions
Thus, although it is not possible to make a final choice of grid 
variables, some of them have been shown to relate to self-esteem in a 
meaningful way and the whole approach seems most promising. It became 
apparent during the second pilot study that a whole new dimension could be 
added to the repertory grids through the simple inclusion of 'ideal self1 
as an element. This would have a number of advantages. First, the 
correlation between the elements ’self1 and ’ideal self’ could be 
calculated and used as an index of self-esteem, as recommended by 
Wylie (1974). This corresponds to the explicit derived evaluation approach 
to measuring self-esteem which was described in the previous chapter ( see 
section 1.3.3). The performance of this correlational measure of self-esteem 
can then be compared with that of Coopersmith’s SEI which is an example of 
the implicit derived evaluation approach (see section 1.3.4). We have seen 
already how the repertory grid technique allows children to compare them­
selves with others using their own terms rather than those supplied by 
adults. The inclusion of the element 'ideal self' in the children’s grids 
allows them to evaluate themselves in their own terms as well. This is 
preferable to using questionnaire measures of children’s seLf— esteem as we 
can be much more confident that the terms being used are meaningful for them.
Reference should be made at this point to the fact that it is possible 
to use both 'self* and 'ideal self* as either elements or constructs when 
compiling repertory grids. As will be clear already, they will be used as 
elements in the present study. This is in accordance with the argument put 
forward by*Morris (1977) who suggests that people can psychologically 
handle 'self' and 'ideal self1 better as elements than as constructs, the 
resulting grids yielding more precise and detailed descriptions of the self.
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2*3.1 Intelligence
In any study which sets out to examine the relationships between 
self-esteem, academic self-concept and academic attainments, intelligence 
must be considered a key variable (see section 1.6). The measure of
i
intelligence chosen for the final study was the English Picture Vocabulary 
Test (EPVT) (Brimer and Dunn, 1962), an adaptation of the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test. This is described as !a measure of listening vocabulary' 
which 'because of its high correlation with more general measures of 
intelligence may be employed as an indicator of academic aptitude'.
Thus, Weisz et al. (1975) quote a study by Dunn (1965) which found 
correlations ranging from *82 to #86 between scores on the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test and Stanford-Binet Mental Ages. The test is individually 
administered and is functionally independent of reading. In the Full Range 
version there are 128 items. For each item, the child is asked to indicate 
which of four pictures best illustrates a word read out by the examiner.
These include objects (for example, spire, binocular), actions (for example, 
yawning, browshg) and abstractions (for example, destruction, dissatisfaction).
2,3.2 Attainments
Reading level was the main index of attainment used, supplemented 
by indices of attainment in mathematics and other subjects. Justification 
for focussing on reading as in index of achievement comes from a study by 
Fitzsimmons, Leonard & Macunovitch (1969). They looked at 270 pupils who 
were having serious academic difficulties at secondary school and found 
that half had already experienced severe failure as early as second grade 
and that reading was the most frequent origin of failure with other failures 
typically spreading from there.
Although the Neale Analysis of Reading Ability was the test used in the 
first pilot study, it did not prove to be wholly satisfactory for the 
particular age group involved. A suitable alternative was found in the 
Schonell Graded Word Readina Test (Schonell and Schonell, 1950) uihich was 
routinely administered by the junior school concerned. The 1972 norms were 
used. The Schonell is an individually administered test with an age range 
of 5 to 15 years. Although this avoids a ceiling effect with the younger 
age groups, an alternative test had to be found for the oldest group (12 to
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is sentence-completion, multiple-choice test of 60 items, and yields a 
standardized score. (The fact that this test differs in kind from the one 
used with the two younger groups is not a problem as far as within-group 
analyses are concerned. For between— group analyses, scores on both tests were 
converted to standard scores on a class-by-class basis),
1 Additional measures of attainment were available for the junior school
subjects based on the progress children had made through a series of set. 
texts in English and mathematics. (Details of the sample are given in section 
2.4). All children in the youngest group (8 to 9 year olds) were working at 
.their own pace through the 8 books of A.E. Tansley's Sound Sense (i960) series 
and the 7 books of Harold Fletcher’s Mathematics for Schools (.1970-3) series.
The children in the second group (10 to 11 year olds) were also using the 
Fletcher books. The advantages of using such indices of attainment as well 
as the attainment tests described above is that the children themselves were 
well aware of their relative progress through these books. In the absence of 
any formal reporting or grading by the school, this information presumably 
serves as a major source for these children's academic self-concepts.
(Progress in both series bias measured by the number of pages completed, this 
being the criterion used by the children themselves).
• For some of the analyses, a composite attainment rank bias used. This 
was calculated by averaging the ranks achieved by each child for the various 
attainment indices used with his or her class.
2.3.3 Self-esteem
The three measures of self-esteem to be used have all been described 
already. Tbio are measures of general self-esteem and the third a measure of 
academic self— ssteem. The two measures of general self-esteem are 
Coopersmith's Self-Esteem Inventory (Coopersmith, 1967) and the correlation 
between 'self' and 'ideal self' on the general repertory grid. These will 
be referred to as general self-esteem (SEI) and general self-esteem (Self/ideal). 
The measure of academic self-esteem is the correlation between 'self' and 
'ideal self' on the academic repertory grid.
2.3.4 Academic self-concept
The various indices of academic self-concept derivable from repertory 
grids have been described already and will merely be listed here. They are:-
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- average distance of ’self1 from successful classmates
- average distance of ’self1 from unsuccessful classmates
- correlation between the 'self1 and the construct 'clever' 
on the academic grid
- correlation between 'self' and the construct 'good at schoolwork' 
on the academic grid
i
(Although it might appear that the last two are identical, one can 
expect a progressive differentiation between the two as children get older.
As for the first two of these measures, it may seem that they are simply 
mirror opposites of each other. However, an examination of their respective 
correlations with other variables as shown in Table 2.2 suggests that they do 
not mirror each other exactly and need to be treated separately).
An additional and even more explicit measure of academic self-concept 
will be used. This is a technique, devised by Nash (1973, pp.90-1) which 
allows the child to estimate his academic standing in the class. The procedure 
is to write the names of all the children in the class on cards and then to 
get each child to sort the names of all the children in the class on cards and 
then to get each child to sort these cards into three groups : a group who 
were 'a bit cleverer than you*, a group 'about the same as you', and a group 
'not so clever as you'. The names of the children placed in each group were 
noted. Each child was then asked to rank those in the middle group ('put 
them in the right order*), including himself. The children's self-ranks for 
the whole class are arrived at by adding the number of children in the top 
group to the rank they assign themselves in the middle group. This method 
has the advantage of being both quicker and less demanding than getting the 
children to rank everyone else in the class. The resulting score will be 
referred to as the child's self rank.
2.3.5 Peer evaluations
Another advantage of the self-ranking method described above is that 
it allows one to calculate classmates* opinions of each child (Nash, 1973, 
p.9l).! This is done by- subtracting the number of- times the child was named 
as 'slower than me* from the number of times the child was mentioned ss 
'cleverer than me' by classmates. In a class of 25, the possible scores 
derived from this would range from -24 (for a child judged by everyone else 
in the class to be slower than themselves) to +24 (for a child everyone else 
deemed to be cleverer than themselves). These scores are then ranked and
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opinions of each other. This measure will be referred to as the child’s 
class rank.
2.3.6 Teacher evaluations
To match the two sets of ranks described above (self rank and class 
rank)^ a third ranking by the teachers was needed. The approach used is 
based on repertory grid technique and again is taken 'from Nash (1973, pp.
21-2). The first stage involved eliciting a dozen or more constructs from 
the class teachers using Kelly's triadic elicitation procedure (Kelly, 1955). 
Thus, the names of three children in the class were given to the teacher 
who was asked to say in what way two of them were alike and different from
the third. This procedure bias repeated with different groupings of children.
When sufficient constructs had been produced, the teachers were asked to rank 
them according to the qualities they valued most highly by their pupils. The 
eight qualities most highly valued by the teacher were then used as the basis 
of a rating scale, the teacher being asked to rate each child in the class on 
each of these qualities on a 4-point scale (for example, concentrates well, 
concentrates fairly well, qpite easily distracted, very distractible). These 
ratings were totalled for each child (the scores ranging from 8 to 32) and 
the resulting scores ranked. Ties were eliminated by giving the higher rank 
to those children rated more favourably on those constructs that the teacher 
valued more highly. This measure will be referred to as the child's teacher 
rank.
It will be noted that the teachers were not asked specifically to 
evaluate their pupils* academic prowess. In fact, the qualities they chose 
were usually a mixture of the personal (such as lively, forthcoming, truthful) 
and the academic (such as concentrates, tries hard, co-operative). It was
assumed that the teachers' behaviour towards their pupils would be based on
just such a broad mixture of constructs and that the children's evaluations 
of themselves (that . is, their self-esteem as well as their academic self- 
concepts) would be more affected by that behaviour than by behaviour based 
on a more narrow set of constructs.
• For the secondary school group, measuring teacher evaluations bias a 
more complex business as more than one teacher bias involved. If one 
excludes the 'non-academic' subjects (for example, craft, drama, music, PF)^ 
this class had six separate teachers. The teacher evaluation score for 
this class bias obtained by averaging the evaluations of three of these
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teachers ^the teachers ot Lngiisn, rrencn ana bcience;. ror 
comparison, an indication of all six teachers’ evaluations of the 
pupils’ progress bias obtained from the school records. Each child at this 
school receives half-yearly reports in which subject teachers rate the 
child's potential, effort, and actual attainments on a five-point scale.
The last two half-year reports were examined and an average rating 
for actual attainments in six subjects (English, Naths, Science, History, 
Geography and French) bias derived. The importance of this particular 
measure is that it is based on information made available to the children 
themselves, so should closely relate to their academic self-concepts.
It will be referred to as the child's academic report.
2.3.7 Popularity, field-independence and locus of control
The measures used for these three variables have been described 
already (section 2.1.3). For the younger children, field-independence was 
assessed by the Children’s Embedded Figures Test (liJitkin et al., 1971) while 
those of secondary school age were given the Embedded Figures Test (also 
Witkin et al.,1971), which is the version for adults and adolescents.
Locus of control bias measured by the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility 
Scale (Crandall, Katkovsky and Crandall, 1965).
2.3.8 Measures derived from children’s descriptions of their peers
The technique used for eliciting children’s personal constructs 
produces a lot of incidental data in the form of descriptions of peers 
(both in general and academic terms). These were analysed in a variety of 
ways, but only a few of these are relevant to the present study. One 
quality that can be identified from children’s descriptions of others is 
egocentrism, the tendency to describe others in terms of their relationships 
biith s or impact upon oneself rather than giving an impersonal ’objective* 
account of their characteristic behaviour towards others. The criteria 
used to identify this tendency are those elaborated by Peevers and Secord 
(1973) in their study of developmental changes in children's descriptions 
of their contemporaries. Peevers and Secord coded each descriptive item 
according to whether it was egocentric (describing another in terms of 
oneself), mutual (referring to shared activities or qualities), or other- 
oriented (containing no reference to oneself). The essential feature of 
egocentric descriptions is that they provide no real information about the 
person being described, only about the person doing the describing. (Fuller 
details can be found in Peevers and Secord’s Person Concept Code, available 
from the authors).
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peers is the proportion of abstract constructs used. Abstract ( or central) 
constructs have been distinguished from peripheral constructs by Livesley 
and Bromley (1973, pp.106-7) and it is their definition which uii.ll be used 
in the present study. Briefly, abstract or central constructs deal with 
personality traits, general habits, motives, values, attitudes and the 
like, uihereas peripheral constructs refer to the external qualities of 
people and their surroundings (such as appearance, possessions, social 
relationships and so on).
A third measure that can be derived from children’s descriptions of their 
peers is what Peevers and Secord (1973) call evaluative consistency.
This refers to the extent to uihich children’s descriptions of their peers 
are consistently positive or negative in tone (that is, whether they describe 
their friends exclusively in positive terms and those they dislike in 
negative terms, or whether they can see good and bad qualities in both).
Each construct is first coded as positive, negative, or neutral in tone 
(see Peevers and Secord’s Person Concept Code for the criteria used). 
Evaluative consistency is given by the percentage of positive constructs 
used in describing liked classmates and the percentage of negative 
constructs used in describing disliked classmates.
2.3.9 Cognitive complexity
Two measures of what may arguably be equated with cognitive complexity 
were used. The first involved a simple count of the number of constructs used 
by each child in describing others. Livesley and Bromley (1973) have 
discussed the problems involved in reliably identifying the number of 
constructs or statements used in such descriptions, but report a high 
degree of consensus between independent judges (correlations ranging from 
•89 to *98). They defined a construct or statement as "one element or idea 
referring directly or indirectly to the stimulus person or to some other 
person" (p.98). In the present study, all the children's descriptions 
were divided into constructs by two independent judges (both experienced 
educational psychologists). Agreement was high (*95), indicating that 
the number of constructs used could be identified reliably. Many children 
used some constructs more than once, but an analysis of the results using 
both the total number of constructs used and the number of distinct 
constructs used indicated that eliminating the repeated constructs yielded 
little or no further information. Moreover, it proved more difficult 
to get agreement between the judges on the number of distinct constructs 
used by each child (the correlation being *87). Consequently, repetitions
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have been allowed in establishing the number of constructs used.
Since each child produced two sets of descriptions, one couched in 
general terms and the other focussing on academic achievements, there are 
two measures of the number of constructs used (labelled general and 
academic respectively). Similarly, there are two versions of the second
i •
measure of cognitive complexity, the variance accounted for by the first 
principal component on both the general and the academic repertory 
grids. (This measure was described in section 2.2.3).
2.3.10 Value placed upon being clever and/or-good at schoolwork
Mention was made in the previous chapter (section 1.2.2) of the 
importance of the value one places on successful achievement. It was argued 
that academic failure will only effect the self-esteem of one who values 
achievement in this area. To assess the value that children place upon 
being clever and/or good at their work, the present study uses a repertory 
grid measure devised by Ryle and Breen (1972), which indicates how extreme 
a view is taken of a particular element or construct. This is given by the 
product of the loading of the element or construct on the component and the 
percentage of the total variance accounted for by the component. This is 
calculated for the first two principal components.
In the present study, there are two measures of this kind, one for 
each grid. On the general grid, the value placed upon academic success 
is given by the sum of the products of the loading of the construct ’good 
at work* on the first two principal components and the percentage of the 
total variance accounted for by these components. And for the academic 
grid, the value placed upon academic ability is calculated in the same 
way, this time for the construct ’clever’.
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2.4 1HL bAlvIFL t
As has been argued already, there are good reasons for thinking 
that children's classmates have a considerable influence on their 
perceptions of themselves. One cannot establish the influence of such 
factors as attainments and ability on children's self-esteem and academic 
self-concepts without taking into account the constitution of their immediate 
reference group and the evaluations of the members of that group. In other 
words, whole classes must be studied. In the present investigation, the 
intention was to interview all the children in as many classes a"S possible, 
but the amount of interviewing and testing involved in such a detailed 
study limited the number of classes that could be used. In the end, three 
classes were studied, two at junior school level and one at secondary 
level, with partial information being available on another junior school 
class.
As has been suggested already, a number of important developments 
occur in c h i l d r e n s  self-concepts as they grow older. In order to examine 
these changes, children of different ages were studied. The lower limit 
was determined by the nature of the tasks involved. The questionnaires 
used are not suitable for children younger than 8 years of age, and the 
same is true of the repertory grid technique. Thus, Salmon (1976) 
suggests that only children of about eight years and older can categorize 
elements presented in verbal terms (rather than categorizing real objects 
such as photographs). The upper age limit in the present study was 
determined by the willingness of schools and parents to agree to the 
children being interviewed at length, a procedure which necessarily 
involved frequent withdrawal from lessons. The older the children, the 
more difficult it was to get this agreement. Thus, the oldest group 
studied were 13 year olds, although a somewhat older group would have 
been preferable. Details of the sample are as follows :
Table 2.3 : Details of sample
Level of class Flean age Range Numbers of Total
_ v . Boys Girls
Class 1 Second year 
junior school
8*41 yxs 8*08 to 9*00 12 10 22
Class 2 Fourth year 
junior school
11*33 yrs 10*75 to 11*83 13 12 25
Class 3 Second year 
secondary school
13*11 yrs 12*67 to 13*58 12 14 26
-99-
boys and 6 girls from a parallel class in the same school was included in 
some analyses (those which did not violate the rationale of class-by-class 
analyses). This larger group was constituted as fallows :
Second year 8*42 yrs 8*08 to 9*00 16 16 32
junior school
Thus, the total sample (Classes, 1, 2 and 3) consisted of 73 children, with 
some analyses being based on a larger sample of 83 children.
The two schools involved in this study come from a large (population) 
approximately 300,000) and relatively wealthy outer London Borough. The main 
concern in choosing suitable schools was to ensure that they were properly 
’comprehensive1 in their admission procedures, that is, that they did not 
select children on the basis of ability or sex. It bias felt that a wide 
range of abilities and attainments within each class would sharpen the 
children’s awareness of their standing in class and hence increase the 
likelihood of finding significant differences in academic self-concept and 
self-esteem. The choice of junior school bias relatively straightforward as 
none of the junior schools in this Borough were selective in their admissions. 
This bias not the case at the Secondary level, and the school used in this 
study was selected because it was one of the few which was not competing 
with a local grammar school for its pupils and which did not ’stream' its 
classes according to ability. Another consideration in choosing schools 
bias obtaining their co-opeBtion and goodwill. This bias achieved by making 
the selection from those schools that the present author visited already as 
Educational Psychologist employed by the Local Education Authority.
As the main emphasis in this study was to be on within-class analyses, 
no particular attempt bias made to match the schools or classes chosen on such 
factors as ability or socio-economic status, other than ensuring that the 
pupils were of a reasonably wide range of ability. Nevertheless, it bias 
felt that both the individual classes and the schools themselves were 
broadly comparable. To have achieved a closer match would have involved 
a great deal more preliminary screening, leaving less time for actual 
interviewing.
Another fact that should be noted is that certain children were 
omitted from the sample, the actual class numbers being somewhat greater 
than those quoted above. These omissions were made on the following
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grounds : (a) immigrant children who had been in England less than 12 
months and whose English was therefore suspect (2 cases); (b) children 
who had transferred to the school within the last 6 months and who might 
not yet be fully integrated in the class (1 case); (c) children who 
persistently failed to attend school (1 case); and (d) children whose 
parents refused permission for their child’s involvement (3 cases). The 
numbers omitted for each class were 1 from Class 1, 3 from Class 2 and 
3 from Class 3. The final' sample of 73 children is 91% of the possible 
total.
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7.5 PROCEDURE
All questionnaires and group tests were administered first, with 
individual testing and interviewing being left till later. The 
Questionnaires and group tests were given in the classroom by the present 
author and the class teacher (or, in the case of Class 3, the form tutor). 
The questionnaires involved were Coopersmith1s Self-Esteem Inventory, the 
Crandall et al. Intellectual Achievement Resonsibility Scale, and the 
brief socio-metric Questionnaire. In the case of the youngest group, 
these were read aloud to assist the weaker readers. The only group test 
involved was the NFER Reading Test EH1 used with Class 3. All other 
testing and interviewing bias done individually, either by the teachers 
(in the case of the Schonell Graded Word Reading Test) or by the present 
author. Besides the Schonell, the tests administered individually were 
the English Picture Vocabulary Test, the Embedded Figures Test and the 
Children’s Embedded Figures Test.
Following the testing, a lengthy interview bias conducted with each 
child, usually over several sessions. In the first of these sessions, 
the individual tests were administered and any anomalies in the children’s 
responses to the questionnaires (such as items not answered) were clarified. 
Then the children were asked to name eight classmates of the same sex as 
themselves, four whom they liked and three whom they disliked. . They were 
then asked to describe three of those they liked and two whom they disliked. 
(The exact procedure has been described in section 2.2.2).
As an example of the kind of data this procedure yields, here is an 
eight year old boy describing a friend of his :
"He’s a good and friendly boy. He's kind and helpful, he helps other 
people. He plays with me a lot. He's got a brother and a sister. (How is 
he different from you?). UJe both came from Ireland but from different 
parts. He goes travelling a lot - he goes to about 2 or 3 places in his 
holidays, liie're both good at football. He's very good at rounders, he 
always "gets'one more ruti than me. He's scared of'the bars, he can’t climb 
up to the top. H e ’s very bad-tempered, much more than me. (is there 
anything you dislike about him?). Yes, when he comes up and hits me.
And sometimes he fouls us when we play football".
This account contains 17 concepts, four of which were judged to be 
’egocentric', while two were coded as 'mutual' and the rest as ’other- 
orientated' .
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ivcn. a n  u m i u r e n  i n  i n i s  g r o u p  u u u l u  p i u v i u a  a s  muun u t i d i i  m  m a n  
descriptions. Here is an eight year old girl describing someone she 
dislikes :
"She's got brown hair down to her shoulders. And she's little.
And she's spiteful. And she does untidy work. And she bosses me 
about when I don't kick the ball at rounders. (How is she( different from 
you?). She's spiteful, (is there anything you like about her?). No".
There are only six concepts here, one of which is 'egocentric' and 
the rest 'other-oriented'.
For the sake of comparison, here are examples of corresponding 
descriptions by 12 year olds.
"He's quite a joker, but he does get on my nerves sometimes - he 
might make a snide joke about you behind your back. I like talking about 
football with him because he knows about football and his team. He's sort 
of a carefree person - if he was going to the doctors, he'd take the whole 
day off, whereas I would corrte to school for half the day. (How else is 
he different from you?). He can be a bad sport - he gets in a mood and 
sulks - he takes things a bit too seriously. He's a bit old-fashioned - in 
his clothes, haircut, that sort of thing, (is there anything you dislike 
about him?). He's good at football but sometimes he boasts about it".
And a girl describing someone she dislikes :
"She's spiteful. If you tell her anything, she'll go round telling 
everyone. She's sly. She's a gossiper - you can never tell her any secrets. 
If you ever fight with her, she'll call you names and then tell everyone you 
said something that you hadn't said and then everyone would hate you. She's 
such a tomboy — all she wants to play is football. She goes round with 
older boys. (How is she different from you?). She’s taller and she's got 
much shorter hair, cut like a boy's. . She likes playing football and I 
don't. If -you have any new clothes and she'si jealous, she'll try and 
run them down. (is there anything you like about her?). No"
The first of these descriptions contains 15 concepts (3 of them 
'egocentric') while the second has 13.
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Between the first and second interview sessions, all constructs 
used by the particular child were identified and those applicable to a 
range of people were written on slips of paper. (for example, the 
constructs extracted from the last description quoted above were 'spiteful*, 
'sly', 'gossips', 'lies about people', 'tomboy', 'goes round with older 
boys', 'tali', 'short hair', and 'makes jealous comments'). Those used 
in more than one description were identified (in the example quoted, these 
were the constructs 'spiteful' and 'gossips’) and, in the second session, 
the children were asked to rank the rest according to how important the 
constructs were for them. Those listed as most important were added to 
those used most often to make up the final list of eight constructs for 
the repertory grid. Finally, for each of these constructs, the children 
were asked to rank ten 'elements' : four liked classmates, four disliked 
classmates (all the same sex as themselves), plus 'self* and 'ideal self'*
With minor modifications, this same process was repeated for the 
second repertory grid. This time the children were asked to nominate 
classmates who were successful or unsuccessful academically and to give 
reasons for their success oY1 lack of it. The resulting descriptions were 
generally briefer than those quoted above. Here is a typical B year old's 
description of a successful and an unsuccessful classmate :
"He never copies anyone. I help him think of the answers. He gets 
his sums right sometimes. He's not very good at his writing. He never 
looks at anybody else's work".
"He gets some of the sums wrong. He's always talking to people.
He's on lower books in Fletcher Maths. He's useless at answering 
questions. He's not clever".
And here are the corresponding descriptions by one of the 12 year olds :
"He thinks hard. He doesn't want to be disturbed. Whenever he's not 
sure of something, he-always asks. He keeps his books very neat and tidy.
He's very well equipped, he's got a ruler and colouring pencils. He's 
got a good memory. When he starts work, he always sits down to finish it."
"He fools about. He often asks people for answers. He doesn't 
think hard enough about the work. He always goes with people that play
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about. He often comes without any ink in his pen".
The same process as before was used in arriving at a list of eight 
constructs, except that the first three constructs were provided ('clever1, 
'good at maths', 'good at English'), whether they had been mentioned 
by the child or not. Again, on each of these constructs the child was 
asked to rank ten 'elements' : four successful classmates, four 
unsuccessful classmates, plus 'self' and 'ideal self'. At the same 
time as the children were ranking these elements according to the 
construct 'clever*, they were asked to extend this to the whole class, 
using the method devised by Nash (1973). of sorting their names into three 
piles (see section 2.3.4). this yields both a self rank and (by combining 
all the children's rankings of each other) a class rank.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
A key feature of this study is its focus on whole classes of children.
As explained in the first chapter, the rationale for this approach is that 
children’s thoughts and feelings about themselves, especially when it comes 
to things academic, are intimately bound up with how they compare with their 
immediate peer group. And for most children, particularly young children, 
this peer group consists of their classmates. Because the primary focus 
was to be on individual classes, no detailed attempt bias made to match the 
three classes on features such as ability, socio-economic status or ethnic 
background. This was because the concern is not so much with the 
representativeness of the particular classes chosen as with establishing 
whether similar processes operated in different classrooms, however disparate 
they might be.
Therefore, in this chapter the principal focus will be on analysing 
each class separately. Nevertheless, there will be times when analyses of 
the whole sample will be useful. There are problems in making such analyses, 
however. For instance, there are substantial correlations at each age level 
between children’s academic self-concepts and their reading ages. However, 
when the whole sample is analysed together, the correlation drops to zero.
This is because children’s academic self-concepts are based on comparisons 
within their own age group rather than on comparisons with much older children 
who will mostly have higher attainments. A 10 year old boy with a reading age 
of a 12 year old does not think himself any less clever because his older 
sister is reading at a 15 year old level but would definitely re-evaluate 
himself if he finds that one of his own classmates was reading at that level. 
Therefore, in analysing the sample as a whole, care must be taken to prevent 
age differences from obscuring the important variations that occur within 
each age group.
This can be done by translating each variable for each age group into 
standard scores. When these are used in calculating the correlation between 
academic self-concepts and reading ages for the whole sample, a substantial 
correlation is found, just as one would expect from the analyses of the 
separate classes. The use of standard scores is of particular importance when 
we are dealing with these variables which are specifically based on comparisons 
within the classroom (such as self rank, class rank, popularity). In fact, it 
bias decided to standardize all variables whenever the whole sample was being 
analysed.
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Almost all of the statistical analyses performed in this study used the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (S.P.S.S.) (Nie, Bent and Hull, 
1970). Non-parametric statistics were used whenever ranked data was involved. 
Whenever parametric analyses were involved, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
(Siegel, 1956) was used first to establish that the variables involved were
normally distributed. Only variables which met this criterion were included
I
in parametric analyses.
Another feature of the results that follow is that the direction of some
of the variables has been altered so that correlations between measures of
similar variables are positive rather than negative. The aim has been to 
make the correlational results less confusing to follow. Thus, the 
correlation between the two measures of general self-esteem (SEI score and 
self/ideal self correlation) is negative because favourable self-esteem is 
given by a high score on the former and a low score on the latter. Accordingly, 
the grid measure of self-esteem has been reversed (so that a high score 
indicates favourable self-esteem), with the result that the correlation 
between the two measures becomes a positive one. The following variables 
have been altered in this way^ : general self esteem (self/ideal self), 
academic self esteem, class rank, self rank, distance from liked others, 
and distance from successful others. Two other variables have been altered 
so that they correlate negatively with the above variables. They are 
distance from disliked others and distance from unsuccessful others. Finally, 
two further variables have been inverted, this time so that the scores
reflect their titles. High scores on.the two measures of cognitive
complexity now mean that the children concerned have relatively complex 
personal construct systems.
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3.2 MEASURES OF SELF-ESTEEM
3.2.1 Introduction
Two measures of general self-esteem have been used in the present study, 
representing two of the approaches described in the first chapter (section 
1.3). One measure, an example of the explicit derived evaluation approach, 
is the correlation between the elements ’self* and ’ideal self*' on the 
general repertory grid. The other measure, an example of the implicit 
derived evaluation approach, is Coopersmith’s Self-Esteem Inventory (SEl) 
(Coopersmith, 1965). Before comparing these two measures5the results of 
some preliminary investigations of the SEI will be considered.
3.2.2 Aim 1 : To factor analyse Coppersmith’s SEI
As previously discussed (section 1.3,4), there are certain problems 
in interpreting the scores on questionnaires such as the SEI. When one 
totals the answers to a range of questions, one can never be quite sure 
what the final score means, whether it represents one central quality or 
a possible meaningless average of several qualities. Therefore, in order 
to interpret the correlations between SEI scores and other variables, we 
need to know how unitary a measure it is, how large a *g* component it 
possesses. This can be established by factor analysing the responses. If 
the first factor accounts for a sufficiently large proportion of the 
variance (preferably greater than 50%) and has a good number of items 
loading positively on it, then it can reasonably be assumed that the SEI'is 
measuring some central quality (which we may choose to call general self­
esteem). As has been seen already, previous factor analyses of SEI responses 
suggest that it is multidimensional rather than unidimensional and that the 
dimensions that emerge do not correspond with the subscales proposed by 
Coopersmith. To establish whether this was the case with the present 
sample, the children’s SEI responses were factor analysed.
The method used was the Principal Factoring with Iteration option from 
the S.P.S.S. (Nie, Bent and Hull, 1970). This method was chosen because it 
assumes the existance of a unique (general) factor. In this method, the 
main diagonal elements of the correlation matrix are replaced by communality 
estimates which are then improved via an iteration procedure. For the present 
purposes, the factors were rotated orthogonally using the quartimax method, 
again because the first factor produced by this method tends to be a general 
one with many variables loading high on it. In deciding how many factors
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being stopped once the eigenvalues associated with the factors dropped below 
1.0. Summary results of these factor analyses for the first, five factors are 
given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 : Factor analyses of SEI responses ; percentage variance
accounted for by the first five factors.
Factor Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
First factor 20*5 19 *4 20*7 23*0
Second factor 10*0 11*3 12-7 10*8
Third factor 7.8 9.9 10.8 8.2
Fourth factor 7.0 8.9 8.9 6.8
Fifth factor 6*6 7*3 8*2 6*3
Cumulative percentage 51-9 56*8 61*3 55*1
These results do not hold out much hope for the identification of a 'g* 
factor of general.self-esteem, none of the first factors accounting for a 
substantial proportion of the variance. Instead, the results confirm the 
multi— dimensional nature of the SEI. However, there remains the possibility 
that some of the above factors are interpretable, perhaps as something more 
specific than general self-esteem (academic self— concept,for example). An 
inspection of the SEI items which load on the various factors will reveal 
this. If interpretable factors do emerge, then the individual children*s 
factor scores on each of these factors can be used as a measure of self­
esteem (or self-concept) in place of the more ambiguous SEI score. To 
see whether this is possible is the next task.
3.2.3 Aim 2 s To establish whether factor scores can be used 
as additional or alternative measures of self-esteem
Factor scores can be derived either from factor analyses of each group 
separately, or from a factor analysis of the whole sample. Factor scores 
derived from separate analyses can be used as indices of self-esteem only 
if it can be demonstrated that the factors themselves are compatible with 
one another. The simplest way of doing this is to inspect the main factors 
to see if the items loading on these factors are the same for each age group. 
Factor scores derived from an analysis of the whole sample can be used as 
measures of self-esteem only if the means of the factor scores for each age 
group are more or less equal.
Both these approaches uiill be tried, beginning with an inspection of 
the items loading on the main factors for each group. The decision as to 
what items loaded significantly on each factor was made according to the 
Burt-Banks formula (Child, 1970). Table 3.2 gives the details of the first 
two factors for each group as well as for the sample as a whole.
Table 3.2 : Factor analyses of SEI responses ; items loading on 
first tiito factors (Classes 1 and 2)
First factor (20.5%)
•883 I wish I were younger
•714 It's pretty tough to be me
•526 No one pays much attention to me at home
Second factor (10*0^)
•805 I find it hard to talk in front of the class
•711 I don't like being with other people
•635 I can't be depended upon
- -632 I'm easy to like
• 472 I often feel ashamed of myself
- -460 My parents and I have a lot of fun together
Class 2 First factor (19*4?6)
- -878 My teacher makes me feel I'm not good enough
•876 I'm proud of my schoolwork
• 813 I'm a lot of fun to be with
-•791 I'm not as nice looking as most people
•712 I'm pretty sure of myself
•663 I can make up my mind and stick to it
• 604 I'm easy to like
• 514 If I have something to say, I usually say it
Second factor (11*3/6)
•858 There are lots of times when I'd like to leave home
•612 My parents usually consider my feelings
• 576 I give in very easily
-•527 I spend a lot of time day dreaming
•520 I often feel upset in school
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loading on first, two factors (Class 3 and iiihole sample)
First factor (20*7^
—  778 I'm pretty sure of myself
•720 I'm not as nice looking as most people
• 693 I'm not doing as well at school as I'd like
•643 It takes me a long time to get used to anything
new
• 636 I often get discouraged at school
• 585 I'm often sorry for the things I do
•499 My teacher makes me feel I'm not good enough
-•483 My parents understand me
•482 I get upset easily at home
Second factor (12*7^)
•798 I'm doing the best work that I can
-•769 There are lots of times when I'd like to leave
home
Whole
Sample
First factor (23»O/0
•724 My parents expect too much of me
•588 Kids pick on me a lot
•564 I usually feel as if my parents are pushing me
-•483 My parents understand me
•476 I would rather play with children younger than me
•313 I spend a lot of time daydreaming
— •305 I'm pretty happy
Second factor (10*8^)
819 Most people are better liked than I am
646 I'm not as nice looking as most people
From an inspection of the loadings giv/en in Table 3.2, it is clear that 
there are considerable differences between the three age groups in the way 
they responded to the SFI. The content of the first factors differs for 
each group, while the second factors consist of as few as two items.
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An additional problem is that none of the factors can he easily 
summarized or labelled. Therefore, it will not be feasible to use factor 
scores derived from factor analyses of each separate group. The other 
approach looks more promising as the first factor for the whole sample is 
reasonably coherent. Three of the items concern relationships with parents 
and the factor as a whole seems to be dealing with feelings of 
victimisation and isolation. As stated previously, if the scores derived ( 
from this factor are to be used as measures of self-esteem, then the means 
of these scores for each class have to be more or less equal. The actual . 
means (and standard deviations) of these factor loadings were 2*197 (*069), 
3*541 (*142) and — 5*738 (-2*221) for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Clearly, 
the loadings for Class 3 are significantly different from those of Classes 1 
and 2, This means that these, .factor' scores do not mean the same thing for 
the oldest children as they do for the younger groups. Therefore, the 
loadings on this factor cannot be used as a substitute for total SEI score. 
Thus, it has not proved possible to derive alternative measures of self-esteem 
by factor analysing the children*s responses to the SEI,
3.2.4 Aim 3' : To compare the nomoloqical networks of the two measures 
of general* self-esteem
The above analyses have confirmed the difficulties in interpreting total
scores on Coopersmith*s SEI yet have failed to produce any less ambiguous
substitute in the form of factor scores. In the hope of learning more about
what SEI scores reflect, the two measures of general self-esteem will now
be compared. Their respective nomological networks will be examined in order
to establish whether they are measures of the same construct or not. The
idea of a nomological network, which comes from Cronbach and Fleehl (1955), is
that if the two measures reflect the same construct, then not only would they
correlate with each other but their relationships with other variables (their
correlational networks) should also be similar. If their correlations with
other variables do not match, then they are probably not measures of the same
in
construct. Another aim is: examining the nomological networks of these two 
measures is to identify those variables with which they are systematically 
correlated, thereby further elucidating the meaning of the construct. There 
are a number of different procedures for developing nomological networks, a 
correlational approach (as in Gottfried and Brody, 1975) being adopted here.
Before examining the patterns of correlation however, the children*s 
responses to the two measures of general self-esteem will be analysed to see
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if there are any differences according to age and sex. Table 3.3 and 3.4 
gives the class means and standard deviations plus the results of a two-way 
analysis of variance (by age and sex) for each self-esteem measure.
Table 3.3 : Age and sex differences in general self-esteem 
(Coppersmith’s SEI)
I
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Boys 28*75 31.69 35*17 31-56
Girls 28.25 32*00 35*00 31*57
All 28.50 31*84 35*08 31.57
(S.d.) (8.61) (7.93) (6.97) (8.30)
2-way ANOVA : by age F = 4*77 (p = *011 with 2 and 77 d.f.)
by sex F = 0*00 (p = n.s. with 1 and 77 d.f.) 
by age- and sex F = 0*04 (p = n.s. with 2 and 77 d.f.)
From Table 3.3, it can be seen that scores on the SEI increase 
significantly with age (the test for linear trend gives F=9*93, p O 0 0 1  
with 1 and 80 d.f.) There are.no sex differences. Table 3.4 gives the 
corresponding figures for the second measure of general self-esteem. (Note 
that the self/ideal self correlations are expressed in terms of degrees 
where 0° is equivalent to a correlation of 1*0, 90° to one of 0*00 and 180° 
to one.of - 1*0 ).
Table 3.4 : Age and sex differences in general self-esteem (self/
ideal self)
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Boys 42.40 43.67 63*57 48*99
Girls .43.00 55.82 54.52 50*50
All 42.70 49*46 58.67 49.74
(S.d.) (26*12) (24*02) (33*36) (28*47)
2-way AN0VA : by age F = 2*28 (n.s. with 2 and 77 d.f.)
by sex F = 0*03 (n.s. with 1 and 77 d.f.)
by age and sex F = 0*89 (n.s. with 2 and 77 d.f.)
Table 3.4 shows that there is a tendency for the correlation between 
’self’ and ’ideal self* on the general repertory grid to decrease with age.
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This tendency is not statistically significant however. Again, there are no 
differences in the responses of boys and girls.
The fact that the two measures of general self-esteem show opposing 
age trends suggests that they do not reflect the same construct. An 
inspection of the correlations between the two measures confirms this.
These are as follows : for Class 1, r = *65 (p<«00l); fpr Class 2, 
r = •2'! (n.s,); and for Class 3, r = *04 (n.s.). For the whole sample, 
the correlation between the two measures is *33 (p<^*00l). As suspected, 
the two measures of general self-esteem diverge from each other as children 
get older. The correlation between the two measures for the youngest group, 
is significantly greater than those for both the middle group (p<^*035) and 
the oldest group (p-c^/OIS).
The nomological network of each measure will now be examined to see if 
this divergence is reflected there as well. Table 3.5 (on next page) gives 
the correlations of each measure with a number of other variables. These are 
divided into four groups, three of which have some connection with academic 
progress.
There is a consistant pattern which can be discerned in the 
correlations given in Table 3.5. For the eight year olds (Class l), the 
grid measure of self-esteem correlates at a statistically significant level 
with every academic variable except one (verbal intelligence). These 
correlations are almost all weaker for the eleven year olds (Class 2) and 
bieaker still for the thirteen year olds (Class 3) where none are 
statistically significant. Coopersmith1s SEI also correlates significantly 
uiith some of the academic variables for the youngest group, though generally 
the correlations are not as high as they are for the grid measure. However, 
unlike the grid measure, SEI scores continue to be linked with the various 
academic measures, and are significantly correlated with all of the academic 
variables for the oldest group. For Class 3, the correlations of the two 
measures of self-esteem with the other academic variables are significantly 
different in three instances (reading attainment, academic report, and class 
rank) (for all three, p</025).
When the three variables concerned with social functioning are examined, 
the pattern is reversed. For Class 1, both measures of self-esteem correlate
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MEASURES OE ATTAINMENT Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Reading
attainment
SEI
Self/ideal
*
• 33
• 52***
• 02 
•06
•**
• 53 
-•01
*
• 30 
•20*
Maths
attainment
SEI
Self/ideal
• 25 
•55
•28
•29
-
English
attainment
SEI
Self/ideal
•40*
.46**
- -
Academic
Report
SEI 
Self/ldeal
- •53***
•03 —
MEASURES OF ACADEMIC SELF-CONCEPT
Self rank SE1 
Self/ideal
•27
rn'X#*50
• 14 
•32
•36*
•02
• 26** 
•29**
Self/
successful
others
SEI
Self/ideal
•32*
•46**
•38*
•30
• 38 
•03
•36***
•26**
Self/
unsuccessful
others
SEI
Self/ideal
—  39
*
-•40
-•24
-•34
*
-•33
-•28
ry y y AAA
-•32
y y y _ _ AAA
-•35
OTHER ACADEMIC MEASURES
Class • 
Rank
SEI 
Self/ideal
V V V■■ . A A A
•54
-V V V_ . * A A
•54
• 34* 
*33
V V/ V •58*-*-*-
•00
y y yn 7\ A A
•50
•31**
Teacher
Rank
SEI
Self/ideal
•25
•36*
• 34*
• 45*
• 35 
•06
•31**
•29
Verbal
Ability
SEI
Self/ideal
• 09 
•20
—  08 
• 15
• 36* 
*19
•12
•18
MEASURES OF SOCIAL FUNCTIONING
Popularity SEI 
Self/ideal
•34*
*
•33
• 22 
•13
—  11
•15
•16
•22*
Self/
liked
others
SEI
Self/ideal
•59*** 
• 68***
•25
•54
-•01
*41
y y y 
y y y
• 55
Self/
disliked
others
SEI
Self/ideal
-•48**
y y Vr* « A A *
-•57
—  12 
-•49
•21
***
-•61
—  16
__***
-•56
(The statistical significance of these correlations is given by 
*p<T05, **p<-01, and ***p<-00l).
- 118-
Classes 2 and 3, the correlations between SEI scores and the three 'social' 
variables become progressively weaker, while for the grid measure of self­
esteem the correlation with two of these variables at least remain statistic­
ally significant.
It must be concluded that the two measures of self-esteem are not 
measuring the.same construct. This may be because, as discussed previously, 
they represent different approaches to the measurement of self-esteem (implicit 
derived evaluation versus explicit derived evaluation). At any rate, on the 
evidence considered so far, it would seem that Coopersmith's Self-Esteem 
Inventory has a stronger academic element and a weaker social element than 
the grid measure of self-esteem. The next step is to compare these results 
with those for the third measure of self-esteem.
3.2.5. Aim 4 : To compare the nomolooical network of the measure
of academic self-esteem with - those*of the two treasures of general 
self-esteem
Academic self-esteem is given by the correlation between the elements 
'self1 and 'ideal self1 on the academic repertory grid. Thus it is the 
counterpart of the second measure of general self-esteem but can be regarded 
as a measure of academic self-esteem because of the narrower focus of the 
grid from which it is derived. Before comparing this measure with the two 
measures of general self-esteem, age and sex differences will be analysed.
Table 3.6 gives the relevant means and standard deviations plus the results 
of a two-way analysis of variance (by age and sex) for academic self-esteem.
As before, the self/ideal self correlations are expressed in the form of 
degrees.
Table 3.6 : Age and sex differences in academic self-esteem
Class 1 . Class 2 Class 3 All
Boys 29*0 67*2 65*8 51*9
Girls 44* 6 52-4 69-1 55*0
All 36*8 60*1 67*6 53*5
(S.d.) (27-7) (42*7) (33? 7) (36*8)
2-way AWOUA ••
by age
by age : F = 
by sex : F = 
and sex : F =
6*30 (p = *003 
0*12 (n.s. with 
1*36 (n.s. with
with 2 and 77 d.f.)
1 and 77 d.f.)
2 and 77 d.f.)
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tendency for the correlations between self and ideal self on the academic grid 
to decrease with age. This tendency was also observed for the corresponding 
measure on the general grid but was not statistically significant. As with 
the two measures of general self— esteem, there are no consistent sex 
differences in academic self-esteem.
In comparing the nomological networks of the three measures of self­
esteem, one of the aims is to establish whether similar methods of measuring 
self-esteem have more in common than measures which purport to be similar in 
content. In view of the differences that have emerged between the two 
measures of general self-esteem, it can be expected that academic self-esteem 
will be more highly correlated with scores on the SEI than with correlation 
between self and ideal self on the general grid. However, in view of the 
similar age trends found for the two grid measures of self-esteem, perhaps 
these will correlate more highly with each other than with the SEI.
Table 3.7 gives the actual correlations between academic self-esteem and 
the general self-esteem measures.
Table 3.7 : Correlations •between academic self-esteem and
two measures of general self-esteem
General self-esteem Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
_  - —  * * *  •***
(1) SEI *47 *11 *57 *39
_y y v- sl x y y
(2) Self/ideal self *72 *42 *26 -49
* p < * 0 5 ,  * * p < - 0 1 ,  * * * p < * 0 0 1 .
The correlations in Table 3.7 more or less follow the expected pattern. 
Thus, the correlations between academic self-esteem and the grid measures of 
general self-esteem decrease with age, the drop from *72 for Class 1 to 
•26 for Class 3 being statistically significant ( p O 0 3 5 ) .  Academic self­
esteem correlates significantly with SEI scores for both Class 1 and Class 3 
(as anticipated) but not for Class 2 (which was not). For further 
clarification of these differences, the nomological network for the measure 
of academic self-esteem will now be considered, using the same variables 
as before. Table 3.8 (on the next page) gives the details.
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vari abl es
MEASURES OF ATTAINMENT Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Reading attainment
*
.44 • 33
*
•42
***
•40
Maths attainment
*
.44
-K-X-*
•59 - -
English attainment •28 - - -
i
Academic report - -
*
•36 -
MEASURES OF ACADEMIC SELF-CONCEPT
Self rank •28
***
•63
**
•53
***
• 46
Self/successful others •28
***
• 61 •62
***
•49
Self/unsuccessful others
*-*
-•51 -•84
. *** 
-•67 -•66
OTHER ACADEMIC MEASURES
* ** * ***
Class rank •39 •54 •44 •45
Teacher rank •34 •00 •25
*
•21
Verbal ability •12 •30 •29
*
•22
MEASURES OF SOCIAL FUNCTIONING
Popularity •31
*
-•35 •06 •00
Self/liked others
*
•45 •30 •33
***
•37
Self/disliked others
*
-•38 -•31 -•06
*
-•22
* p<*05, **p<-01, ***p<*001.
From this table it can be seen that the measure of academic self-esteem
matches the nomological network of the SEI more closely than it does that of 
the grid measure of general self-esteem, at least as far as academic variables 
are concerned. On average, academic self-esteem correlates more highly with 
the various academic variables than SEI scores but not in every instance,
(Thus, SEI scores tend to correlate more highly with class rank). With 
regard to the measures of social functioning, the picture is confused, academic 
self-esteem not matching either of the measures of general self-esteem in its 
pattern of correlations.
Three points emerge from these results. First, there is some 
justification from thinking of the correlation between ’self’ and 'ideal self1 
on the academic grid as a measure of academic self-esteem. Second, it is not 
simply a matter of different ways of measuring self-esteem. After all, 
academic self-esteem (which is an example of the explicit derived evaluation
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approach) does not seem to be as cioseiy matcnea w i x h  u m  uuLicopunujLi.y 
measure on the general grid as it is with the SEI (which is an example 
of the implicit derived evaluation approach). Third, the above results 
confirm the academic bias of the SEI, In view of the fact that such a 
bias was not evident when SEI responses were factor analysed,' we must 
conclude that it does not apply to all children, that is, that a high 
SEI score does not always mean that a child has a positive academic 
self-concept or is doing well academically. Nevertheless, it will need 
to be kept in mind when we are considering the main body of the results,
3,2,6 Summary
This section has been devoted to a preliminary analysis of the three 
measures of self-esteem, beginning with an attempt to clarify what 
Coopersmith*s Self-Esteem Inventory actually measures. Factor analyses of 
the children's responses to the SEI only confirmed what earlier studies had 
shown , that the SEI is multidimensional and does not possess an identifiable 
*g* factor. The possibility of using factor scores instead of the more 
ambiguous total SEI scores was explored but proved not to be feasible with 
the present sample. Some clarification of what the SEI measures emerged
i
from a comparison of the nomological networks of the three measures of 
self-esteem, SEI scores were found to correlate consistently with 
academic variables but were only linked with ’social* variables in the case 
of the youngest group. The pattern of correlations indicated that the SEI 
measure of self-esteem had more in common with the grid measures of academic 
self-esteem than with the grid measure of general self-esteemw The 
correlations between the two measures of general self-esteem dropped 
significantly with age, with the grid measure failing to correlate with any 
of the academic variables in the case of the oldest group.
Thus, the evidence indicates that the two measures of general 
self-esteem do not measure the same construct.
3.3,1 Introduction
Although the present study is cross-sectional in design, no rigorous 
attempt bias made to match the different age groups. As explained in the 
last chapter (section 2.4), this was because of the decision to focus on 
whole classrooms and on within-group analyses. Moreover, to have matched 
the classes with any precision would have involved a great deal of 
preliminary assessment which would have limited the amount of time available 
for individual interviewing and testing. This relative absence of matching 
means that caution is necessary when interpreting age differences between 
the three classes. This does not mean that comparisons between the groups
are inappropriate. Where previous research has established the existence
of particular developmental trends, it is worth looking to see if these same 
trends are observable in the present sample. If they are, this will show 
that the present sample is at least comparable to previous samples that 
have been studied.
The first hypothesis to be considered deals with changes in the way 
children describe themselves and others.
.3.3.2 Hypothesis 1 : In their description of others, older children 
will tend to (a) use a greater number of constructs overall,
(b) use a higher proportion of abstract constructs, (c) make
fewer references to themselves, and (d) be more inclined to
attribute both good and bad qualities to others
As was seen in the first chapter (section 1.5.1 and 1.5.2), children’s 
descriptions of both themselves and others change in predictable ways as they 
grow older. Such descriptions were obtained in the present study as by­
products of the process of eliciting constructs for the repertory grids. 
Measures derived from these descriptions have been described in the previous 
chapter (sections 2.3.7 arid 2.3.8). Four features of these descriptions will 
be analysed. These are the number of constructs used (general and academic 
descriptions being analysed separately), the proportion of abstract constructs 
used, the proportion of egocentric constructs used, and evaluative
consistency (that is, the tendency to describe others only in good or bad
terms). Table 3.9 gives the relevant figures.
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Table 3.9 : Developmental chanqes in children *s descriptions
of their peers.
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
F value 
( d.f., 2,801 _ P
NUMBER OF GENERAL Mean 41*1 45*5 50*3 2*45 n.s.
CONSTRUCTS USED (S.d.) (14.4) (17.1) (1,8.4)
NUMBER OF ACADEMIC Mean 16*8 18*9 21-6 5*24 •008
CONSTRUCTS USED (S.d.) (5*8) (5-3) (7-4)
PROP. OF ABSTRACT Mean .267 .475 .459 15.42 .001
CONSTRUCTS USED (s.d.) (.181) (.176) (.094)
PROP. OF EGOCENTRIC Mean • 257 • 139 •113 11.78 .001
CONSTRUCTS USED (S.d.) (.141) (.129) (.072)
EVALUATIVE Mean •749 •696 •740 0*95 n.s.
CONSISTENCY (S.d.) (•166) (•141) (•113)
From Table 3.9, it can be seen that the predicted developmental changes 
in children’s descriptions are evident in four of the five measures, reaching 
statistical significance for three of them. In addition, significant linear 
trends were shown by two of the measures, number of academic constructs used 
(F = 9*21, p<*001 with 1 and 80 d.f.) and proportion of egocentric constructs 
used (F = 21*63, p<*001 with 1 and 80 d.f.). For the third measure, 
proportion of abstract constructs used,Scheffe*s Test for Multiple Comparisons 
indicated that the two older groups used a significantly higher proportion 
of abstract constructs than the younger group (F = 2 9 * 9 ,  p<*01 with 2 and 
•80 d.f.).
So far, these results are reasonably encouraging. The next two 
hypotheses concern cognitive changes similar to those just dealt with but 
this time involve measures derived from the repertory grids.
3.3.3 Hypothesis 2 : Older children will have more complex
personal construct systems than younger children
Following Bieri (1955) the present study uses as a measure of cognitive 
complexity the percentage of the variance accounted for by the first principal 
component of a repertory grid. It was anticipated that the younger children 
would tend to interpret events in simpler, unidimensional terms, that is, that
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component would be larger in the repertory grids of the younger children 
than in the repertory grids of the older children. The results for both 
repertory grids are given in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10 : Percentage of variance accounted for by the first
principal components of general and academic grids
F value
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 (d.f.2,80) p
GENERAL GRID Mean 
(S.d.)
60*1
(13-8)
60*0 
. (15-7)
56-7
( U * 2)
0*92 n.s.
ACADEMIC GRID Mean 
(S.d.)
77-1
(12-3)
78*2
(12*0 )
70*8
(10*9)
3*31 •041
The results given in Table 3,10 offer only partial support for 
Hypothesis 2., There is a tendency, as predicted, for both the academic and 
general repertory grids of the two younger groups to be simpler than those 
of the oldest group# However, this tendency is statistically significant in 
the case of the academic grid only (Scheffe*s Test for Multiple Comparisons 
giving F = 6»22, p<C*05 with 2 and 80 d.f.). A further test of the tendency 
for younger children to think in less complex ways is provided by the next 
hypothesis.
,3.3.4 Hypothesis 3 ; Younger children will be more extreme in
their rankings of themselves than will older children
Another grid measure was used to assess how extreme children were in 
their self-rankings. The particular measure was the importance of the element 
^ e l f 1 as given by the sum of squares on the repertory grids. This measure 
reflects the extent to which the child ranks ’self* at one or other pole of 
each construct dimemsion. A tendency to make extreme rankings is indicated 
by a high sum of squares. Table 3.11 (on next page) gives the mean sums of 
'-squares for each age group on both repertory grids.
The data presented in Table 3.11 confirm the predicted tendency for 
younger children to be more extreme in their rankings of themselves. For 
the general grid, there is a statistically significant linear trend 
(F = 19*05, p < * 0 1  with 1 and 80 d.f.) while for the academic grid Scheffefs 
Test for Multiple Comparisons indicates that the mean sum of squares for
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on general and academic qrids
F value
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 (d.f.2,80) p
GENERAL GRID Mean
(S.d.)
7*23
(2*91)
5*53
(2*47)
4*28
(2*83)
9*19 < • 0 0 1
ACADEMIC GRID Mean
(S.d.)
7* 57( 
(3*41)
3*55
(2*10)
3*98
(2*47)
18*22 < • 0 0 1
the youngest group is'significantly higher than the mean sums for the older 
groups (F = 34*5, p<*0.1 with 2 and 80 d.f.). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is strongly 
supported by the evidence.
The final hypothesis to be considered in this section .deals with another 
grid measure, the correlation between the elements ’self1 and *ideal self1.
3.3.5 Hypothesis 4 : The correlation between self and ideal
self will decrease with age
The research evidence on which this hypothesis is based was reviewed 
in the first chapter (section 1.5.3). It has been suggested (by Zigler et al., 
1972) that the progressive differentiation between self and ideal self is just 
one manifestation of the general trend towards greater cognitive 
differentation. The three hypotheses considered-^ far all deal with this 
general trend and indicate that the children in the present sample tend to 
display greater cognitive complexity with age. The results pertaining to 
Hypothesis 4 are given in Table 3.12 (on the next page). (Note that, as 
for Table 3.4, the correlations are expressed in the form of degrees, so that 
the smaller that the smaller the angle the higher the correlation)
%
As predicted, the figures in Table 3.12 show that the correlations . •_ 
between self and ideal self decrease with age. However, this tendency is 
statistically significant in the case of the academic grid only. S c h e f f ^ s  
Test for Multiple Comparisons shouts that the self/ideal self correlations are 
significantly higher for Class 1 than for the other two groups (F = 11*27, 
p < * 0 1  with 2 and 80 d.f.). This finding parallels the results for Hypothesis 
2 (given in Table 3.10) which shouted that the tendency for older children to 
manifest greater cognitive complexity Was statistically significant for the 
academic grid only.
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1se L T ' and 'ideal seLt1 on the qenerai and academic arids
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
F value
(d.f.2,80) p
GENERAL GRID Mean 42*7 49* 5 58* 7 2»28 n.s.
(S.d.) (26*1) (24*0) (33*4)
ACADEMIC GRID Mean 36*8 61*0 67*6 6*30 -003
(S.d.) (27*7) (42-7) (33?7)
3.3,6 Summary
All four of the developmental hypotheses considered in this section have
received at least partial support. Evidence was found for most of the changes
in children’s descriptions of others predicted by Hypothesis 1. In addition,
it has been shown that, as they get older, the children in the present sample 
cofopWx
develop more personal construct systems (for academic matters at least)
A
(Hypothesis 2), become less extreme in their self-rankings (Hypothesis 3), 
and report greater disparities between the way. they see themselves and the 
way they would like to be ideally (again, more so for academic matters) 
(Hypothesis 4).
Thus, although the three age groups were not rigorously matched, the 
above results suggest that, as far as age differences are concerned, the 
present samples differ much as one would expect, both on a priori grounds and 
on the basis of comparisons with previous samples studied. To that extent, 
therefore, the present samples can be thought of as representative of a 
wider population.
Further hypotheses concerning age differences will be dealt with in the 
context of hypotheses about the accuracy of children's self-estimates, field 
independence, academic locus of control, and sex differences^ In addition, 
the regression and factor analyses described at the end of the chapter throw 
light on differences between the three age groups.
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3.4.1 Introduction
In the first chapter (section 1,4), various sources of self-concept 
and self-esteem were considered, Many previous writers (for example,
Cooley, 1902; H(ewitt, 1976; Laing, 1971; Sullivan, 1953) have credited the 
opinions of others with having the greatest impact on our thoughts and 
feelings about ourselves. However, as has been seen, there are good 
theoretical reasons for thinking that self-concept and self-esteem are 
influenced by other factors as well, such as our observations of our own 
behaviour and the comparisons we make between ourselves and our peers. 
Therefore, the influence of the opinions of others on self-concept and self­
esteem is relative rather than total. The extent of this influence on 
the childrenfs self-esteem will be considered first,
3.4.2 Hypothesis 5 ; C h i l drens self-esteem will vary
according to the opinions held of them by others
This hypothesis can be tested by examining the correlations between the 
three measures of self-esteem and the two measures of opinions of others 
(teacher rank and class rank). Table 3,13 gives the details.
.Table 3,13 : Correlations between measures of self-esteem
and the opinions of others
Correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
GENERAL SELF-ESTEEM (SEI) and *
Teacher rank *25
*
•34
*
•35
**
•31
Class rank *54
*
•34
*-**
•58
#**
•50
GENERAL SELF-ESTEEM (SELF/lDEAL) and
*
Teacher rank *36
*
•45 •06
**
•29
*•**
Class rank *54 •33 •00
**
•31
ACADEMIC SELF-ESTEEM and
*
Teacher rank *34 •00 •25
*
•21
*
Class rank *39
**
•54
*
•44 •45
*p<*05, **p<*01, ***p<*001.
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Several things emerge from the correlations given in Table 3.13. The 
most important finding is that there is a link between what children feel 
about themselves and what others say about them, although this does not 
seem to be true for all measures of self-esteem at all age levels. As 
measured by scores on the SEI, general self-esteem is significantly linked 
with the opinions of both teachers and classmates at each age level (with 
the single exception of the teacher’s opinion of Class 1 children where the 
correlation was only *25). This is despite the fact both teachers and class­
mates were rating the children from an academic point of view rather than 
giving global evaluations. This academic emphasis would explain why the 
grid measure of general self-esteem correlates with the opinions of others 
for the younger groups only. As was established in the previous section, 
the two measures of general self-esteem do not reflect the same construct, 
the SEI having a much larger academic component than the grid measure. In 
the case of the oldest group, general self-esteem as measured by the correlation 
between self and ideal self is unrelated to the academic evaluations of 
teachers and classmates. This is not true of the corresponding measure from 
the academic grid (academic self-esteem) which is significantly correlated 
with class rank at all age levels.
In short, there is some evidence that self-esteem varies according to 
the opinions of others just as predicted by Hypothesis 1. The next hypothesis 
deals with the impact of the opinions of others on children's academic self- 
concept.
3.4.3 Hypothesis 6 : Children's academic self-concepts will
vary according to the opinions held of them by others-
This hypothesis can be tested by examining the correlations between 
the three measures of academic self-concept and the two measures of the 
opinions of others. As these opinions were primarily concerned with the 
children's academic abilities, it may be anticipated that they will correlate 
more highly with the children's academic self-concepts than they do with their-, 
self-esteem. The relevant correlations are given in Table 3.14 (on next page).'
These correlations support Hypothesis 6, at least as far as the 
influence of classmates' opinions on the children's academic self-concept 
is concerned. In addition, the figures confirm the suggestion that the 
opinions of others should correlate more highly with academic self-concept 
than with general self-esteem. This is especially true of Class 3 where
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self-concept and the opinions of others
Correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
SELF RANK and
Teacher rank
**
•44 •11
*
•41
***
•33
Class rank
y y y ^ Tv A
•62
V V VA A a
•81
■***
•73
***
•68
SELF/SUCCESSFUL OTHERS and
Teacher rank
*
•38 •27
**
•47 •38
Class rank
*
•32
**
•48
■V y yA A Tv
•69 •45
SELF/UNSUCCESSFUL OTHERS and
Teacher rank •10 -•13 -•30 -•09
Class rank -•13
***
-•67
**-*
-•66 -•42
* p < « 0 5 ,  **p<»01, ***p<>001.
the opinions of classmates account for between 44% and 53% of the variance 
in academic self-concept (as against between 0% and 34% of the variance in 
self-esteem). .
It has been established that both self-esteem and academic self- 
concept vary according to the opinions of others. The next question 
to be considered is whether it is the opinions of teachers or of class­
mates which have the greatest impact. A specific developmental trend was 
predicted.'
3.4.4 Hypothesis 7 : The younger children will be more influenced
by the opinions of their teachers while the older children will be
more influenced by the opinions of their peers
The correlations given in Tables 3.13 and 3.14 do not show the
predicted trend. Instead, there is a tendency for children of all ages 
to be more influenced by the opinions of their classmates. This applies 
both to their self-esteem and their academic self-concepts though the 
tendency is more marked in the case of the latter. For self-esteem, the 
differences in the correlations are statistically significant in only one 
on the nine instances while for academic self-concept, two of the differences 
were statistically significant. All these differences occurred in the 
case of the eleven year olds (Class 2). For these children, academic
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unsuccessful others (p<»03) all correlate more highly with class rank 
than with teacher rank. A possible explanation as to why this should 
be the case for Class 2 only will be considered in the next section.
The evidence considered so far does not support the claim that 
younger children are more influenced by the opinions of their teachers 
whereas older children take more notice of the opinions of their classmates. 
Instead, all the children (especially the eleven year olds) were more 
influenced by their classmates1 opinions. The next topic concerns the 
role self— processes play in mediating between the opinions of others and 
actual attainments.
3.4.5 Aim 5 : To sBe if academic self-concepts and/or
self-esteem act as intervening variables between the opinions 
of others and actual attainments
It will be remembered (from section 1,7.3) that Brookover and his 
colleagues (1962, 1965, 1967) argued that self-concept of ability acted 
as an intervening variable between children's perceptions of the opinions 
of others and their academic grades, whereas Calsyn and Kenny (1977) found . 
that both self-concept of ability and the perceived opinions of others were 
determined by academic grades. These rival hypotheses can be tested using 
partial correlations. The test will not be an exact one however, as the 
present study measures the actual opinions of others rather than the 
children*s perceptions of what others thought of them. Keeping this in mind, 
two rival predictions can be generated. If Brookover and his colleagues are 
right, then one would expect the correlations between the opinions of others 
and children*s actual attainments to be significantly reduced once academic 
self-concepts are controlled. If Calsyn and Kenny are right, one would 
expect the correlations between the opinions of others and academic self- 
concepts to be significantly reduced once actual attainments are controlled. 
The evidence relevant to the first of these proposals is given in Table 
3.15 (on next page).
The Brookover hypothesis gets little support from the partial 
correlations given in Table 3.15, at least as far as teacher's opinions 
are concerned. The correlations between children's reading ability and 
the teachers* evaluations are only slightly reduced at best when the 
children's academic self-concppts are held constant. Much the same applies 
to the correlations between children's reading ability and their class rank, 
except that holding academic self-concepts constant does lead to a marked
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of others and reading ability with academic self-concept controlled
Correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Reading ability and teacher rank
***
•78 -•01
***
•64 •49
Controlling for :
(l) Self rank
* * *
•75 -•07
**
•53 •40
(2) Self/successful others •76 -•03
* *
•52 •43
(3) Self/unsuccessful others
* * *
•78 -•06 ' •59
***
•48
Reading ability and class rank
***
•74
***
•72
***
•65
**•*
•69
Controlling for :
(l) Self rank
-***
•70
y  y
•62
*
•33
***-
•57
(2) Self/successful others •72
V V V 
/ k A A
•78
*
•46
* * *
•65
(3) Self/unsuccessful others
V V V
A A"A
•75
* * *
•71
•**
•50
* * *
•66
* p< * 0 5 ,  , * * p O 0 l ,  ***p<-Q01.
(but not statistically significant) reduction in all three measures for
Class 3. (However, if academic report is substituted for reading ability
as the index of attainment ’for this group, then controlling for academic
self-concept makes no difference to the size of the correlation). As the
subjects in the Brookover study were tested at the ages of 12, 15 and 17,
this raises the question of whether the Brookover hypothesi s might, hold
true of older adolescents than those in the present study. The evidence
relevant to Calsyn and Kenny1s rival hypothesis is given in Table 3.16
(on next page).
The partial correlations given in Table 3.16 support Calsyn and Kenny’s
hypothesis as far as teachers1 opinions are concerned but not where class­
mates1 opinions are involved. Whenever there is a statistically significant 
correlation between teacher rank and self rank, this is significantly 
reduced when reading ability is held constant. Thus, teacher rank and self 
rank are correlated only because both correlate significantly with reading 
ability. This is not the case where class rank and self rank are concerned. 
Holding reading ability constant makes relatively little difference to the 
size of the correlation between these two variables. Considering the 
evidence as a whole, it would seem that both hypotheses have received partial 
support. However, as was pointed out in the initial discussion of this 
topic (section 1.7.3), the Brookover study (which Calsyn and Kenny re- 
analysed) was concerned with the opinions of others only as they were 
perceived by the adolescents themselves. The present study, on the other
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of others and academic self-concepts with reading ability controlled
Correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
TEACHER RANK and
(l) Self rank
**
•44 •11
*
•41 •33
Controlling for reading ability •29 •13 •00 •11
(2) Self/successful others
*
•38 •27
*-*
•47
***
•38
Controlling for reading ability •31 •26 •19
*
•29
(3) Self/unsuccessful others •10 -•13 -•30 -•09
Controlling for reading ability •17 -•14 •02 •04
CLASS RANK and
(l) Self rank
***
•62
***
•81
***
•73 •68 .
Controlling for reading ability
y y yA A A
•55
***
•75
**
•53
***
•52
(2) Self/successful others
*
•32
**
•48
***
•69
***
•45
Controlling for reading ability •21
y V-y A A A
•67 •53
***
•36
(3) Self/unsuccessful others -•13
*-**
-•67
***
-•66
***
-•42
Controlling for reading ability -•20
***
-•66
**
-•52
***
-•34
*p <  • 05, < •  01, ***p<.Q01.
hand, samples the actual opinions of both classmates and teachers, and 
has obtained someuhat different results.
3.4.6 Summary
The evidence considered in this section confirms that both the 
self-esteem and the academic self-concepts of children vary according 
to the opinions held of them by others (as predicted by Hypothesis 5 
and 6 ).
Furthermore, it bias shown that the opinions of teachers and class­
mates affect children*s academic self-concepts more than their self-esteem, 
presumably because the opinions sampled in this study were explicitly 
or implicitly biased towards the academic. However, there bias no support
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for the prediction (contained in Hypothesis 7) that classmates' opinions 
would have progressively more influence on self-esteem and academic 
self-concept as the children grew older. Instead, the children in all 
three groups were more influenced by what their classmates thought of 
them than by what their teachers thought of them. The question of 
whether self-processes act as intervening variables between the opinions 
of others and actual attainments bias explored but no definite conclusions 
biere possible. . ’
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3.5.1 Introduction
The previous section dealt with the impact of the opinions of 
others on the c h i l d r e n s  self-esteem and academic self-concepts. This 
theme is continued in the present section which deals in part with the
i
degree of agreement between the childrenfs academic self-concepts and 
the opinions of others. All of the hypotheses in this section are 
concerned with the accuracy of the children’s self-estimates. Academic 
self-concepts can be accurate in the sense of congruent with the ratings 
of others pr in the-sense of congruent with' actual'attainments. It is 
predicted that children’s academic self-concepts will become more 
accurate in both these senses as they get older. The first hypothesis 
to be considered concerns the agreement between, children*s self-estimates 
and the opinions of others.
3.5.2 Hypothesis 8 : The academic self-concepts of older
children will match the opinions of others more closely than 
will those of younger- children
In this, as in subsequent analyses, there are three measures of 
academic self-concept to be considered (self-rank, and the average distances 
of ’self’ from successful and unsuccessful classmates on the academic grid). 
As in the previous section, there are two measures of opinions of others, 
teacher rank and class rank, the latter being more concerned with academic 
progress. The full correlations between these various measures have been 
given already in Table 3*14, but the average correlations are given again 
in Table 3.17 for convenience.
Table 3.17 : Average correlations between measures of academic
self-concept and both teacher rank and class rank
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
-X-
Teacher rank *25 *17 *40 *27
* ** ** ** 
Class rank *38 *67 *69 *53
* p <  *05. **p<*001.
As far as the opinions of classmates are concerned the average
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the difference in the correlations for Classes 1 and 2 is greater than 
might be expected. However, as far as teachers1 opinions are concerned, 
the pattern of correlations does not follow the predicted trend, the 
correlation between academic self-concept and teacher rank being lower 
for Class 2 than for Class 1. This may well be because of the way the 
particular teacher rated her pupils. It will be remembered (from section 
2 .3,6) that the method used in sampling teachers1 opinions of tiheir 
pupils allow’ed the teachers to rate their pupils in terms they (the 
teachers) have chosen. It was assumed that the terms chosen would have 
general relevance for the children's academic performances, and this 
seems to have been the case for most of the teachers concerned. At 
least four of the eight constructs chosen by the teacher for Class 1 
and each of the three subject teachers for Class 3 can be seen as 
pertaining to schoolwork. Typical examples include 'listens to the 
teacher/does not listen', 'achieves through effort/achieves through 
ability', 'slow on the uptake/quick to catch on', 'lazy/conscientious', 
and 'presents work carefully/slapdash presentation'. However, in the 
case of the teacher for Class 2, only two of the constructs she chose 
appear to have any bearing .on the children's academic performances 
(‘'hard working/not hard working', 'independent/seeks help', while the 
other constructs concerned personal qualities that she evidently 
valued more highly (such as 'sensitive towards others/not sensitive 
towards others', 'aggressive/gentle'). Since they were based primarily 
on such non-academic qualities, it is not surprising that this teacher's 
ratings should correlate poorly with her pupils' academic self-concepts. 
This might also explain why the academic self-concepts of the children 
in her class should be so strongly linked with the opinions of their 
classmates. In the absence of strong cues from their teacher, these 
children would seem to have relied more heavily on the opinions of their 
peers.
Despite this apparent anomaly, there is at least some support for the 
prediction that, as they get older, children's self-estimates agree more 
and more closely with ratings of them by others. The next hypothesis to be 
considered deals with the level of agreement between the children's 
academic self-concepts and their actual attainments.
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children will match their actual attainments more closely
than will those of younger children
Table
The relevant correlations are 
3.18 : Correlations between
given in Table 3,18. 
attainments and measures
of academic self-concept 
Correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Reading attainment and 
(l) Self rank
*
•36
**
•49
-**-*
•65
(2) Self/successful others •25 • -08
**
•54
(3) Self/unsuccessful others -•□1 -•33
**
• •49
Maths attainment (Classes 1 and 2)/Academic report (Class 3) and
(i) Self rank
***
•53
V V VAAA
•63
y y y
v\ A A
•70
(2) Self/successful others
**
•54
**
•51
***
• 66
(3) Self/unsuccessful others -•11
***
-•64
**-*
■•61
*p<-05, **p<-01, ***p<-001.
From Table 3.18 tie can see that, although the age of differences between 
these correlations are statistically significant in only one instance, the 
general trend is in the predicted direction. The significant shift occurs 
between Classes 1 and 2 for the correlation between maths attainment and 
the average distance from unsuccessful classmates (p<C*03). The trend 
towards greater congruence between academic self-concepts and attainments 
is most obvious in the case of reading attainment where significant levels 
of correlation for all three measures are present for Class 3 only. Before 
drawing any firm conclusions from these results, it needs to be established 
that they are not due to differences in intelligence. Table 3.19 (on next 
page) shows what happens when verbal ability is held constant.
As can be seen from Table 3.19, holding verbal ability constant makes 
little difference as far as the non-verbal indices of attainment are 
concerned (maths attainment and academic report) but does weaken the 
correlations between academic self-concepts and reading attainment.
(This might not have occurred had a non-verbal measure of ability been 
used). Nevertheless, the trend towards greater accuracy is still evident, 
even over the fairly narrow age band involved. It is interesting to note
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of academic self-concept (with verbal ability controlled)
Partial correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Reading attainment and
(1) Self rank
CDCM• •15
**
•53
(2) Self/successful others •21 i •11
*
•38
(3) Self/unsuccessful others •02 I •
'1
a -•25
riaths attainment (Classes 1 and 2)/Academic report (Class 3) and
(1) Self rank
•*-*
•52
***
•61
-V V VA 7T A
•62
(2) Self/successful others
*** 
•53 .
■***
•52 •59
(3) Self/unsuccessful others -•10
***
-•62
***
-•52
* p <  *05, * * p < * 0 1 ,  * * * p < * D l #
that the academic self-concepts of the youngest group are only tenuously
linked with reading attainment (the average correlation being only *16)
but were more firmly linked with maths attainment where the average
vvas
correlatiorm was *40). This presumably because it was easier for theA
children to know how they irere getting on in maths than it was to know 
how their reading skills compared with those of their classmates.
According to Uylie (1979), self-favourability biases occur less frequently 
as evidence of one's actual attainments becomes publically available.
Perhaps if maths attainment had been assessed by a standardized test rather 
than by progress through the Fletcher maths book (see section 2.3.2), then 
the developmental trend observed for reading attainment might have been 
seen for maths as well.
Although reading level is the key attainment measure used in the 
present study, children’s estimates of their own ability will presumably 
be based on a broader spectrum of academic skills. Another way of testing 
Hypothesis 9 is to use attainment rank (which reflects this broader spectrum) 
as the index of attainment and the correlations between the element ’self1 
and the construct ’clever* on the academic grid as the index of 
perceived ability. The rank order correlations between these two measures 
are *16 (n.s.), *57 (p<*0l) and *71 (p< * 0 0 l )  for Classes 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. Again, the developmental trend towards increased accuracy 
is clearly apparent. Gross errors of both under-estimation and over- 
estimation can be seen in the youngest group. One girl who ranked 
second in the class in terms of attainment had a lower opinion of her 
ability than any of her classmates (the correlation between 'self' and
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had an extremely good opinion of his ability (the correlation betuieen 
’self1 and ’clever* being *78), yet his actual attainments were the 
weakest in the class. Such dramatic inaccuracies did not occur among 
the older children although the match was by no means perfect. It was 
still possible for children to do well academically and not consider 
themselves very clever, just as it was possible (though less likely) 
for children to have a good opinion of their ability yet not be 
achieving brilliantly. In Class 3, the girl who had the highest opinion 
of her ability in the class (r = *84) bias only ranked tenth in her 
attainments.
If attainments and acedemic self-concepts become more congruent with 
age, then it can be expected that the older children will respond to the 
different measures of academic self-concept with a greater degree of 
consistency. Table 3.20 gives the correlation betuieen the three measures 
concerned.
Table 3.20 : Correlations between three measures of academic
self-concept 
Correlations betuieen Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Self rank and self/successful
* * * * * * * * *
others. •56 •57 •72
Self rank and self/unsuccessful
* * * * *-**
others -•37
to00.1 -•62
Self/successful others and 
self/unsuccessful others
* *
-•41
V v v  
A A A
-•59
y y v
A TV A
-•83
*p<*05, **p<*01, ***p<«001.
The correlations given in Table 3.20 indicate that the older 
children do indeed tend to respond to the different measures of academic 
self-concept with greater consistency than the younger children. The 
differences betuieen the correlations are statistically significant in 
two cases ( p < * 0 2 )  : the increase from -*37 for Class 1 to -*83 for 
Class 2, and the increase', from -«41 for Class 1 to -*83 for Class 3. 
These results offer further (if indirect) support for Hypothesis 9.
It has been' established that younger children tend to have less
accurate academic self-perceptions than do older children. The next 
question to be considered is whether these inaccuracies show any 
consistent pattern. Hypothesis 10 predicts that they will.
3,5.4 Hypothesis 10 : The younger children will tend
to overestimate their attainments to a greater extent than will 
the older children 1
The extent to which children tend to overestimate their attainments 
can be tested by subtracting each child’s attainment rank from his or her 
self rank and then totalling the resulting discrepancies for each age.
The details are given in Table 3.21.
Table 3.21 : Discrepancies between self rank and attainment ranks
BOYS GIRLS - ALL
CLASS Total Number Average Total Number Average Total Number Average
CLASS 1 40 (12) 3*33 8 (10)
□00•o 48 (22) 2*18
CLASS 2 30*5 (13) 2*35 30*5 (12) 2*54 61 (25) 2*44
CLASS 3 1 (12) 0*08 14 (14) 1*00' 15 (26) 0*58
TOTALS 71*5 (37) 1*93 52*5 (36) 1*46 124 (73) 1*70
The results; given in Table 3.21 suggest that 8 and 11 year olds tend
to overestimate their academic standing in class by an average of two or 
more places, while the 13 year olds are more accurate. The difference 
betuieen the mean for Class 3 and the combined mean for Classes 1 and 2 
•is statistically significant (Mann-Uhitney U Test gives u = 366*5, 
z = 2*82, p = *002).
Another way of testing Hypothesis 10 is to examine the discrepancies 
between self ranks and both class ranks and teacher ranks. The figures 
are given in Tables 3.22 and 3.23 respectively(see next page).
The difference betuieen the mean for Class 3 and the combined mean for 
Classes 1 and 2 is statistically significant for both sets of figures. For 
Table 3.22, the Mann-ldhitney U Test gives u = 393*5, z = 4*53, p < * 0 0 1 ,  uihile 
for Table 3.23 the corresponding u = 451, z = 1*84, p = *033.
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Table 3.22 : Discrepancies betuieen self ranks and class ranks
CLASS Total
BOYS
Number Average Total
GIRLS
Number Average Total
ALL - 
Number Average
Class 1 48 (12) 4*00 0 (10) 0*00 48 (22) 2*18
Class 2 32*5 (13) 2*50 28*5 (12) 2*38 61 (25) 2*44
Class 3 9 (12) 0*75 6 (14) 0*43 15 (26) 0*58
TOTALS 89*5 (37) 2*42 . 34*5 (36) 0*96 124 (73) 1*70
Table 3.23 • Discrepancies betuieen self ranks and teacher ranks
BOYS GIRLS ALL
CLASS Total Number Average Total Number Average Total Number Average
Class 1 38 (12) 3*17 10 (10) 1*00 48 (22) 2*18
Class 2 27 (13) 2*08 30 (12) 2*50 57 (25) 2*28
Class 3 13 (12) 1*08 2 (14) 0*14 15 (26) 0*58
TOTALS 78 (37) 2*11 42 (36) 1*17 120 (73) 1*64
It has been established that the academic self-concepts of the older 
children are more in line both with their actual attainments and with 
ratings by others than are those of the younger children. The junior 
school children display self-favourability biases in estimating their 
academic standing while the secondary school children tend to be much 
more conservative. One possible reason for this change is that the 
older children come to feel that it is not acceptable to be too open 
about being intelligent or good at schoolwork. This was certainly an 
impression gained from the interviews, the younger children being less 
inhibited about saying what they thought of themselves, even if their 
self-estimates were somewhat inflated. Evidence of this trend towards 
more conservative self-estimates comes from an inspection of the means 
of the self-ranks for each age group. These were 9*32, 10*56 and 12*92 
for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. To establish the significance of 
these differences we must first compensate for the difference in group 
sizes. This can be done by calculating for each child the percentage 
of other children in the class whom he rated as cleverer than himself.
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were cleverer than him would have a percentage score of 28*6%, whereas 
a child in Class 3 who also ranked himself 7th would have a percentage 
score of 74%. because he bias comparing himself against 25 others). The 
average percentage score for Classes 1, 2 and 3 were 39*4^, 39*7% and 
47*7^ respectively, the children in Class 3 being significantly more 
conservative in their self-rankings when compared with those in Classes 
1 and 2 (the Mann-liJhitney U Test gives u = 444, z = 1*55, p < *05).
Further evidence of this trend can be found when we examine the 
correlation betuieen the element ’self1 and the constructs 'clever'and 
’good at work' on the academic grid. These correlations (expressed as 
degrees) are. given in Table 3,24,
Table 3,24 : Correlations between element ’self' and constructs
'clever* and *qood at work' on academic qrid
Construct Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
F value 
(d.f.2,80) P
'Clever* Mean 59*1 70*2 94*9 7*37 <•001
(S.d.) (33*8) (38*5) (35*3)
'Good at work' Mean 56*4 70*8 88*2 5*12 •008
(S.d.) (33*6) (44*1) (35*5)
•The figures in Table 3,24 offer further evidence that older children 
are more conservative in the estimation of their own ability than younger 
children. Significant linear trends were found both for the construct 
'clever' (F = 14*1.1, p O O O l  with 1 and 80 d.f,) and the construct 'good 
at work' (F = 10*22, p O O O l  with 1 and 80 d.f.).‘ It was suggested above 
that this trend may be due to the growing awareness of an unspoken taboo 
against claiming to be clever. It may also be due to the fact that the 
academic progress of the children in this particular secondary school 
bias evaluated in a much more explicit and public way than was the progress 
of the junior school children. This meant that the children in Class 3 
had clearer evidence on uihich to base their self-concepts and knew moreover 
that any rash claims they made could be easily checked.
Thus, the evidence clearly supports Hypothesis 10 with the junior 
school children tending to overestimate their attainments. The next
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those biho are relatively accurate in their selT-estimates and those who 
overestimate or underestimate their positions in class. Hypothesis 11 
suggests that there are.
3.5.5 Hypothesis 11 : Children who are more accurate in
their self— estimates will be viewed more favourably by both 
their classmates and their teachers i
The appropriate measure of how favourably children are viewed by 
their peers is popularity. There is no exactly equivalent measure of 
how favourably children are viewed by their teachers, the closest being 
teacher rank. As for the accuracy of children’s self-estimates, it has 
been seen already that this can be established by subtracting their 
attainment ranks from their self-ranks. The smaller the resulting 
discrepancies': the more accurate the children’s self-estimates are.
The criterion used for identifying the more accurate children in 
Classes 1 and 2 was a discrepancy of (plus or minus) three places or 
less. The children in Class 3 were generally more accurate in their 
self-estimates and a slightly more stringent criterion was needed (plus 
or minus two and a half pla’ces or less). The number of children 
identified as accurate according to these criteria were 10 in Class 1,
11 in Class 2 and 12 in Class 3. The other children either overestimated 
or underestimated their relative positions in class. Table 3.25 shows 
the differences in popularity and teacher rank between the accurate and 
inaccurate children in each class.
Table 3.25 : Differences betuieen accurate and inaccurate children
in popularity and teacher ratings
(Average ranks)
Popularity Teacher rank
Class 1 accurate (10) 11*10 9*20
inaccurate (12) 11*83 13*42
(Mann-Whitney U Test) (u=56,n.s.) (u=37,n.s.)
Class 2 accurate (11) 8*82 12*91
inaccurate (14) 16*29 13*07
(Mann-UJhitney U Test) (u=31,p<*0l) (u=76,n.s.)
Class 3 accurate (12) 13*29 11*21
inaccurate (14) 13*69 15*46
(Mann-Whitney U Test) (u=81* 5,n.s.) (u=56*5,n.s.)
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accurate and inaccurate children are all in the predicted direction but are 
statistically significant in only one instance. For Class 2, those whose 
self-estimates are relatively accurate are significantly more popular with 
their classmates than those who either over or underestimate their 
academic standing. However, the two groups are given much the same rating 
by their teacher. In Classes 1 and 3, the accurate children differ little 
from the inaccurate children in popularity but are rated more favourably 
by their teachers, the differences falling just short of the *05 level of 
significance. Thus, the children whose estimates are relatively accurate 
are perceived more favourably by either their teachers or their peers 
but not by both at the same time. Hypothesis 11 thus receives partial 
support only from the present data.
It is worth seeing whether accurate children differ from inaccurate 
children, particularaly with regard to intelligence and actual attainments. 
The relevant figures are given in Table 3.26.
Table 3.26 : Differences between accurate and inaccurate children
in verbal ability and attainment ranks
Verbal ability Attainment rank
Class 1 accurate (10) 
inaccurate (12)
(Test of significance)
92* 70 
93*17 
(t=0*53,n.s.)
9*40
13*25
(u=39,n.s.)
Class 2 accurate (ll) 108*64 9*36
inaccurate (14) 92*50 15*86
(Test of significance) (t=2*06,p<*05) (u=37,p<*025)
Class 3 accurate (12) 111*17 10*75
inaccurate (14) 102*17 15*86
(Test of significance) (t=l*88,n.s.) (u=51,p=* 05)
From Table 3.26, it can be seen that children whose self— estimates 
are relatively accurate tend to be doing better academically (statistically 
significant for Classes 2 and 3) and to be more intelligent (statistically 
significant for Class 2) than their less accurate classmates.
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3.5.6 Summary
All four hypotheses considered in this section were supported by 
the evidence. Thus, as predicted by Hypotheses B and 9, it was established 
that children’s academic self-concepts become more accurate with age, that 
isj that the self-ratings of older children are more congruent both with 
ratings of them by others and with their actual attainments than is the 
case with younger children. In addition, as predicted by Hypothesis 10, 
it was shown that younger children’s inaccuracies are the result of their 
tendency to overestimate their relative positions in class whereas the 
older children are generally more conservative in their self-estimates. 
Differences between the relatively accurate and the relatively inaccurate 
children were also investigated. As predicted by Hypothesis 11, there 
was a distinct tendency for.the children whose self-estimates were 
relatively accurate to be doing well academically, and milder tendencies 
for these same children to be more intelligent and to be more favourably 
viewed by both their teachers and their peers.
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3,6.1 Introduction
This section deals with three hypotheses concerning the relation­
ship between self-esteem and academic achievements. The first focusses 
on how these two variables are related in turn to academic self-concepts.
3.6.2 Hypothesis 12 ; Pleasures of attainment will be more
highly correlated with measures of academic self-concept than 
with measures of self-esteem
Besides being backed by research (section 1.6), this hypothesis is 
intuitively plausible in that one would expect academic self-concepts to 
be principally based on observations of o n e ’s attainments and self-esteem 
to be only partly based on such observations. Previous studies suggest 
that the correlation between attainments and academic self-concept should 
be of the order of *50 while that between attainments and self-esteem 
should be around *25. Table 3.27 shows the correlations between the 
various measures of attainment and self-esteem.
Table 3.27 : Correlations between measures of attainment and
measures of self-esteem
Correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Reading attainment and
(l) General self-esteem (SEl)
*
•33 •02
**
•53
**
•30
(2) General self-esteem 
(self/ideal)
-V y yA A A
•52 •06 -•01
*
•20
(3) Academic self-esteem 
(self/ideal)
**
•44 •33
*
•42
y Y V7. a 7v
•40
Maths attainment (Classes 1 and 2)/academic 
(l) General self-esteem (SEl) *25
report (Class 3) and 
**
•28 -53
(2) General self-esteem 
(self/ideal)
V y y Tv A A
•55 •29 •03
(3) Academic self-esteem 
(self/ideal) / /** •44 r-r,***•59 •36* -
* p <  • 05, **p < - 0 1 ,  * * * p O 0 0 1 .
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most consistently linked with measures of attainment for the youngest group.
The correlations ranged from *25 (n.s.) to *55 (p<C*00l), somewhat higher than 
predicted. Tor Class 2, the correlations are somewhat weaker and only reach 
a level of statistical significance in one instance (for academic self­
esteem and maths attainment, r = *59, p<C*00l). As for Class 3, we have 
seen before that t h e ^ r i d  measure of general self-esteem is independent of. 
academic progress at this level. The other two measures of self-esteem are 
linked with measures of attainment, the correlations ranging from #36(p<.*05) 
to •53(p.<*0l)
The corresponding' cdrrslations.-between measures of academic self-concept 
and attainment have been given in a previous section (Table 3.17). They 
show that, unlike measures of self-esteem, measures of academic self-concept 
are most consistently linked with measures of attainment in the case of the 
oldest group. The correlations range from •49(p<C*0l) to •70(p<^*00l), 
somewhat higher than predicted. For Class 2, the pattern is less consistent 
and for Class 1 there is even greater variation. As has been established 
previously, there is a distinct tendency for children*s academic self- 
concepts to become increasingly congruent with their attainments as they 
get older. The opposite seems to apply to self-esteem. This can be seen 
most clearly in Table 3.28 which shows the average correlations between
all measures of attainment and all measures of self-esteem and academic
self-concept at each age level.
Table 3.28 : Average correlations between measures of attainments
and measures of academic self-concept and self-esteem
Correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Attainment and
(1) Self-esteem
(2) Academic self-concept
*p <*05, **p<-01-, ***p<*001.
Although the differences between the two sets of correlations are not 
statistically significant, the figures given in Table 3.28 offer support for
Hypothesis 12, at least in the case of the two older age groups. However, it
is important to establish what happens to these correlations when verbal 
ability is held constant. The resulting partial correlations are given
43 *27 -33 *35
* **-* **-* 
32 *46 •61 »47
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Table 3.29 : Average partial correlations between measures of
attainment and measures of self-esteem and academic self-concept 
(mith verbal ability controlled)
Average partial correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _    '_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     t
Attainment and
(1) Self-esteem *42 *24 *30 *32
(2) Academic self-concept *28 •38 *49 *39
* p<-05, **p<*0.1, ***p<-001.
Comparing the partial correlations in Table 3.29 with the original 
correlations in Table 3.28, we can see that holding intelligence constant 
leads to very little reduction in the size of the correlations between 
self-esteem and attainments, but a somewhat larger (though still not 
statistically significant) reduction in the size of the correlation between 
academic self-concept and attainments. Nevertheless, the differential 
predicted by Hypothesis 12 is preserved, with attainments being more highly 
correlated with academic self-concept (•39,p<C*00l) than with self-esteem 
(•32,p<l*01). Although this difference is not as great as predicted, it 
still suggests the possibility that self-esteem and attainments might be 
correlated only because both correlate with academic self-concept. This 
is what Hypothesis 13 predicts.
3.6,3 Hypothesis 13 ; Academic self-concept acts as an
intervening variable between self-esteem and attainments
This hypothesis can be tested by calculating the correlations between 
self-esteem and attainment rank when academic self-concept is held constant. 
The resulting partial correlations are *35(p<C*05), •08(n.s.) and *17(n.s.) 
for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively, the partial correlation for the whole 
group being •20(p<C«05). Thus, for the two older groups at least, holding 
academic self-concepts constant leads to sizeable reductions in the 
correlations between self-esteem and attainments, much greater reductions 
than resulted when intelligence was held constant. It has been established 
that the academic self-concept of the eight year olds are both less 
consistent and less accurate than those of the eleven and thirteen year olds. 
Thus, the present evidence suggests that, once academic self-concepts
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esteem and attainment, just as predicted by Hypothesis 13.
The next hypothesis to be considered is based on a distinction 
between c h i l drens perceptions of their attainments and their actual 
attainments.
1 3.6.4 Hypothesis 14 : Children1s self-esteem will be more
closely linked with their perceiv/ed attainments than with their 
actual attainments
An indication of the children’s perceptions of their attainments 
is given by the correlation between the element ’self’ and the construct 
’good at schoolwork' on the academic repertory grid. Their actual 
attainments are indicated by their attainments ranks (derived from all 
the attainment indices used with each class). The correlations between 
these two measures are given in Table 3.30. (in order to facilitate 
comparisons between the two sets of correlations, average correlations 
for the three measures of self-esteem have been calculated).
Table 3.30. s Correlations.between measures of self-esteem and 
measures of perceived and actual attainment
Correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Perceived attainment and
(l) General self-esteem (SEl) *44 •23
**
•52
-x-x-x-
•40
y  y
(2) General self-esteem (self/ideal) *44
*
•41 •23
V  y yA A A
•36
V V V. . A A A
(3) Academic self-esteem *61 .
-x-x-x-
•88
y y yA A A
•75
' -x-x-x 
•74
-X-X-
Average correlation *50
***
•59
-x-x-
•53
**-x
•52
Actual attainment and
*
(l) General self-esteem (SEl) *42 •17
**
•48
*x-x
•36
(2) General self-esteem (self/ideal) *68 •20
LDO.1 -x-x•30
(3) Academic self-esteem *49
*•*
•50 •27
**-x
•43
-X--X-X-
Average correlation *54 •30 •23
-x-xx
•36
*p <*05, **p<*01, ***pO001.
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in that nearly all the correlations between perceived attainments and measures 
of self-esteem are higher than those between actual attainments and self­
esteem. However, this is only so for the two older groups. We will now 
substiute academic self-concept for self-esteem to see if the same 
pattern is found. Again, the prediction is that academic self-concept
will be more highly correlated biith perceived attainments
1
than biith
measured attainments. The relevant correlations are given in Table 3. 31.
Table 3.31 : Correlations between measures of academic self-concept
and measures of perceived and actual attainment
Correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Perceived attainment and
(l) Self rank •16
v y y7T A 7r
•77
* * *
•74
* * *
•53
(2) Self/successful others •28
* - * *
•81
* * *
•87
* * - *
•62
(3) Self/unsuccessful others •26
* * *
•88
* * *
•87 • 64
Average correlations •24
* * *
•82
y  y yA 77 7T
•83
v  v  v A A A
•60
Actual attainment and
(l) Self rank
* *
•57
* * *
•73
* * *
•78
y y y'A' 'A 7V
*70
(2) Self/successful others
y  y y A A A
•62
*
•35
* * *
•70
* * *
•56
(3) Self/unsuccessful others •10 •62
- * #  
•54
* - * *
•43
Average correlations
*
•46
* * *
•59
y y y7. A A
•68
* * *
•57
*p<-05, **p<-01, ***p<»001.
The correlations in Table 3.31 show the predicted trend with academic 
self-concept correlating more highly with perceived attainments than with 
actual attainments. However, as for self-esteem, this was only true of the 
two older groups, presumably because the children in these groups have more 
clearly formulated academic self-concepts.
3.6.5. Summary
All three hypotheses dealt biith in this section have received at least 
partial support for the data. As predicted by Hypothesis 12, measures of 
attainment were found to be more highly correlated biith measures of 
academic self-concept (the average correlation being *47) than biith
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measures of self-esteem (where the average correlation was *35).
This differential bias maintained even when intelligence bias held constant, 
the average partial correlations being *39 and *32 respectively. As 
predicted by Hypothesis 13, academic self-concepts were found to act as 
intervening variables between self-esteem and attainments, at least for 
the two older groups. And as predicted by Hypothesis 14, both self­
esteem and academic self-concepts were shown to be more closely linked 
biith perceived attainments than with actual attainments.
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3 . 7  S E LK -P K U C LS S tS  AND 1 N I LLL 1 ULIMUt
3.7.1 Introduction
The question of the relationship between intelligence and self- 
processes such as self-esteem and academic self-concept is explored at 
various points in this chapter. This is usually in an attempt to 
establish whether variations in intelligence can explain relationships 
between particular variables. In this section we will be looking at 
specific hypotheses regarding intelligence.
In the first chapter, it was argued that self-esteem and self-concepts 
are derived from three sources, how others behave towards us, how we 
compare with our peers, and our observations of our own behaviour. In the 
present academic context, the first two of thsse sources are represented 
by what classmates and teachers think of each child's attainments and how , 
each child's actual attainments compare with those of his or her classmates. 
The third source, which can be seen as the impression children gradually 
develop of their own potential and actual competence, is not directly 
represented in the present ’study. However, we can expect one's observations 
of one's own behaviour will be reasonably highly correlated with measured 
intelligence, and the first hypothesis to be considered in this section 
is based on the assumption that measured intelligence is a better indicator 
of the. child's developing sense of his or her competence than are actual 
attainments.
3.7.2 Hypothesis, 15 : Among the older children, academic
self-concepts will be more closely linked biith intelligence 
than attainments whereas the opposite will be true of the 
younger children
UJhat this hypothesis predicts is a growing tendency for children's 
academic self-concepts to depend upon an internalized sense of competence 
rather than an external indices of achievement. This can be tested by 
comparing the correlations between verbal ability and the three measures 
of academic self-concept. These are given in Table 3.32 (on next page).
The figures in Table 3.32 show the predicted developmental trend 
quite clearly, biith academic self-concepts being consistently linked
academic self-concept
Academic self-concept Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
(1) Self rank ♦25
**
•50
**
•47
***
•39
(2) Self/successful others • 14 -•02
*
•42 •18
(3) Self/unsuccessful others •06 -•34
*
-•44
*
-•22
Average correlations •11 • 28
I*1 
sr •
*
•26
*p<«05, **p<-01, ***p<-001.
with verbal ability only in the case of the oldest group. In addition, 
Hypothesis 15 predicts that this link between academic self-concepts and 
ability should eventually become stronger than the link between academic 
self-concepts and attainment. The corresponding correlations between 
academic self-concept and attainment have been given already (Table 3.18).
For-the sake of comparison with the correlations in Table 3.32, the average 
correlations between measures of academic self-concept and attainment are 
•32(n.s.), «46(p-<l*0l) and «6l(p<l*00l) for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
It is apparent that there is a distinct trend for academic self-concepts 
to become more closely linked biith both ability and attainment as children 
get older. Contrary to the prediction , the link with attainments is stronger 
than that with ability at all age levels.
• There are two possible reasons for the lack of support for Hypothesis 
15. One is that measured ability may not accurately reflect the sense of 
competence children develop as a result of observations of their behaviour 
and performance. The other reason is that the children in the present 
sample are still too young to have begun to distinguish clearly between 
intelligence and achievement. This can be tested by comparing the 
correlations between the element 'self1 and the constructs ’good at work’ 
and 'clever' on the academic grids. This correlation should be lowest in 
the case of the oldest group. The actual correlations are *83, *96 and *93 
(all p<C*00l) for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively, no developmental trend 
being apparent. The repertory grids may well be too small to permit a 
clear •’distinction to Be made between the two constructs concerned, but 
these figures do suggest that the explanation offered above may be correct. 
Hypothesis 15 bias formulated on the basis of a longitudinal study by 
Brookover and his colleagues (1962, 1965, 1967) which used a somewhat older 
sample (12 to 17 year olds). Thus, although the evidence of the present study
-153-
u u  o I iu u o u f j u u i  l» » i j p u  u • i c. -L o 1. vj ^  n c x t i i c i  u u  r: o xu# u  i t c i  y i u u n u o  i u  i. i c j c u  ui i ly
it.
3.7,3 Hypothesis 16 : The correlations between academic self-
concepts and ability will be reduced significantly when attainments 
are held constant
i
As discussed in the first chapter (section 1.7.3) the Brookover study 
just mentioned showed that, for the 12 year olds at least, the correlation 
between self-concept of ability and measured intelligence was significantly 
reduced when attainments were held constant, for the present sample, this 
can be tested by calculating the correlations between verbal ability and 
the three measures of academic self-concept while controlling for attainment. 
The resulting partial correlations are given in Table 3.33.
Table 3.33 : Partial correlations between verbal abjility and
academic self-concept (controllinq for attainment)
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Controlling for reading attainment 
(l) Self rank •10 •19 •13 •10
(2) Self/successful others. •02 -•16 -•04 •03
(3) Self/unsuccessful others •08 -•12 -•08 •06
Controlling for Maths attainment (1 and 2)/Academic report (3)
(1) Self rank •18 •47 •26 -
(2) Self/successful others •04 -•16 •24 -
(3) Self/unsuccessful others •09 -•25 -•29 -
*p<^*05
The figures in Table 3.33 offer clear support for Hypothesis 16. With
only one exception, the previously statistically significant correlations 
between verbal ability and academic self-concept are reduced dramatically. 
This indicates that verbal ability only correlates with academic self-concept 
because both are independently correlated with attainments. Therefore 
the tendency for verbal ability and academic self-concept to be more closely 
linked for older children must be due to the fact that academic concepts 
become more accurate with age (that is, more congruent with attainments).
For this sample at least, it would seem that verbal ability makes little 
or no independent contribution to academic self-concept. (The same 
calculations could be repeated with self-esteem, but the correlations
between verbal ability and self-esteem are so slight as to render such
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The next hypothesis deals biith the relationship betbieen self-esteem 
and both perceived and measured ability.
3.7.4 Hypothesis 17 : Self-esteem will be more closely
linked biith perceived ability than biith measured ability
This complements Hypothesis 14 (dealt biith in the last section) 
bihich predicted that self-esteem biould be more closely linked biith 
perceived attainments than biith measured attainments. This bias found 
to be so for academic self-concept as well as self-esteem. Children’s 
perceptions of their ability are indicated by the correlations betbieen 
the element ’self* and the construct ’clever’ on the academic grid.
The correlations betbieen the three measures of self-esteem and measures 
of both perceived and actual ability are given in Table 3.34.
Table 3.34 : Correlations betbieen measures of self-esteem and
measures of perceived and actual ability
Correlations betbieen Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Perceived ability and
(1) General self-esteem (SEI) •29 •20
*
•39
**
•29
(2) General self-esteem (self/ideal)
*
*43
*
•37 •26
**■*
•36
(3) Academic self-esteem
y y y A A A
•72
*
•42 •26
***
• 6g
Average correlations
*-*
•51
*
•34 •31
***
•39
Measured ability and
*
•36(1) General self-esteem (SEl) •09 -•08 •12
(2) General self-esteem (self/ideal) •20 •15 •19 >18
(3) Academic self-esteem •12 •30 •29
*
•22
Average correlations •14 •13 •28 •17
* p < * 0 5 , **p<*01, . ***p<-001.
Hypothesis 17 (jets clear support from the figures in Table 3.34
at least as far as the two younger groups are concerned. For Class 3, 
self-esteem is just as closely linked with actual ability as biith 
perceived ability, perhaps another reflection of the increasing accuracy 
of children’s self-perceptions. For the sake of comparison, we will 
examine the corresponding correlations for academic self-concept . Again,
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the prediction is that academic self-concept should correlate more 
highly with perceived ability than with measured ability. The relevant 
correlations are given in Table 3.35.
Table 3.35 : Correlations between measures of academic self-concept
and measures of perceived and actual ability
I
Correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Perceived ability and
(l) Self rank •24
***
•82
**•*
•76
***
•58
(2) Self/successful others •32
***
•79
***
•88 •63
(3) Self/unsuccessful others •37 •88 •93 •70
Average correlations •31
***
•83
***
•87
-*■**
•64
Pleasured ability and
(l) Self rank •25
**
•50
**
•47 •39
(2) Self/successful others •14 -•02
*
•42
*
•18
(3) Self/unsuccessful others -•06
*
•34
*
•44
*
•22
Average correlations •11 •28
*
•45
*
•26
*p <  *05, **p<*01, ***p<-001.
The above correlations show the predicted trend clearly, with the 
correlations between perceived ability and academic self-concept being 
consistently higher than those between measured ability and academic self- 
concept .
3.7.5 Summary
Earlier in this chapter, it was established that academic self-concepts 
become more congruent with actual attainments as the children get older.
In the present section, it was shown that academic self-concepts become 
more congruent with ability as well. However, contrary to Hypothesis 15, 
the link between academic self-concept and attainment was stronger at all 
age levels, than the link between academic self-concept and ability. It was 
argued that the most likely reason for the lack of evidence for this 
hypothesis was that the children in the present study were too young 
to have begun relying significantly on an internalized sense of self­
competence (rather than on external confirmation of achievement) as a
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source of academic self-concept. Thus, although the evidence does not support 
Hypothesis 15, neither does it provide grounds for rejecting it.
Tbio further predictions were tested in this section. As predicted 
by Hypothesis 16, the correlations between academic self-concepts and 
ability were reduced significantly when attainments were held constant.
This indicates that, for this sample at least, verbal ability makes little 
or no independent contribution to academic self-concept . Finally, in 
accordance biith Hypothesis 17, both self-esteem and academic self-concept 
were found to be more closely linked biith perceived ability than biith 
measured ability.
3.8 ACHIEVEMENT VALUES
3.8.1 Introduction
This section deals with the theory (outlined in section 1.2.2) that 
our self-esteem is not necessarily implicated in all our successes and 
failures, only being .affected by success or failure in areas we value.
This should make achievement value a key variable, controlling the extent 
to which academic achievements influence global self-evaluation. The 
implication is that, unless one takes achievement values into account, 
individual differences in the relevance of academic success for self-esteem 
will be obscured.
The main proposal to be tested is that, of the children who value 
success, those who do well will have higher self-esteem than those who 
do poorly. In addition, there is the complementary question of the effect 
success or failure has on those who do not value academic achievement. 
Presumably, any success, even in an area one does not value particularly, 
will be gratifying to some extent, but not as much as success in a valued 
sphere. Therefore, it is predicted that, for children who do not value 
academic achievement, there will be relatively little difference in self­
esteem betuieen those who do well and those who do not.
• 3.8.2 Hypothesis 18 : For students who value academic
success, those who do well will have higher self-esteem than
not
those biho do poorly; for those who do^value success, there
will be relatively little difference in self-esteem betbieen
successful and unsuccessful students
As described in the last chapter (section 2.3.2), measures of 
achievement • value were derived from the two repertory grids. The 
general grid yielded a measure of the value placed upon being good at 
schootwork while the corresponding measure from the academic grid 
concerned the value placed upon being clever. These two measures will 
be treated separately. To test Hypothesis 18, tTie children in each 
class were divided according to whether they were above or below 
average in attainment rank and again according to whether they were 
above or below average in achievement value. Because the numbers 
in each of the resulting four cells were so small, it bias decided 
to combine the three groups for the purpose of this analysis.
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form of standardized scores, the number of children in each category being 
given in brackets. To assess the differences betbieen the means, the Mann- 
Whitney U Test (Siegel, 1956, p.116 ff.) is used. Table 3.36 gives the 
results for the first measure of achievement value.
Table 3.36 : Differences in self-esteem according to the degree
of academic success and the value placed upon being good at schoolwork
Value placed upon being 
good at schoolbiork:
Level of attainment: Above average Below average
General self-esteem Above average 
(SEl) Below average
General self-esteem Above average 
(self/ideal) Below average
•662 (20) *427 (16)
•090 (16) -1*023 (21)
z = 1*96 z = 3-64
(p = *025) ( p < -00l)
From Table 3.36, it can be seen that, for those who value success, self­
esteem tends to be higher among those who are doing well than among those who 
are not having as much success. This tendency is statistically significant 
for tbio of the measures of self-esteem and is in line with the first part 
of Hypothesis 18. However, when we consider those who do not place as much 
value on being good at schoolwork, there are significant differences in 
self-esteem betbieen the successful and unsuccessful students as well. In 
fact,; for two of the measures of self-esteem, these differences are even 
greater than those found for the children who valued success. This is the 
opposite of bihat bias predicted and indicates that academic success or failure 
has greater impact on the self-esteem of those who do not place much value 
on being good at schoolwork.
Academic self-esteem Above average 
(self/ideal) Below average
•332 (20) -393 (16)
-•195 (16) -*466 (21)
z = 1-43 z = 2*41
(n.s.) (p = *008)
•431 (20) *114 (16)
-•228 (16) -*325 (21)
z = 1*99 z = 1*37
(p = *023) (n.s.)
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achievement value.
Table 3.37 : Differences in self-esteem according to the degree
of academic success and the value placed upon being clever
Value placed upon being clever 
Level of attainment Above average Below average
General self-esteem Above average •401 (22) •361 (14)
(SEI) Belobi average •045 (16) -•689 (21)
z = 1*12 z = 3*33
(n.s.) ( p <  • ooi)
General self-esteem Above average •093 (22) •403 (14)
(self/ideal) Below average •039 (16) -•396 (21)
z = 0*14 z = 2*27
(n.s.) (p = *012
Academic self-esteem Above average •521 (22) •253 (14)
(Self/ideal) Below average -•127 (16) -•618 (21)
•
z = 1*98 z = 2-54
(p = #024) (p = *006)
The figures in Table 3.37 only confirm the pattern found for the first
measure of achievement value. For each measure of self-esteem, the self­
esteem differences between successful and unsuccessful students are greater 
among those who do not place much value on being clever than among those 
who do. Thus, the evidence contradicts the prediction made in Hypothesis 18.
Although there are plausible reasons for thinking that achievement 
value might be important for self-esteem, no previous study has demonstrated 
that this is so. Stein and Bailey (1973) reviewed studies which showed that, 
for girls at least, achievement value bias linked biith both persistence and 
actual attainments in the tasks valued. Rosenberg (1965) found that self- 
esteern bias higher in those adolescents who valued achievement and who 
thought they were doing well. Thus, previous research suggests that 
achievement values should be linked biith both academic self-concepts and 
actual attainments. A link between achievement value and attainments is 
predicted by Hypothesis 19 and will be examined shortly. First, the 
relationships between self-esteem, academic self-concept and achievement 
value will be considered.
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of children who value success, those who have more favourable academic self- 
Concepts will have higher self-esteem than those mho have less favourable 
academic self-concepts. In addition, it is predicted that, for children 
who do not value success, there will be relatively little difference in 
self-esteem between those who have favourable academic self-concepts and
those who do not. The results for the two measures of achievement value
I
are given in Tables 3.38 and 3.39. Again, the three age groups have been 
combined for the purposes of these analyses.
Table 3.38 : Differences in self-esteem according to the level of
academic self-concept and value placed upon being good at work
Value placed upon 
Level of being good at work
academic self-concept Above average Below average
General self-esteem Above average •308 20) •177 (15)
(SEI) Below average -•354 17) -•132 (21)
z = 1 98 z = 1*27
( p  = 024) (n.s.)
General self-esteem Above average •338 20) -•088 (15)
(self/ideal) Below average . -*041 17) -•226 (21)
z = 1 30
CDto.□IIN
(n.s. (n.s.)
Academic self-esteem Above average •712 20) •166 (15)
(self/ideal) Below average -•370 17) -•498 (21)
z = 2 45 z = 1*67
( p  = 007) (p = *048)
The figures in Table 3.38 offer some support for the hypothesized 
relationships between self-esteem, academic self-concept and achievement value. 
For all three measures, self-esteem is higher among those who both value 
being -good at work and* think they are good at woTk than among those who share 
these values but do not think they are fulfilling them. The same pattern 
is found for those who do not value being good at work but, as predicted, 
the differences are less marked. Table 3,39 (on next page) gives the 
results for the second measure of achievement value.
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academic self-concept and value placed upon beinq clever
Level of
academic self-concept
Value placed upon 
being clever 
Above average Below average
General self-esteem 
(SEI)
Above average 
.Below average
•532 (22) 
-•120 (15)
z = 1*97 
(p = *024)
-•220 (14) 
-•311 (22)
z = 0 - 4 7  
(n.s.)
General self-esteem 
(self/ideal)
Above average 
Below average
•206 (22) 
-•122 (15)
z = 0-23 
(n.s.)
•142 (14) 
-•213 (22)
z = 0* 44 
(n.s.)
Academic self-esteem 
(self/ideal)
Above average 
Below average
•615 (22) 
-•324 (15)
•197 (14) 
-•519 (22)
z = 2*63 
(p = *004)
z = 2*05 
(p = -02)
Further support for the hypothesized relationship between self-esteem, 
academic self-concepts and achievement value is provided by the figures in 
Table 3.39. For children who do value being clever, self-esteem is higher 
among those who have favourable academic self-concepts than among those who 
do not see themselves as succeeding. The same is true for those who do not 
value being clever, but not to such a degree.
So far, it has been established that, to a certain extent, achievement 
value acts as an intervening variable between academic self-concept and 
self-esteem but not between actual attainments and self-esteem (as predicted 
by Hypothesis 18). The next question to be considered is whether there is 
any link between achievement value and actual academic success. Hypothesis 19 
predicts that there will be.
3.8.3 Hypothesis 19 : Children who value being academically
successful and/or intelligent will tend to be more academically 
successful than those who do not
This hypothesis can be tested by comparing the average attainment ranks 
of those who value being academically successful and/or intelligent and those
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Table 3.40. Again, the significance of the differences between the means 
have been assessed by the Mann-Whitney U Test (Siegel, 1956).
Table 3.40 : The relationship between children1s attainment ranks
and the value they place upon being good at schoolwork and/or clever
i '
Value placed upon :
Level of valuation
Being good at 
schoolwork 
(general grid)
Being clever 
(academic grid)
Class 1 Above average 
Below average
9*3 (11)
13-1 (11)
u = 43 (n.s.)
llrl (11)
11*9 (11)
u = 56 (n.s.)
Class 2 Above average 
Below average
11*8 (12)
14*1 (13)
u = 63*5 (n.s.)
12*2 (12)
13*8 (13)
u = 68 (n.s.)
Class 3 Above average 
Belobi average
15*8 (13)
11*2 (13)
u =  54*5 (n.s.)
13*5 (13)
13-5 (13)
u = 84*5 (n.s
The above results do not offer much support for Hypothesis 19. For 
the two younger groups, there is a tendency for those who value success to 
be more successful, just as predicted, but none of the differences are 
statistically significant. For the oldest group, the difference for one 
of the measures of achievement value is in the wrong direction, although 
not significantly so.
3.8.4 Summary
The results offer no support for either of the two hypotheses 
concerning the value children place upon being clever and/or academically 
successful. Contrary to Hypothesis 19, childreg whose attainments were above . 
average did not value being clever or successful any more than those whose 
attainments were below average. The absence of any link betbieen achievement 
value and academic success inevitably meant that the hypothesized relationship 
betbieen self-esteem, achievement value and academic success would not be 
observed either. In fact, the opposite of the pattern predicted by Hypothesis 
18 bias found.
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Relative academic success or failure had greater impact on the self-esteem 
of those who did not value such success than on the self-esteem of those 
who did.
The failure to find support for these two hypotheses suggests that 
the measures used might not accurately reflect children’s achievement values. 
However, there bias one further prediction, based on earlier research, which 
wa6 tested and which would seem to confirm the validity of the two measures 
of achievement value. As found by Rosenberg (1965), differences in academic 
self-concept were more closely related to differences in self-esteem among 
those biho valued academic success than among those who did not value success. 
Thus, the evidence suggests that achievement value acts as an intervening 
variable betbieen academic self-concept and self-esteem but not betbieen actual 
attainments and self-esteem.
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3.9 ACADEMIC LOCUS OF CONTROL
3.9.1 Hypothesis 20 ; Internal locus of control will
increase with age
It is a well established fact that internal locus of control increases 
with age. In order to see if this is so for the present sample, age 
differences will be examined first of all. It will be remembered that the 
Crandall et al. (1965) Intellectual Achievement Responsibility scale (IAR) 
consists of two subscales which deal with the extent to which children 
accept responsibility for their academic successes and failures respectively. 
Thus, the IAR yields three scores : internality on the success subscale, 
internality on the failure subscale and total internality. Table 3.41 gives 
the age differences for these scores.
Table 3.41 : Age differences in IAR scores.
F value
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 (d.f.2,80) P
IAR (Success) Wean 10*69 11*80 12*65 4*47 •015
(S.d.) (2*95) (2*47) (2*37)
IAR (Failure) Mean 8*03 9*40 10*77 5*95 •004
(S.d.) (2*98) (3*78) (2*08)
IAR (Total) Mean 18*63 21 • 20 23*42 17*32 < • 0 0 1
(S.d.) (3*07) (3*29) (2*96)
As predicted by Hypothesis 20, internality increases biith age. There 
is a significant linear trend for each of the three measures, their respective 
F values being 8*86, 11*90 and 34*59 (all p < * 0 0 1  biith 1 and 80 d.f.). In 
addition, mean scores on the success subscale are significantly higher than 
those on the failure subscale ( p < * 0 1  at each age level). Thus, children 
in all classes were more willing to accept the credit for their failures.
The correlations betbieen the two subscales were -*47 (p<*0l), -*51 ( p<*0l) 
and -*12 (n.s.) for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. These correlations 
suggest that, for the junior school children, those who take the credit 
for their academic successes tend not to be willing to accept the blame 
for their failures, while those who are willing to blame themselves for 
failure tend not to accept the credit for their successes. These tendencies 
are not evident to the same extent in the secondary school children,
-165-
suggesting that these children have more complex views of their 
intellectual achievements.
The rest of this section will concentrate on the relationships 
betbieen scores on the IAR and the key variables in this study, namely 
self-esteem, academic self-concept, attainments and intelligence. Self­
esteem will be considered first. i
3.9.2 Hypothesis 21 : Self-esteem scores mi11 correlate
positively (if modestly) with internal locus of control
Strictly speaking, what this hypothesis predicts is a link between 
general self-esteem and general locus of control. However, the IAR deals 
with academic locus of control and might be expected therefore to be more 
closely linked with academic self-esteem than with general self-esteem. 
However, both pilot studies found that general self-esteem (as measured 
by Coopersmith1s SEl) correlated significantly with internality on the 
Success subscale of the IAR only. The actual correlations between the 
three measures of self-esteem and IAR scores are given in Table 3.42.
Table' -3.42 •• Correlations between self-esteem and locus of control
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
General (i) IAR Total •11 ?01 •03 •06
self-esteem (2) IAR Success •26 •26 -•07 •15
(SEl) (3) IAR Failure -•14 -•16 •12 -•06
General (1) IAR Total
**
•46 -•04 -•22 •10
self-esteem (2) IAR Success
***
•60 -•02 -•04
*
•21
(self/ideal)(3) IAR Failure -•12 -•02 -•27 -•14
Academic (1) IAR Total •27
*
-•36 -•02 -•01
self-esteem (2) IAR Success *27 •22 •10
*
•20
(self/ideal)(3) IAR F ailure •00
*
-•45 -•13 -•18
*p< * 0 5 ,  < •  01, ***p<*001.
The correlations in Table 3.42 offer only very limited support for 
Hypothesis 21. As predicted, all three measures of self-esteem correlated 
positively with internality on the Success subscale of the IAR and negatively 
with internality on the Failure subscale. However, these correlations only 
reached statistical significance in a couple of instances. Despite the
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with scores on the Success subscale. Correlations between academic self­
esteem and IAR scores were not consistently stronger than those between 
the two measures of general self-esteem and IAR scores. These results 
indicate that children’s self-esteem is only marginally influenced by 
their understanding of why they succeed or fail in intellectual tasks.
Next to be considered is the relationship betbieen academic self- 
concept and locus of control.
3.9.3 Hypothesis 22 : Academic self-concept will be
linked with internal locus of control
This hypothesis is based more on the theoretical links betbieen the 
two variables, than on a previous research ( which is non-existent).
The relevant correlations are given in Table 3.43..
Table 3.43 : Correlations between locus of control and academic
self-concept
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Self (1) IAR Total •27 •01 •28
*
•19
Rank (2) IAR Success
**
•47 •07
*
•36
**
•32
(3) IAR Failure -•19 -•04 -•01 -•09
Self/ (1) IAR Total
*
•32 -•23 •15 •10
successful (2) IAR Success
***
•53 •27 •15 •33
others (3) IAR Failure -•20
*
-•38 •05 -•17
Self/ (1) IAR Total •13 •16 •02 •10
unsuccessful (2) IAR Success -•29 -•19 -•14
*
-•21
others (3) IAR Failure
**
•41 •26 *19
**
•30
*p<*05, **p<*01, ***p<-001.
A reasonably consistent pattern emerges from the correlations given 
in Table 3.43. All three measures of academic self-concept correlate biith 
IAR scores in the expected direction (the signs varying according to the 
nature of the particular measure). None of the correlations are very 
substantial and by no means all of them are statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, they are somewhat larger than the correlations betbieen
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these correlations show is that children who view themselves as 
relatively successful in their schoolwork tend to see this success 
as due to their own efforts and ability while any failures they experience 
are due to circumstances beyond their control. This trend is marginally 
stronger in the youngest group. Although these findings are intuitively 
plausible, they show, that the relationship between academic self-concept 
and locus of control is moderate at best.
As bias stressed in the first chapter (section 1.8), the relationship 
betbieen locus of control and both self-esteem and academic self-concept can 
only be understood properly when attainments and intelligence are taken into 
consideration. Thus, it may be that some or even all of the moderate 
correlations betbieen locus of control and academic self-concept are due to 
the fact that both variables correlate biith intelligence and/or attainments. 
Thus, it is conceivable, as Lefcourt (1976) has suggested, that children's 
perceptions of their academic ability as well as the sense they have of being' 
responsible for their intellectual successes and failures are both derived 
from observations of their actual attainments.
This is the next question to be explored.
3.9.4 Aim 6 : To see if the correlations betbieen academic
locus of control and both self-esteem and academic self-concept
are altered when both ability and attainments are held constant
Partial correlations can be used to explore this question. First, 
the correlations betbieen locus of control and both intelligence and attain­
ment will be examined. Previous studies suggest that we should find positive 
(if moderate) correlations betbieen scores on the IAR and measures of 
intelligence and attainment. The results for the present study are given 
in Table 3.44 (on next page).
As Table 3.44 shows, IAR scores are linked biith measures of 
intelligence and attainment for the youngest group only. For the Class 1 
children, internality on the Success subscale of the IAR correlates 
significantly biith both verbal ability and biith attainment in maths while 
Total IAR score correlates significantly biith attainment in both maths 
and reading. For the children in Classes 2 and 3, many of the correlations 
approach zero. Clearly, for the two older groups, the links betbieen locus 
of control and both self-esteem and academic self-concept cannot be explained
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intelligence and attainment 
Correlations between Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Verbal ability 
and (1) IAR Total •29 •28 -•14 •15
(2) IAR Success
*
•33 •04 -•11 •11
(3) IAR Failure -•03 •22 -•08 •03
Reading attainment 
and (l) IAR Total
**
•48 •12 •01 •22
(2) IAR Success •28 -•10 •07 •10
(3) IAR Failure •22 • 17 -•0B •11
Maths attainment (Classes 1 and 2)/Academic report (Cl ass 3)
and (l) IAR Total
***
•50 -•01 •07 _
(2) IAR Success
***
•59 •17 •03 -
(3) IAR Failure •03 -•12 •06 -
*p< • 05, **p<*01, ***p<-001.
in terms of variations in either intelligence or attainment. For the 
youngest group,houwever, this still remains a possibility. The partial 
correlations between locus of control and self-esteem/academic self-concept 
(with intelligence and attainment held constant) were calculated for Class 1 
only. These are given in Table 3.45 (measures of self-esteem) and Table 
3.45 (on next page) (measures of academic self-concept).
Table 3.45 Partial correlations between locus of control and self­
esteem (controlling for intelligence and attainment) (Class 1 only)
controlling for :
Pearson Verbal Reading Maths
correlations ability attainment attainment
General (l) IAR Total •11 •09 •02 •05
self-esteem (2) IAR Success •26 •25 •17 •14
(SCI) (3) IAR F ailure -•14 -•15 -•23 -•15
General (l) IAR Total
*
•46
*
•44 •28 •19
self-esteem (2) IAR Success • 60
■V V V -A ^  A
• 58
**
•55
*
•41
(self/ideal)(3) IAR F ailure -•12 -•13 •01 -•12
Academic (l) IAR Total •27 •25 •07 •01
self-esteem (2) IAR Success •27 •24 •17 •01
(self/ideal)(3) IAR F ailure •00 -•01 •11 •01
* p < * 0 5 ,  ■**p < - 01, ***p<*001.
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esteem in Table 3.45 are compared with the original correlations, it can 
be seen that holding verbal ability constant makes little difference but 
that holding attainment constant often does lead to a reduction in the 
size of the correlation. Whatever variable is controlled however, the 
grid measure of.general self-esteem still correlates significantly with 
internality on the Success subscale of the IAR. The corresponding results 
for measures of academic self-concept will now be considered.
Table 3.46 : .Partial correlations between locus of control and academic
self-concept (controlling for intelligence and attainment) (Class 1 only)
controlling for :
Pearson Verbal Reading Maths
correlations ability attainment attainment
Self rank (1) IAR Total •27 •21 ■ *12 -•07
(2) IAR ■Success
**
•47
-Y-
•42 “
*
•41 •23
(3) IAR Failure -•19 -•19 -•13 -•21
Self/ (1) IAR Totql
*
•32 •29 •24 -•01
successful (2) IAR Success
**
•53
**
•52
**
•49 •31
others (3) IAR F ailure -•20 -•20 -•15 -•22
Self/ (1) IAR Total •13 •12 •14 •25
unsuccessful (2) IAR Success -•29 -•29 -•29 -•28
others (3) IAR Failure
*
•41
*
•41
*
•41
*
•42
* p <  *05, **p<-01.
It can be seen from Table 3.46 that, for the children in Class. .1, holding 
verbal ability constant makes virtually no difference to the correlations 
between IAR scores and measures of academic self-concept. Of the two 
attainment measures, reading attainment has little impact but holding 
maths attainment constant does lead to significant reductions in some 
(but not all) of the correlations. It will be remembered that the particular 
method used for measuring maths attainment meant that the children would be 
more §ware*of houi well they were doing in maths ,than of how good their 
reading was or how well they might have done on a verbal ability test.
This lends some force to the idea that both academic self-concepts and 
(academic) locus of control might derive from observations of how well 
one is doing academically. However, even holding maths attainment constant 
did not eliminate all correlations between locus of control and academic
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self-concept. In particular, the results snow tnat tnose c i u l u i - b m  u m u  
disassociate themselves from their unsuccessful classmates also tend to 
be unwilling to take the blame for their own intellectual failings. This 
is regardless of how intelligent or successful they are. (The association 
of these two tendencies suggests that academic self-concept might have two 
distinct aspects, positive and negative. Thus, thinking of oneself as clever 
and capable of good work is not necessarily the same thing as thinking of 
oneself as incapable of bad work or as unlike those who are not clever).
3.9.5 Summary
The only hypothesis concerning locus of control that has received 
unequivocal support was Hypothesis 20 which predicted that internality on 
the IAR should increase with age. On the basis of previous research, modest 
correlations were predicted between locus of control and self-esteem 
(Hypothesis 21) and academic self-concept (Hypothesis 22). Of these two, 
only academic self-concept showed anything like the expected pattern of 
correlations and then mainly in the case of the youngest group. Even some 
of those correlations could be significantly reduced if attainment in maths 
was held consctant. It would seem that locus of control makes only a 
limited independent contribution to the academic self-concepts of the 
children in the present sample. (One final hypothesis concerning locus 
of control is dealt with in the section on sex differences).
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3.10.1 Introduction
Measures of popularity were included in the present study because of 
the presumed contribution a child’s relative popularity makes to his or her 
general self-esteem. Prior research (considered in section 1.4.5) is 
inconclusive on this point. However, as none of the previous studies 
involving measures of popularity have used a repertory grid measure of 
self-esteem, it bias important to include such measures in the present 
study. Perhaps popularity would be a dimension which differentiated between 
the tbio measures of general self-esteem. Moreover, we have the opinion of 
no less an authority than Ruth Wylie (1979) recommending that popularity 
be included as one of the variables when self-esteem is the subject of 
study. No specific predictions were made concerning the relationship 
between popularity and other variables. The relationships explored in 
the rest of this section are those between popularity and measures of 
self-esteem, academic self-concept, class rank, teacher rank and actual 
academic attainments.
3..ID.2 Aim 7 : To explore the relationship between children’s
popularity and their self-esteem and academic self-concepts
The correlations between the sociometric measure of popularity 
and the various measures of self-esteem and academic self-concept are 
given in Table 3.47 (on next page).
From Table 3.47 we can see that there is a moderate positive 
correlation between popularity and both self-esteem and academic self- 
concept for Class 1 only. For the four academic measures (that is, 
academic self-esteem plus the three measures of academic self-concept), 
there seems to be a curvilinear relationship with popularity : to think 
well of one's academic progress is acceptable in Class 1 but is associated 
biith unpopularity in Class 2 and remains so to a certain extent in Class 3. 
This suggests that,, in younger children, popularity is partly linked with 
academic success but becomes less so as children grow older.
This can be checked by examining the link between popularity and 
other academic variables.
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Table 3.47 : Correlations between popularity and measures of both
self-esteem and academic self-concept
Variable Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Self-esteem
(l) General self-esteem (SEl) *34 •22 -*11 •16
(2) General self-esteem (self/ideal) *33 •13 1 *15
*
•21
"X"
(3) Academic self-esteem (self/ideal) *31 -•35 *06 •00
Average correlation *32 -•01 *03 •12
Academic self-concept
(l) Self rank *36 -•20 -*17 •02
(2) Self/successful others *41 -•11 -*03 •11
(3) Self/unsuccessful others *09 •37 *15 •19
Average correlation *24 -•23 -*12 -•02
*p<^*05, **p<^*01.
3.10.3 Aim 8 : To explore the relationship between c h i l d r e n s
popularity, the opinions held of them by others, and their actual
attainments
The correlations between popularity and class rank, teacher rank
and attainment rank are given in Table 3.48.
Table 3.48 : Correlations between popularity and class rank.
teacher rank and attainment rank
Variable Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
**
Class rank *64 •07 -*08
*
•25
**
Teacher rank *53 •39* *09
**
•35
■JHf
Attainment rank *52 - •02 *03
*
•19
*p<*05, **p<-01.
The correlations in Table 3.48 confirm the tendency for popularity 
and academic success to become progressively differentiated. The correlations 
between popularity and both class rank and attainment rank are significantly 
lower for both Class 2 and Class 3 than for Class 1. The same is true of 
teacher rank, though the differences are not statistically significant.
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way the teacher used this measure, stressing personal rather than academic 
qualities. It seems likely that, had she rated the children more on academic 
qualities, her assessments would have been less highly correlated with 
popularity and a mare gradual differentiation between popularity and 
achievement might have been observed.
3.10.4 Summary
Popularity was found to be modestly related to both self-esteem 
and academic self-concept but ably for the youngest group. This bias 
also true of the opinions of others (class ranks and teacher rank) and 
of actual attainments, although the correlations were more substantial.
For the whole sample, popularity is most closely linked with teachers' 
evaluations of their pupils. Overall, the results suggest that popularity 
and academic success are linked in young children but become progressively 
differentiated with age.
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3.11.1 Hypothesis 73 : There will be no significant sex
differences in self-esteem
As discussed in the first chapter (section 1.9), previous research 
suggests that boys and girls do not differ consistently in their levels 
of self-esteem. For the present sample, it has been established already 
(section 3.2) that there are no sex differences for the three measures
of self-esteem (Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6). Although boys and girls were
not expected to differ in their overall . self-evaluations, differences 
were predicted in their academic self-concepts.
3.11.2 Hypothesis 24 ; Boys will have more favourable
academic self-concepts than girls, even when their actual 
attainments are inferior
This hypothesis is based on previous research (considered in 
section 1.9) which suggests that, as cultural stereotypes about the 
respective roles and abilities of men and women are assimilated, girls 
begin to view themselves as less able than boys. These self-perceptions 
act as self-fulfilling prophecies so that girls1 academic attainments, 
usually superior at junior school level, fall behind those of boys in 
adolescence. For the present sample, this can be tested by comparing 
the self-ranks of boys and girls at each age level. The details are 
given in Table' 3.49.
Table 3.49 : Sex differences in self ranks
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Boys 10*50 9*62 11*25 10*43
Girls 7*90 11*58 14*36 11*64
Both 9*32 10*56 12*92 11*03
From these figures, it can be seen that the girls in the youngest 
group rank themselves more highly than their male classmates while the 
girls in the two older groups (especially those in the oldest group) 
rank themselves less highly than the boys. Ue cannot assess the statistical
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significance of these differences as they stand because the self ranks 
are not continuously distributed. First, the self ranks must themselves 
be ranked. The averages for these ranked self ranks are given in Table
3.50. The significance of the sex differences is given by the Mann-Ulhitney 
U Test (Siegel, 1956).
Table 3.50 : Sex differences in (ranked) self ranks
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Boys 13*50 11*96 11*00 12*15
Girls 9*10 14*13 15*64 13*32
Both (11*50) (13*00) (13*50) (12*73)
u = 36 u = 77*5 u = 54
(n.s.) (n.s.) (n.s.)
Table 3.50 shows that none of the differences between the self 
rankings of boys and girls are statistically significant (although for 
both Class 1 and Class 3 they only fall just short of the *05 level of 
significance). However, the figures do show clearly how girls in the 
two older groups rank themselves lower than the boys. The question is 
,whether they do so regardless of their actual attainments. To test this, 
we need to compare the (ranked) self ranks given in Table 3.50 with the 
c h i l d r e n s  attainment ranks. These are given in Tabls 3.51. Again, the 
Mann-Ufhitney U Test is used to assess the statistical significance of the 
sex differences.
Table 3.51 : Sex differences in attainment ranks
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All
Boys 13*83 11*96 11*33 12*36
Girls 8*70 14*13 15*36 13*10
u = 32 u = 77*5 u = 58
(p<*05) (n.s.) (n.s.)
The first point to be made about the average attainment ranks 
given in Table 3.51 is that they conform to the usual pattern of girls
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having higher achievements when young but not doing as well as boys 
in adolescence. The second point to be made is that these average 
attainment ranks closely match the average self ranks given in Table
3.50. Thus, the observed sex differences in self ranks would appear to 
be accurate reflections of boys’ and girls’ actual attainments.
i '
Contrary to prediction, boys' academic self-concepts were more 
favourable than those of girls only when their achievements were higher.
When the boys were doing less well academically (as bias the case for 
the eight year olds), then their academic self-concepts were correspondingly 
less favourable. However, the sex differences predicted by Hpothesis 24 
strictly apply to children older than this group so that the present 
results do not constitute a true test of the hypothesis. Although the 
results are in the predicted direction (in that boys' academic self- 
concepts become more favourable with age while those of girls become 
less favourable), it is impossible to say whether this is the result 
of the children’s cultural preconceptions about the respective abilities 
of boys and girls or of the tendency for academic self-concepts to become 
more accurate with age. However, the latter is.the more parsimonious 
explanation and has already received support from the present study.
Another way of approaching Hypothesis 24 is to see if boys and 
girls differ in their tendency to under- or overestimate their academic 
standing in class. The prediction is that boys will tend to overestimate 
uihile girls, particularly the thirteen year olds, will tend to under­
estimate. The accuracy of the children’s self-estimates can be established 
by subtracting the average self ranks given in Table 3,49 from the average 
attainment ranks given in Table 3.51. The average differences are given 
in Table 3.52.
Table 3.52 : Sex differences in children’s tendencies
overestimate their positions ini class
Class r Class 2 Class 3 ' All
Boys 3*33 2*34 0*08 1*93
Girls 0*80 2-55 1*00 1*46
Both 2*18 2-44 0*58 1 *70
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three age groups tend to overestimate their positions in class, if only 
slightly. The boys in Class 1 overestimate the most while those in 
Classes 2 and 3 show increasing degrees of accuracy. This apparent 
developmental trend is not evident for girls where the greatest accuracy 
is shown by the girls in Class 1. A comparison of the figures in Table 
3.52 with the children's attainment ranks suggests an explanation for
/
these discrepancies. At each age level, greater accuracy is linked 
with higher attainments and it is those who are doing less well academically 
who tend to overestimate. In fact, this is something that has been 
established earlier in this chapter when it was shown that children 
whose self-estimates were relatively accurate tended to be more intelli­
gent and to do better academically. Thus, with the present sample at 
least, it would seem that the tendency for children to become more 
accurate in their self-estimates as they get older over-rides any 
tendencies to adopt culturally-assigned roles.
The final hypothesis to be dealt with in this section continues 
with the same theme.
3.11.3 Hypothesis 25 ; Boys will have higher internality
scores on the success subscale of the IAR while oirls will 
have higher internality scores on the failure subscale
This hypothesis bias formulated partly on the basis of earlier 
research (discussed in section 1.9) and partly on the theories discussed 
in the present section. If girls do inhibit their academic performances 
to conform to cultural expectations, then this might be expected to alter 
their perceptions of their intellectual successes and failures. This 
should apply particularly to the children in Class 3. Table 3.53 (on 
next page) gives the relevant details.
The figures in Table 3.53 show no significant sex differences 
in IAR subscale scores and hence offer no support for Hypothesis 25.
This adds further weight to the earlier conclusion that the pressures 
to make self-estimates accurate over-ride the tendency to adopt 
conventional sexual roles as far as academic achievements are concerned.
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Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Scale (IAR)
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 . All
Boys 10*44 11 • 00 13*25 1.1*44
IAR Success
Girls 10*75 12*67 12*14 11*76
I
Mean 10*59 11*80 11*76 11*60
(S.d.) (2*96) (2*47) (2*69) (2*75)
One-way ANOVA (by sex): F := 0*23 (n.s. with 1 and
Boys 7*56 11*38 10*50 9*63
IAR Failure
Girls 8*50 7*25 11*00 8*98
Mean 8*03 9*40 10*77 9*30
(S.d.) (2*98) (3*78) (2*08) (3-19)
One-way ANOVA (by sex): F ;= 1*38 (n.s. with 1 and
3.11.4 Summary
As in many previous studies, no sex differences were found for 
any of the measures of self-esteem, thus supporting Hypothesis 23.
Boys and girls differed in their academic self-concepts but these 
discrepancies closely paralleled differences•in their actual attain­
ments.- , Thus, for the youngest group, girls have higher attainments • 
as well as more favourable academic self-concepts than boys, whereas for 
the two older groups it was the boys who were more successful and who 
accordingly rated themselves more favourably. Thus, contrary to 
Hypothesis 24, boys had more favourable academic self-concepts than girls 
only when justified by their actual attainments. Boys showed no more 
tendency than girls to overestimate their relative standing in class. 
Instead, it was found that, regardless of sex or age, it was the 
relatively unsuccessful children who tended to overestimate and the 
relatively successful children who were most accurate in their self- 
ratings. From the evidence, it was impossible to tell whether the 
inferior attainments cJf the older girls were thd result of self- 
fulfilling prophecies based on sex role stereotypes. A more parsimonious 
explanation is that the tendency for children's academic self-concepts
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to become more accurate with age over-rides any tendency to adopt 
culturally-assigned sex roles.
Although sex differences in IAR scores were predicted (Hypothesis 
25), none were found.
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3 .1 2 FIELD INDEPENDENCE
3.12.1 Hypothesis 26 ; Field independence will
increase with age
Perhaps the most frequently confirmed finding about field 
independence is that it increases with age. The first thing to 
establish therefore is whether this is the case with the present 
sample. Because the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) used with Class 
3 yields a different form of score than the Children’s Embedded 
Figures Test (CEFT) used with Classes 1 and 2, only the scores 
of the two younger groups can be used to test for age differences. 
These scores are given in Table 3.54.
Table 3.54 : Age differences in field independence
Class 1 Class 2 Both
Mean 11*59 17-84 14-33
(Standard deviation) ' (4*33) (3-69) (5-10)
One-way ANOVA (by age): F = 32-79 (p< - 0 0 1  with 1 and 56 d.1
The figures in Table 3.54 show that the children in Class 2 have 
significantly higher scores on the CEFT than the children in Class 1.
Thus, the older children are more field-independent as predicted.
However, the possible confounding effects of differences in intelli­
gence need to be taken into account. These will be considered next.
3.12.2 Aim 9 : To explore the relationship between
field independence and both ability and attainments
As discussed in the first chapter (section .1.10), some critics 
(such as Vernon, 1972; Zigler, 1963) have argued that variations in 
general intelligence explain a large proportion of the differences 
found in field independence. Witkin and his colleagues concede that 
there is some link between the two variables but argue that the 
relationship is not a strong one. In the present study, the correlations 
between field independence and intelligence are *03 (n.s.), *51 ( p < - 0 l )  
and *64 (p</00l) for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Thus, intelligence
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accounts for 26% of the variance in field independence for the middle 
group and 41% for the oldest group. Thus, at best, intelligence accounts 
for less than half the variance in field independence. Perhaps this 
proportion might have been greater had non-verbal rather than verbal 
ability been measured. Where the link between ability and field 
independence has been acknowledged, it has been with regard to non­
verbal ability,and performances on certain of the non-verbal subtests 
of the liiechsler Intelligence Scale for Children have even been used as 
measures of field independence. The moderately high correlations found 
in the present study between field independence and verbal ability clearly 
indicate that more than just non-verbal ability is involved.
If field independence correlates with ability,then some link with 
attainments can be expected as well. Previous research (discussed in 
section 1.10), suggests this should be so. In the present study, the 
correlations between CEFT/EFT scores and attainment ranks are *36 (p<C*05),
•33 (n.s.) and *57 (p<C*Ol) for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively, indicating 
a moderate link between field independence and attainment. Knowing that 
field independence and verbal ability are correlated, we must ask whether 
the relationship between field independence and attainment will be altered 
if ability is held constant. The partial correlations between CEFT/EFT scores 
and attainment ranks (controlling for verbal ability) are *36 (p<%*05),
•01 (n.s.) and *31 (n.s.) for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Thus, 
holding ability constant makes virtually no defference for Class 1 but 
significantly reduces the size of the correlations for Classes 2 and 3.
The link between field independence and attainment would therefore seem to 
be a very weak one at best.
The next hypothesis to be considered concerns the relationship 
between field independence and susceptibility to the opinions of others.
3,12.3 Hypothesis 27 : The academic self-concepts of
field dependent children wilt match the opinions held of 
them by others more closely than will the academic self- 
' concepts of field independent children
One of the characteristics attributed to field independent people 
is an ability to form one's own opinions without being unduly influenced
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by the views of others. Field dependent people on the other hand are 
thought to be much more susceptible to the influence of others. Thus, 
in the present study, the self-estimates of field dependent children 
should be more congruent with ratings of them by their classmates than 
will the self-estimates of field independent children. To test this, 
each class must first be divided into two groups according to whether 
the children are above or below average in field independence. The 
prediction is that the self ranks of the below average group will 
correlate more highly with their class ranks than will the self ranks 
of the above average group. The actual correlations are given in 
Table 3.55 (with the numbers in each group given in brackets).
Table 3.55 : Correlations between self rank and class rank for
those above and below average in field independence
Field independence Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
* p < * 0 5 ,  **p < •  01. ’
The correlations in Table 3.55 do not conform to the predicted 
pattern. In both Class 1 and Class 3, it is the field independent 
children whose self-estimates more closely match the opinions of their 
classmates. For the field dependent children in these two classes, 
the correlations between self rank and class rank do not even attain 
the level of statistical significance. Thus, the present evidence 
offers no support for Hypothesis 27. Perhaps this is not so sur­
prising in view of some of the evidence presented earlier. Thus, 
it has been established that children whose academic self-concepts 
are relatively accurate (in the sense of congruent with class and 
teacher ranks) tend to be more intelligent and more academically 
successful. Both these Qualities are themselves associated with 
field independence. On the basis of these results, an association 
between children’s field independence and the accuracy of their 
academic self-concepts could have been predicted. This suggests 
that Hypothesis- 27 does not constitute a fair test of the field 
independence hypothesis. Uhen facts are scarce, field dependent 
children might well prove particularly susceptible to the opinions
Above average 
Below average
* ** . **, . 
•60 (11) *73 (12) •78 (13)
■H-X-
•53 (11) *75 ‘ (13) *41 (13)
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of others. However, when relevant evidence is plentiful (as in the 
present case),then it will be their (more intelligent) field independent 
peers whose opinions match those of others closest.
The last hypothesis to be considered is based upon the notion 
that field independent people have a sharper awareness of separate 
identity from others than do field dependent people. Accordingly, 
it is predicted that children who are field independent (as measured 
by the CEFT/EFT) will see greater differences between themselves and 
others (as measured by repertory grids) than will field dependent 
children.
3.12.4 Hypothesis 28 : Field independence will be related
to the size of the average distance of the element ’self1
from other elements on the repertory grids
As explained in the last chapter (section 2.2.3), closeness 
between elements on a repertory grid implies perceived similarity 
whereas distance implies that the elements are seen as dissimilar.
For each repertory grid, there are three measures in which distances 
between the element ’self’ and groups of other elements are averaged.
In the case of the general grid, there are the average distances of 
self from both liked and disliked classmates, the third measure
being the average distance of self from these two groups combined.
In the case of the academic grid, the corresponding measures are the 
average distances of self from successful classmates, unsuccessful 
classmates and both groups combined. Before seeing if any of these 
measures correlate with field independence, each measure will be 
examined for age differences. As field independence increases with 
age, we would expect perceived distance from others to increase with 
age as well. Table 3.56 (on next page) gives the figures for the 
three general grid measures.
As Table 3.56 shows, there is a tendency for the average distances 
of self from others to become smaller with age, indicating that the 
older children perceive themselves as being more like their peers than 
the younger children do. There is a statistically significant linear 
trend for two of the measures : for average distance from disliked
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element ’self’ from qroups of others on the qeneral. repertory
qrid
Average distance 
of ’self’ from : Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
F value 
(d.f.2,80) P
Liked others Mean 
(S.d.) ’
•778
(•163)
•781
(*136)
•739
(•129)
0*62 i n.s.
Disliked others mean
(S.d.)
1*083
(•163)
1-039
(•138)
•969
(•159)
3*75 •029
All others mean
(S.d.)
•920
(•083)
•868
(•065)
•844
(•066)
8-30 •001
others, F = 7*65 (p<C*01 with 1 and 80 d.f.), while for average distance 
from all others, F = 15*98 (p-<*005 with 1 and 80 d.f.). Thus, contrary 
to prediction, the younger children make sharper distinctions between 
themselves and others than do the older children. What these figures 
reflect is the tendency for the younger children to rank themselves at 
one or other extreme of each construct dimension whereas the older 
children rank themselves more towards the middle. In particular, the 
younger children dissociate themselves more from those they dislike 
whereas the older children are more prepared to acknowledge similarities 
between themselves and their disliked classmates. These findings cast 
doubt on the rationale underlying Hypothesis 28. Before drawing any 
conclusions however, we will see if the same age differences are 
observable in the corresponding measures from the academic grid. These 
are given in Table 3.57 (on next page).
These figures show that there are statistically significant 
age differences for all three academic grid measures, with a different 
pattern being observable in each case. The average distance of self 
from successful others is greater for Class 3 than for Classes 1 and 
2 (Scheffe’s Test for'multiple Comparisons giving F = 6*56, p O 0 5  with 
2 and '80 d.f.), while ‘"the average distance of self from unsuccessful 
others decreases with age, the linear trend being statistically 
significant (F = 21*9, p<C*005 with 1 and 80 d.f.). Thus, the junior 
school children are much readier to identify with their successful
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Table 3.57 : Aqe ditterences in tne averaqe Distance oi tne
element ’self1 from qroups of others on the academic repertory
arid
Average distance 
of ’self’ from - : Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
F value 
(d.f.2,80) P
Successful others Mean
(S.d.)
•707
(•164)
•708
(•183)
•858
(•204)
6*04 •004
Unsuccessful others Mean
(S.d.)
1*127
(•228)
•910
(•226)
•863
(•200)
12*26 < • 0 0 1
All others Mean
(S.d.)
•915
(•095)
•788
(•070)
•820
(•065)
20*39 < • 0 0 1
classmates and to dissociate themselves from those iiiho are less successful, 
whereas the secondary school children see themselves as equidistant from 
both successful and unsuccessful others. For the third measure, the 
average distance of self from all others, the age trend is curvilinear 
(F = 17*64, p < * 0 0 1  with 1 and 80 d.f.). Thus, it is the eight year olds 
who place the greatest distance between themselves and others and the 
eleven year olds who place the least.
From these analyses, it can be seen that the average distance of 
the element tselfl from other elements on repertory grids varies according 
to whether the others are liked or disliked, successful or unsuccessful. 
However, the general trend is towards these average distances to be smaller 
for older children. Although this is contrary to what was predicted, it 
does not necessarily contradict our basic thesis which is that older 
children should see themselves as less like their peers than younger 
children do. Uithin the limits imposed by ranked repertory grids, this 
is indeed what seems to happen. Thus, the younger children identify 
strongly with those they like or whom they see as successful, at the 
same time dissociating themselves from those they dislike or whom they 
see as unsuccessful. The older children do not identify themselves 
with (or against) any'particular group, thereby "dissociating themselves 
from all others. The reason this is not reflected by the most pertinent 
measure used here (average distance from all others) lies in the nature 
of the task itself. Ranking one’s self (and ideal self) against eight 
others does not provide much scope for expressing the extent to which 
one feels distinct from others in general, only from particular others. 
Given a two-dimensional construct, the only way one can show that one
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question is to rank oneself somewhere around the middle. This is what 
the older children in the present sample seem to do on many of the 
constructs on both grids. This has the paradoxical effect of reducing 
the size of the average distance of self from all others although, as 
has just been argued, it can be interpreted as indicating an increase 
in the sense of being distinct from o n e ’s peers.
These analyses were intended to clear the ground before we examined
the evidence pertaining to Hypothesis 28.. This hypothesis predicts that 
field independence should be positively correlated with'the average distance 
of self from others on repertory grids. However, as we have just seen, 
these measures do not appear to function in quite as straightforward a 
way as was hoped and therefore may not be as closely linked with field 
independence as predicted. The actual correlations between scores on the 
EFT/CEFT and the relevant repertory grid measures are given in Table 3.58.
Table 3.58 : Correlations between field independence and
average distance from others on repertory orids
Average distance
of ’self * from : Class 1 Class 2 Class- 3 All
General Liked others -*25 -•18 •00 -•15
grid Disliked others *21 •03 -•01 •10
All others *01 -•08 •12 •02
** *
Academic Successful others -*52 •02 -•17 -•25
grid Unsuccessful others *14 •30 •24
*
•22
All others -*20
*
•36 -•08 •01
*P <*05, **p<C#Dl«
The correlations given in Table 3.58 show that field independence
does not correlate at a statistically isignificant level with any of the
general grid measures and only occasionally does so with the academic 
grid measures. Overall, there is a weak (albeii; statistically significant) 
tendency for field independent children (particularly in Class l) to see 
themselves as similar to their successful classmates and dissimilar* to 
their unsuccessful classmates. However, no consistent pattern emerges
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witn regard to the average distance from all others.
3.12.5 Summary
Although only the two younger groups could be compared, the eleven 
year olds proved to be more field independent than the eight year olds, 
as predicted by Hypothesis 26. There were statistically significant 
correlations between field independence and verbal ability for the two 
older groups. For the thirteen year olds, verbal ability accounted 
for over 40% of the variance in field independence scores. There were 
moderate correlations between field independence and attainments at all 
age levels but, for the two older groups at least, these were significantly 
reduced when verbal ability bias held constant.
On the assumption that field dependent people are more readily 
influenced by the opinions of others, Hypothesis 27 predicted that the 
self ranks of field dependent children would be more congruent with the 
ranks assigned to them by their classmates than would the self ranks of 
field independent children. The evidence suggested that the opposite 
bias true. It bias argued that this hypothesis did not provide a fair 
test of the field independence hypothesis.
On the assumption that field independent people have a sharper 
sense of separate identity, Hypothesis 28 predicted that field indepen­
dence would be positively correlated with the average distance of self 
from others on the repertory grids. This proved to be the case for the 
academic grid only and even then the correlations were very modest and 
not always consistent. -Prior analyses had established that the grid 
measures used in these analyses did not show the expected tendency for 
the average distance of self from others to increase with age. Indeed, 
for some of the measures the opposite trend was found. It bias argued 
that these inconsistencies are due to the constraints imposed by ranked 
repertory grids and that the results can still be interpreted as 
supporting the prediction that children see themselves as less like 
others ^as they grow older. ' .
3  ,  L O rt i Ul\; MIMML n i 3
3.13.1 Introduction
A major aim of this study has been to explore the relationship 
between general self-esteem and more narrowly-focussed self-processes 
such as academic self-esteem and.academic self-concepts. The relation­
ships between these two variables and various other factors have been 
examined already, but only for two or three variables at a time. In 
order to see hobi the key variables related to all other variables at 
once, multiple regression and factor analyses are needed. In using 
the multiple regression technioue, the aim will be to identify those 
variables that best predict the key variables of self-esteem and self- 
concept. Because the multiple regression technioue uses partial co­
rrelations, the confounding effect of such factors as intelligence and 
attainments can be controlled. (Hot all the variables mentioned in 
this study could be included in the multiple regression or factor 
analyses. Thus, the total score on the IAR could not be used if the 
subscale scores were going to be included. Similarly, distance from 
successful and from unsuccessful others could not both be used because 
they partially complement each other. In addition, only those variables 
common to all three groups were used, which meant that the elimination 
of all indices of attainment except for reading age. The final list 
consisted of nineteen variables).
A stepwise multiple regression approach bias chosen, the actual 
analysis being performed according to Subprogram Regression from the 
S.P.S.S. (Nie, Bent and Hull, 1970). In this approach, the variable 
biith the largest F-value is entered into the equation first. At each 
subsequent step, the variable that makes the greatest contribution to 
the multiple correlation is entered, providing its F-value exceeds the 
level specified. This variable will be the one that has the highest 
partial correlation with the criterion variable after all the variables 
already in the equation have been partialled out. The stepwise programme 
also removes from the-eouation any variable that has lost its original 
usefulness as a predictor in the light of the contributions made by 
variables entered at a later stage. It bias decided to limit analyses 
to four criterion variables, the three measures of self-esteem and one
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of academic seLT-concept \seu ranK;.
3.13*2 Regression analyses using general self-esteem
(SET) as the criterion variable
Table 3.59 (on next page) gives the results for each class when 
general self-esteem (SEl) is the criterion variable. For each variable, 
the table shows the step at which that variable bias entered (or removed), 
the F ratio associated with the variable,. the percentage of variance 
in the criterion variable it accounts for independently of the preceding, 
variables in the equation, and the simple correlation between the particul 
variable and the criterion variable. The significance of the F value for 
entering each new variable is also given.
From Table 3.59 it can be seen that only one or two variables 
predict SEI scores at each age level. For Class 1, the only variable 
to do so is the grid measure of general self-esteem which accounts for 
42% of the variance. For Class 2 the only effective predictor is cognitiv 
complexity on the general grid (so that children of high self-esteem have 
relatively simple personal construct systems), but this only accounts for 
17% of the variance. Both class rank and self rank predict SEI scores 
(accounting for 10% and 7% of the variance respectively) but not at 
statistically significant levels. (Even when all the variables have 
been entered in the equation, they only manage to predict 66% of the 
variance in SEI scores for this age group). For Class 3, two variables 
predict SEI scores, class rank accounting for 33% of the variance and 
academic self-esteem accounting for 12%.
When the results for the three classes are compared, it can be 
seen that two of the four variables which predict SEI scores are other 
measures of self-esteem. The effectiveness of the grid measure of 
general self-esteem as a predictor drops sharply for Class 2 (where 
it accounts for less than 1% of the variance) and is not even entered 
in the regression equation for Class 3. Academic self-esteem on the 
other*hand'tends to become more predictive of self-esteem, at least 
for Class 3. An even more striking progression is evident for class 
rank which accounts for 5%, 10% and 33% of the variance in SEI scores 
for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. This confirms the tendency for 
SEI scores to become more closely linked with academic attainments as 
children get older while the grid measure becomes less closely linked 
with attainments.
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I able 3.6U gives the results t or the whole sample.
Table 3.60 : Stepwise regression analysis around general
self-esteem ( SEI) (whole sample)
Criterion variable : General self-esteem (SEI)
independent
Predictor variables Step F % variance r
1. General self-esteem (self/ideal) 5 1* 59 1*4 •33
2. Academic self-esteem 2 3*83' 3*5 •39
3. Self/liked others 10 0*14 0*1 •30
4. Self/successful others 4 3*41 2*0 •36
5. Self rank 3 3*11 2*8 •26
6. Class rank 1 26*73 25*3 •50
7. Teacher rank 15 0*13 0*1 •31
8. Popularity 16 0*14 0*1 •16
9. Reading attainment 8 0*29 0*3 •30
10. Verbal ability (not entered in equation)
11. Cognitive complexity (general) (not entered in equation)
12. Cognitive complexity (academic) 7 0*40 0*4 •25
13. Number of constructs (general) 14 0*08 0*1 •04
14. Number of constructs (academic) 9 0*20 0*2 •07
15. Number of egocentric constructs 13 0*10 0*1 *06
16. IAR Success 11 0*19 0*2 •15
17. IAR Failure 6 0*56 0*5 •06
18. Field independence 12 0*13 0*1 •10
*p </001 Multiple r = •62
Prom Table 3.60 it can be seen that, when the sample is considered 
as a whole, the only variable to predict SCI scores at a statistically 
significant level is class rank. This accounts for only 25% of the 
variance. Even all the variables combined succeed in explaining no 
more than 5QC% of the variance in SEI scores. This suggests that there 
is a great deal more to general self-esteem than has been tapped in the 
present study. It also confirms that the SEI has a low 'g’ factor. The 
results of regression analyses using the grid measures of general self­
esteem will now be examined to see if the same pattern is evident.
3.13.3 Regression analyses usino general self-esteem
(self/ideal) as the criterion variable
Regression analyses for each class using the grid measure of self­
esteem as the criterion variable are summarized in Table 3.61 (on next page).
from Table 3.61 it can be seen that the number of variables 
predicting the criterion variable at a statistically significant level 
drops with age. For Class 1, seven variables predicted general self-esteem 
at statistically significant levels. The most effective predictors are 
academic self-esteem (accounting for 52% of the variance) and internality 
on the success subscale on the IAR (accounting for 17%). Thus, academic 
variables predict over two-thirds of the variance in this measure of general 
self-esteem for this age group. However, there are a number of other non- 
academic variables which are also effective predictors, including distance 
of self from liked others and popularity. Of these variables, the only 
one to predict general self-esteem for Class 2 is distance of self from 
liked others (which accounts for 29% of the variance). The only other 
variable to make a significant contribution for this group is teacher rank 
(accounting for 16%). For Class 3, there is a further falling away with 
only one variable (distance of self from liked others) predicting the 
criterion variable of a statistically significant level and that only 
accounts for 16% of the variance. A comparison of the three groups shows 
that all the variables combined predict 96% of the variance in general 
self-esteem for Class 1, 86% for Class 2 and only 74% for Class 3.
Table 3.62 (oh page No. 195) gives the corresponding results 
for the whole sample.
From Table 3.62 it can be seen that the grid measure of general 
self-esteem is predicted most effectively by another measure from the 
same grid, distance of self from liked others. This accounts for 30% 
of the variance. The next four variables entered in the regression 
equation are all academic variables which between them account for 18% 
of the variance. When'all the variables are combined, they account for 
55% of the variance in this measure of general self-esteem. This is 
somewhat higher than the figure for SEI scores but is probably inflated 
by the correlation with distance from liked others. When the regression 
analyses of the two measures of general self-esteem are considered together, 
it is apparent that much of the variance in general self-esteem remains
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general self-esteem (self/ideal) (whole sample)
Criterion variable : General self-esteem (self/ideal)
independent
Predictor variables Step F variance r
1. General self-esteem (SEI) 10 0* 29 0*2 *33
2. Academic self-esteem 2
***
.12-17 9*3 *49
3. Self/liked others 1
■X-Y-*
35*07 30*7 *55
4. Self/successful others 5 4* 78* 3*3 *26
5. Self rank (not entered in equation)
6. Class rank (not entered in equation)
7. Teacher rank 3 4.24* 3*1 *29
S. Popularity (not entered in equation)
9. Reading attainment 9 0*74 0*5 *20
10. Verbal ability 11 0*26 0*2 *18
11. Cognitive complexity (general) 12 0*28 0*2 -*25
12. Cognitive complexity (academic) 6 1*50 1*0 -*04
13. Number of constructs (general) 7 1*17 0*8 *17
14. Number of constructs (afcademic) B '3*18 2*1 -*07
15. Number of egocentric constructs 13 0*20 0*1 *00
16. IAR Success 4 3*23 2*3 *21
17. IAR Failure 14 0*17 0*1 -*14
IB. Field independence 15 0*09 0*1 *21
*p< * 0 5 ,  * * p < - 0 1 ,  ***p<-001. Multiple r = *74
unaccounted for. This suggests either that there is considerable 
measurement error involved or that there are important aspects of 
general self-esteem not touched upon in this study.
In vieui of the fact that the majority of the present variables 
are concerned in some way with academic progress, better results might 
be expected for the third measure of self-esteem.
3.13.4 Regression analyses using academic self-esteem as
the criterion variable
Regression analyses for each class using academic self-esteem as 
the criterion variable are summarized in Table 3.63 (on next page).
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From the figures in Table 3.63, we see that, for the eight year old 
children, the only effective predictor variable is the grid measure 
of general self-esteem which accounts for 52^ of the variance. This 
suggests that children of this age have not yet begun to differentiate 
clearly between general self-esteem and academic self-esteem. For the 
eleven year olds, the first variable to be entered into the regression 
epuation bias self-rank. However, after four more variables were entered, 
self-rank bias removed from the equation, its usefulness as a predictor 
having been superseded by the other variables. The four variables were, 
in order, internality on the failure scale of the IAR (accounting for 18% 
of the variance), the grid measure of general self-esteem (accounting for 
5>0, popularity (5/Q and class rank (7%). A later variable, internality 
on the success subscale of the IAR, accounted for a further 6/o. It is 
clear from this list that academic variables are much more predictive 
of academic self-esteem for this group. Nevertheless, there is still 
no measure of academic self-concept which makes a contribution in its 
obin right. Moreover, indices of general self-esteem and popularity are 
included, indicating that non-academic variables are still predictive of 
academic self-esteem for this age group.
For the thirteen year olds, a measure of academic self-concept 
(distance from successful others) proves the most effective predictor 
of acddemic self-esteem, accounting for 38/' of the variance. Two other 
variables act as statistically significant predictors, the SEI measure of 
general self-esteem (accounting for 13/u) and reading attainment (accounting 
for nearly 9^). There is some evidence here of a progressive differentiation 
between academic and general self-esteem, with stronger links between 
academic self-esteem and both academic self-concepts and actual attainments 
apparent in the oldest group. Nevertheless, scores of the SEI also predict 
the criterion variable for this group, so the differention is by no means 
complete. Not that we would expect a complete break, since academic self­
esteem would be linked with general self-esteem as well as with academic 
self-concepts and attainments.
•Table 3.64 (on rrfext page) gives the corresponding results for the 
three age levels combined.
Table 3.64 shows that, when the three classes are combined, four 
variables predict academic self-esteem at a statistically significant
- 1 9 7 -
I 5 U 1 E  P < 4  I J t b p i ) i . L a t i  i n i j l .  e a o - L U i  I r t i i d i . y a x a  r  : jl u  u  t i u  cn o n  u  c m x  i ,
self-esteem (whole sample)
Criterion variable : Academic self-esteem
independent
Predictor variables Step F % variance r
1. General self-esteem (SEI) 6 2*20 1*5 •39
2. General self-esteem (self/ideal) 1 24*67 23*8 •49
3. Self/liked others 14 0*36 0*2 •37
4. Self/successful others 2 17*44 13*9 •49
5. Self rank (not entered in equation)
6. Class rank 12 0*88 0*6 •45
7. Teacher rank 5 3*88 2*7 •21
8. Popularity 7 1*72 1*2 •00
9. Reading attainment 3 6*44/ 4*8 •40
10. Verbal ability 8 1*32 0*9 • 22
11. Cognitive complexity (general) 15 0* 26 0*2 -•15
12. Cognitive complexity (academic) 13 0*78 0*6 -•17
13. Number of constructs (general) 9 1*35 0*9 •20
14. Number of constructs (academic) 16 0*27 0*2 •05
<-• CJI . Number of egocentric constructs 4 4* 79* 3*4 -•13
16. IAR Success 11 1*34 0*9 •20
17. IAR Failure 10 1*77 1-2 -•18
IB. Field independence 17 0*09 0*1 •14
* p < - 0 5 ,  * * * p < * 0 0 1 o Multiple r = *75
level. The most effective predictor is general self-esteem, the criterion 
variables' counterpart on the general grid. This accounts for nearly 25% 
of the variance. A further 14% of the variance is accounted for by one of 
the measures from the academic grid, distance of self from successful 
others. Significant contributions are also made by reading attainment (5%) 
and, rather surprisingly, the proportion of egocentric constructs used (3%). 
When combined,all the variables account for 56% of the variance in academic 
self-esteem, only fractionally more than in the case of the grid measure 
of general self-esteem. Although we have seen that the latter figure (55%) 
is probably inflated somewhat, it would seem that, as for the two measures 
of general self-esteem, there is a substantial proportion of the variance 
in academic self-esteem that is not accounted for by the variables used 
in this study.
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The last set of regression analyses to be considered use a measure 
of academic self-concept as the criterion variable.
3.13.5 Regression analyses using self rank as the criterion
variable
is
Self rank fef the most specifically academic of the variables to be 
used as criterion variables in regression analyses. For this reason, it 
can be expected that the variables included in this study mill predict a 
higher proportion of its variance than bias the case for the three measures 
of self-esteem. The results for the three age groups are given in Table 
3.65 (on next page).
A consistent pattern emerges from these analyses, mith the same 
tuio variables predicting self-rank at each age level. In every instance, 
class rank is the most effective predictor, accounting for 38%, 65% and 
54% of the variance for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. As one mould 
expect, the second measure of academic self-concept (distance from 
successful others) also makes statistically significant contributions 
at each level, accounting for 155b, 6% and 6% respectively. Other effective 
predictors are popularity (for Class 2) and internality on the success 
subscale of the IAR (for Class 3), accounting for 7% and 11% of the 
variance respectively. If the only non-academic variable (popularity) 
is omitted for the moment, the above variables account for approximately
50% of the variance in self rank for Class 1 and 70% for Classes 2 and 3.
•Table 3.66 (on page No. 20l) gives the corresponding results for 
the bihole sample.
As expected Table 3.66 shoms that the most effective predictors of 
self rank are class rank (accounting for 47% of the variance) and distance 
from successful others (accounting for 12%). Significant contributions 
(accounting for a total of 7%) are made by three other variables, none of 
them academic (popularity, field independence and SEI score). The tmo 
other measures of self-esteem make no independent contribution to variance 
in self rank at all. When all the variables are combined, they account 
for 70% of the variables in self-rank, markedly more than bias the case
for any of the measures of self-esteem.
- 1 9 9 -
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Criterion variable : Self rank
independent
Predictor variables Step F % variance r
1. General self-esteem (SEI) I 5
*
3*97 1*8 •26
2. General self-esteem (self/ideal) (not entered in equation)
3. Academic self-esteem (not entered in equation)
4. Self/liked others 8 1*12 0*5 26
5. Self/successful others 2
V y vA A A
22*12 11*8 61
6. Class rank 1 69*10 46*7 68
7. Teacher rank 16 0*03 0*0 33
8. Popularity 3
*
5*18 2*6 02
Q• Reading attainment 11 0*49 0*2 49
10. Verbal ability 12 0*51 0*2 39 ,
11. Cognitive complexity (general) 9 0*87 0*4 05 •
12. Cognitive complexity (academic) 7 2*56 1*1 24
13. Number of constructs (general) 10 0*77 0*3 11
14. Number of constructs (academic) 13 0*45 0*2 05
15. Number of egocentric constructs 14 0*27 0*1 07
16. IAR Success 6 2*92 1*3 32
17. IAR Failure 15 0*21 0*1 09
18.. Field independence 4 5* 90* 2*9 39
* p < * 0 5 ,  * * * p O 0 0 1 .  Multiple r = -84
3,16.6 Summary
Regression analyses using SEI score as the criterion variable found 
that different variables predicted self-esteem for each age group. A 
developmental tendency for academic variables to become more predictive of 
SEI scores bias evident, uiith self rank and academic self-esteem together 
accounting for 46% of the variance in the scores of the thirteen year olds.
Uihen the grid measure of general self-esteem bias used as the criterion 
variable, it bias found that the number of statistically significant 
predictor variables dropped sharply biith age from seven for the youngest 
group to only one for the oldest group). The only variable to predict 
scores on this measure of general self-esteem for each age group bias
- 2 0 1 -
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drawn from the same repertory grid, the correlations between them are likely 
to be somewhat inflated. Even if this is not so, the results indicate that, 
with age, academic variables become increasingly less effective as predictors 
of scores on the grid measure of general self-esteem.
When academic self-esteem bias used as the criterion variable, a 
progressive differentiation between academic and general self-esteem bias 
apparent. The only effective predictor for the youngest group bias the grid 
measure of general self-esteem, while for the oldest group academic self- 
concept and actual attainment together accounted for nearly 47% of the 
variance in academic self-esteem.
The most consistent results were obtained when self rank bias used 
as the criterion variable. For all age groups, the same two variables (class 
rank and average distance of self from successful others) acted as 
statistically significant variables. In the regression analysis of the 
whole sample, these two variables between them accounted for 58*5% of 
the variance in self ranks.
- 2 0 2 -
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3.14.1 Introduction
Each variable used in the present study was chosen because of its 
theoretical relevance to self-esteem or academic self-concept. The actual 
number of variables chosen bias large and they range widely. Although they 
may all be related to self-processes, it is not always clear how they might 
relate to each other. (For instance, what sort of relationship ought we to 
expect between locus of control and popularity, or between field indepen­
dence and teacher rank?). So far, we have examined the relationships between 
each variable and a number of other theoretically-related variables. At 
this point, we will consider the relationships between all variables 
simultaneously, using factor analysis to identify those variables that group 
significantly together and those that share little of the common variance. 
(The selection of variables to be included in the analysis has been dis­
cussed in the previous section. Again, nineteen variables in all have 
been used).
As before, the factoi? analytic method chosen bias the Principal 
Factoring with Iteration option from the S.P.S.S. (Nie, Bent and Hull, 1970). 
The factors were rotated orthogonally using the varimax method. Initially, 
the Guttman-Kaiser criterion (Child, 1970) was used in deciding how many 
factors to extract, no more factors being extracted once the eigenvalues 
associated with the factors dropped below 1*0. However, too many of the 
lobier-order factors extracted according to this criterion proved to be 
unique, with only a single variable loading significantly, on them. 
Accordingly, it bias decided to limit the number of factors extracted to 
five. (Results for the first three only are given). The Burt-Banks 
formula (Child, 1970) was used to determine which variables loaded 
significantly on the various factors.
3.14.2 Factor analysis of major variables for Class 1
..-The .results for, the youngest group ate given in Table 3.67 (on 
next page). For this group, the factor analysis yields a strong first 
factor accounting for over 50% of the variance and having 11 of the 19 
variables loading significantly on it. This factor has an academic bias, 
biith the three variables loading most highly being class rank, teacher 
rank and reading attainment. Three other ’academic’ variables (academic
-203-
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CLASS 1
Common factor loadings Communality
Variables I II III (h2)
1. General self-esteem (SEl)
*
•474 -•193 -•382 •497
2. General self-esteem (self/ideal)
*
•599
*-
— •487 -•351 •771 i
3. Academic self-esteem . •493* -•222 -•251 •432
4. Self/liked others • 523* -•271 -•457 •701
5. Self/successful others •338 -• 670* -•258 ' •710
6. Self rank
*
•470
X-
-•482 -•129 •508
7. Class rank •859* -•122 -•114 •788
8 * Teacher rank •850 -•147 •133 •793
9. Popularity
*
•601 -•159 -•029 ■ •410
10. Reading attainment
*
•840 -•083 •193 •760
11. Verbal ability
*
•407 -•197
*
•551 •532
12. Cognitive complexity (general) -•019 •128 • 624* •434
13. Cognitive complexity (academic) -•248 •582* •181 •435
14. Number of constructs (general) -•016 •001 •073 •883
15. Number of constructs (academic) -•067 •213 •262 •435
16. Number of egocentric constructs -•078 •050 •056 •692
17. IAR Success •223 -•856* •173 •814
IB. IAR Failure •309
*
•597 •011 •603
19. Field independence •395* -•409 -•171 •439
Eigen values 6*0.3 2*13 1*36
Percentage variance 51*8 18*3 11*7
* Variables which load significantly on each factor.
self-esteem, self rank and verbal ability) also contribute. However, there 
is a strong contribution from more general variables as well, with popularity, 
distance from liked others, and the two measures of general self-esteem all 
loading significantly on this factor. This suggests that children of this 
age (eight years old) have not yet begun to differentiate clearly between 
academic concerns and general social concerns, success in one sphere easily 
carrying over to the other. This first factor might be summarized as dealing 
with academic and social functioning.
The second factor for Class 1 accounts for only \&% of the variance 
and brings together variables that seem to have something to do with whether 
the children in this group view academic events in simple or complex ways.
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academic locus of control and two are measures of academic self-concept. 
(Thus, those who view themselves as academically successful tend to take 
the credit for their intellectual achievements but reject any blame for 
their failures). A fifth variable loading on this factor is cognitive 
complexity on the academic grid, so that children who adopt the views 
just described have similar academic grids. It would seem from this that 
academically successful children of this age have simpler views of their 
academic environments than their less successful peers. This second factor 
might be labelled academic complexity.
The third factor for this group deals with the complexity of the 
children’s views of social interaction and accounts for 11% of the 
variance. The three variables defining this factor indicate that the 
more intelligent children have mope complex views of social interactions 
and do not see themselves as being particularly similar to those they like.
3.14.3 Factor analysis of major variables for Class 2
The results of the factor analysis for Class 2 are given in Table 
3.68 (on next page). The first'factor to emerge is not nearly as strong 
as for Class 1, accounting for only 36% of the variance and having only 
six variables loading significantly on it. The first five of these are 
the same academic variables which made major contributions to the youngest 
group’s first factor, the only one missing being teacher rank. This can 
be no accident as we have already established that this variable functions 
differently for Class 2 on account of the idiosyncratic way in which the 
teacher rated her pupils. In fact, both teacher rank and the two measures 
of general self-esteem appear in the second factor which is nearly as 
strong as the first, accounting for 29% of the variance. Indeed, of the 
twelve variables which load significantly on the first and second' factors 
for this group, ten appeared on the first factor for the youngest group.
It looks very much as if the failure of teacher rank to correlate with 
the other academic variables has effectively split them into two groups. 
Perhaps if ,this teacher had evaluated her pupils, in a more typical way, 
the first factor for Class 2 would have matched that for Class 1 more 
closely. As it is, the first factor deals almost exclusively with 
academic functioning while the second factor deals with both academic 
and social functioning.
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CLASS 2
Common factor loadings Communality
Variables I II III (h2)
1. General self-esteem (SEI) •056
*
•532 -•082 •322
2. General self-esteem (self/ideal) •132 •580* •159 •413
3. Academic self-esteem • 514* •306 -•203 •670
4. Self/liked others •012
-V-
•450" •390 •553
5. Self/successful others •277
*
•587 -•339 •642
6. Self rank •667 •358 -•166 •779
7. Class rank •858*
X
•471 r-*025 •988
8. Teacher rank -•018
•¥
•712 •170 •683
9. Popularity -•066 •262 •622* •555
10. Reading attainment •875* -•076 •269 •851
11. Verbal ability •822 ' -•152 •253 •884
12. Cognitive complexity (general) •239 -•500* •377 •686
13. Cognitive complexity (academic) •000 -•196 •730* •676
14. Number of constructs (general) •300 •037 •165 •509
15. Number of constructs (academic) •137 -•030 -•085 •803
16. Number of egocentric constructs •159 -•052
*
•586 •374
17. IAR Success •035 -•048 •461* •426
18. IAR Failure •080
*-
-•090 -•056-
■x
•742
19. Field independence •386 •110 -•537 •373
Eigen values 4-30 3*51 1*93
Percentage variance 35*9 29*1 16*0
* Variables which load significantly on each factor.
The third factor for this middle group accounts for 16% of the 
variance and is an odd mixture of variables. It would seem that the 
popular children in this group are those who are relatively field- 
independent, who lack egocentrism, and who have a more complex under­
standing of academic events. Interesting as this constellation of 
characteristics might be, it defies easy categorization.
3.14.4 Factor analysis of rna.jor variables for Class 3
The results of the factor analysis for Class 3 are given in 
Table 3.69 (on next page).
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laDLe j>.oy :  ^actor anaLysis or ma/|or var i a m e s
CLASS 3
Common factor loadings Communality 
Variables I H  m  (h?)
1; General self-esteem (SEI)
•V-
656" •012 •100 •504
2. General self-esteem (self/ideal) 068
*
X
•434
*
-•333 •376
3. Academic self-esteem 670 •390 -•114 •779
4. Self/liked others - 012
*
•926 -•064 •B81
5. Self/successful others
*
760 •178 •198 •733
6. Self rank
*X
762 •004 -•042 •761
7. Class rank
*
799 •042 •029 •703
8. Teacher rank
*
642 -•195 •102 •513
9. Popularity - 081 •020 -•236 •069
10. Reading attainment 876 -•270 -•.180 •913
11. Verbal ability
*
652 -•010 -•299 •633
12. Cognitive complexity (general) 250
*
-•762 -•292 •771
13. Cognitive complexity (academic) - 186 -•052 -•517* •448
14. Number of constructs (general) 191 -•399* -•388 •363
15. Number of constructs (academic) 120 -•148
*
-•693 •544
16. Number of egocentric constructs - 080 -•032 -•177 •563
17. IAR Success 012 .-•190 -•227 •823
CD . IAR Failure - 020 -•067 •293 •098
19. Field independence 380* -•061 -•388 •588
Eigen values 4 82 2-22 1*63
Percentage variance 43 6 20*0 14*7
* Variables which load significantly on each factor.
The factor analysis for Class 3 (given in the above table) yields 
a first factor which accounts for a solid 43% of the variance. This factor is 
predominantly made up of academic variables, including five which have appeared 
in the first factor for the other two groups and a further three which appeared 
in the-, second factor for Class 2. In fact, the only non-academic factor which 
has a substantial loading on this factor is general self-esteem as measured 
by the SEI, (This confirms our earlier finding that, compared with the grid 
measure of general self-esteem, the SEI is linked more closely with academic 
self-concepts and with actual academic success). Apart from this one measure,
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all the other general or social measures (such as popularity and distance 
from liked others) which contributed to the first factor for the youngest 
group have been relegated to lower-order factors. This suggests that older 
children discriminate more clearly between the academic and the non-academic 
worlds, and that their ideas and feelings about themselves become more 
differentiated. Thus, for the youngest group, all three measures of self­
esteem load on the same factor, while for the other two groups general 
self-esteem as measured by the SEI and academic self-esteem load on different 
factors from the grid measure of self-esteem. It would seem that young 
children evaluate themselves in a fairly undifferentiated global way whereas 
older children make distinct evaluations of different aspects of themselves. 
Another feature of these factor analytic results is that the cluster of 
academic variables that appears in some form at all age levels becomes 
more consolidated in the oldest group. The eight variables that, define 
the first factor for Class 3 all have loadings greater than *6, making 
this a particularly coherent factor. For the oldest group therefore, -the 
academic world is more clearly delineated than for the younger children.
The second factor for this group accounts for 2U% of the variance 
and deals with the complexity of the c h i l d r e n s  views of social. interactions. 
This particular cluster of variables suggests that those children who see few 
differences between themselves and those they like have relatively simple 
personal construct systems, use fewer constructs in describing others and 
tend to have more favourable self-esteem. The third factor accounts for 
nearly 1S% of the variance and deals with the complexity of the childrenfs 
views of academic events. It is defined by only two variables, cognitive' 
complexity on the academic grid and number of academic constructs used.
3.14.5 Factor analysis of major variables for the whole sample
liihen we compare the factor analytic results for the three groups, 
a consistent pattern becomes evident. There is a group of five academic 
variables which are strongly associated with one another at every age 
level, linking attainment (and, to a lesser extent, ability) with class 
rank, 'self rank and academic self-esteem. As we' have seen, there are 
grounds for thinking that teacher rank might be considered part of this 
cluster as well. Another feature of the results is that the SEI measure 
of general self-esteem is associated with both class rank and teacher 
rank at every level and might be considered part of the cluster of academic
variables as well. The features just described will be more evident in a 
factor analysis of the variables based on the whole sample. The results 
of such an analysis are given in Table 3.70. As explained previously, 
(section 3.1), all variables were translated into standard scores first.
Table 3.70 : Factor analysis of major variables
WHOLE SAMPLE
Common factor loadings Communality
Variables I II III (h2)
1. General self-esteem (SEI) • 502* -•238 — 059 •312
2. General self-esteem (self/ideal)
#-
•308 -•544^ 130 •446
3. Academic self-esteem •531“ -•334* 170 •473
4. Self/liked others •170 -•809* - 027 •728
5. Self/successful others •618* -•246 - 145 •606
6. Self rank •645* -•112 149 •586
7. Class rank •845* -•083 090 •764
8. Teacher rank •622* -•052 - 086 •499
9. Popularity •182 -•130 - 020 •165
10. Reading attainment •717
*
•205 263
*
•772
1.1. Verbal ability •424 •198 467 •575
12. Cognitive complexity (general) -•002 -•600* - 244 •482
13. Cognitive complexity (academic) -•370* •100 300* •464
1 4 . 'Number of constructs (general) •075 -•173
*
772 •650
15. Number of constructs (academic) -•022 •162
*
591 •378
16. Number of egocentric constructs •001 -•009 071 •227
17. IAR Success •190 •032 011 •518
18. IAR Failure •104 •175 091 •346
19. Field independence •280 -•066 101 •499
Eigen values 4*40 2*13 1 14
Percentage variance 46*4 " 22*5 12 0
* Variables which load significantly on each factor.
The results of the factor analysis for the whole sample given in 
the above table confirm the existence of a strong cluster of academic 
variables. These are concentrated on the first factor which accounts 
for 46 a of the variance. The six variables with the most substantial 
loadings are reading attainment, class rank, self rank, teacher rank,
two variables are general self-esteem (SEI) and verbal ability. Thus, 
general self-esteem, at least as measured by the SEI, is clearly associat 
with academic self-concepts, the opinions of others, actual attainments 
and measured ability. In short, this first factor summarizes all the 
major variables dealing with academic functioning.
i
The second factor, accounting for 22% of the variance, brings 
together various grid measures: distance from liked others, cognitive 
complexity and the grid measures of general and academic self-esteem.
As the three measures with the highest loadings come from the same 
repertory grid, this factor must be viewed with some suspicion as 
the links between the variables concerned are likely to be artifactual 
or at least somewhat inflated.
This cannot be said of the third factor which brings together 
three variables dealing with verbal fluency, the number of constructs 
used (both general and academic) and verbal ability.
3.14.6 Summary
The factor analysis of the variables for the youngest group 
yielded a strong first factor with a large number of both academic 
and non-academic factors loading on it. This suggests that children 
of this age (eight years old) do not differentiate clearly between 
academic concerns and more general social concerns, success in one 
area being associated with success in the other. For Class 2, some 
differentiation has begun, the first factor being exclusively .academic 
in content while the second factor includes both academic and social 
variables. For Class 3, the differentiation is complete with the 
main academic variables loading strongly on the first factor and all 
social variables being relegated to lower-order factors. The factor 
analysis of the whole sample indicated that all three measures of 
self-esteem were included in the otherwise exclusively academic 
first ^factor.
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The principal fncus of this study has been on processes of 
evaluating and conceptualising oneself. Although there is no doubt 
that people actually do have feelings and ideas about themselves and 
their behaviour, there are two major questions to be asked about these 
self-processes. first, are they of any importance? Perhaps self-
i
esteem and self-concepts are nothing more than epiphenomena, unimportant 
by-products of behaviour rather than vital links in the process of acting.
In other words, the role of self-esteem and self-concepts may be a passive 
one, merely reflecting our interactions with the environment. Alternatively, 
they may have a direct'influence on our behaviour. Clearly this is a major 
question which cannot be settled finally by any single study. Nevertheless, 
it is one to which we shall return throughout the course of these last two 
chapters.
The second major question to be asked about self-processes concerns the 
most useful way of conceptualising them. Is it helpful to make a 
distinction (as in the present study) between o n e ’s feelings about oneself 
(self-esteem) and o n e ’s ideas about oneself (self-concepts)? Is it useful 
to think of both self-esteem and self-concepts as global features of our 
experience of ourselves or only as specific to certain areas? Measures of 
these different ways of conceptualising self-processes were used in the 
present study and one of the ways of answering the above questions is to 
see which of these measures proved most effective in predicting behaviour.
To begin with, therefore, the various measures used in the present’ 
study uill be examined to see}first, what evidence there is for their 
construct validity and,second, which predicted children’s behaviour most 
effectively.
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4.2.1 Introduction
In this section we will be considering what light the present study
throws on the problems involved in measuring self-processes. To begin
with, the three measures of self-esteem will be discussed, particular
• i
attention being paid to a comparison of the different approaches to 
measuring self-esteem. Next, evidence for the construct validity oif the 
three measures of academic self-concept will be considered briefly. Finally, 
judgement will be passsed on the various grid measures devised especially 
for this study.
4.2.2. Measuring self-esteem
The three measures of self-esteem used in this study will be considered 
in turn, beginning with Coopersmith1s Self— Esteem Inventory. As discussed 
in the first chapter (section 1.3.4), the SEI is an example of the implicit 
derived evaluation approach to measuring self-esteem. The assumption under­
lying this approach is that self-esteem is specific but can be usefully 
generalised. However, there are problems in interpreting the resulting 
total scores. Factor analyses of such questionnaires rarely yield a single 
dominant factor, suggesting that specific total scores mean different things 
for different children.
Despite the inconsistent results of earlier factor analyses, an attempt 
bias made to elucidate the meaning of the SEI scores of the present sample 
by faotor analysing their responses to the questionnaire. This proved to 
be a fruitless exercise. The factors that emerged were neither large enough 
to indicate the presence of *g* factors or coherent enough to suggest the 
presence of more narrowly focussed self-evaluations. Regression analyses 
using SEI score as the criterion variable confirmed this picture : different 
variables could only account for 38% of the variance in SEI scores. 
Disappointing as these results may be, they are in keeping with the previous 
studies which suggest that most self-esteem measures of this type (including 
the SEI) are multidimensional and do not possess stable !g' factors.
In another attempt to clarify the meaning of children’s scores on the 
SEI, the nomological network of the questionnaire bias examined. Certain
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scores correlated moderately with academic variables such as attainment 
rank (r = 0*42, p < 0 * 0 5 )  and class rank (r = 0*54, p<0*0l), as well as 
with 'social' variables such as popularity (r = 0*34, p < 0 * 0 5 )  and distance 
of self from liked others (r = 0*59, p<^0*00l). For the eleven year olds, 
the correlations between SEI scores and both academic and social variables 
wer^ bieaker than for the eight year olds, rarely reaching statistical 
significance. For the thirteen year olds, SEI scores again correlated 
reasonably well with academic variables such as attainment rank (r = 0*48, 
p<^0*0l) and class rank (r = 0*58, p<[0*00l) but tended to be negatively 
correlated with social variables such as popularity (r = 0*11, n.s.) and 
distance of self from liked others (r = -0*01, n.s.)
As measured by the SEI, therefore, the general self-esteem of eight 
year olds tends to be linked with both academic and social success while 
that of the thirteen year olds is linked with academic success only, 
suggesting that the academic and social worlds become progressively., 
differentiated. The eleven year olds seem caught in a transitional stage 
biith the old certainties dissolving and new sources of self-esteem yet to 
be consolidated. Such a trend is intuitively plausible but must await 
further research for confirmation. What is clear is that SEI score implies 
different things for children of different ages and, with the older children 
at least, has a distinct academic bias. Only with young children does it 
function as a true measure of general self-esteem.
What of the other measure of general self-esteem, the correlation 
between the elements 'self' and 'ideal self1 on the general repertory grid?
As discussed in the first chapter (section 1.3.3), this measure is an example 
of the explicit derived evaluation approach to measuring self-esteem. Strong 
evidence of the construct validity of this kind of measure has been provided 
by Silber and Tippett (1965) who were able to demonstrate that low dis­
crepancies between self and ideal self were indicative of high self-esteem.
In the present study, this bias the case for Class 1 only. Thus, the 
correlations between the two measures of general self-esteem bias not 
statistically significant in the case of the two older groups. Moreover, 
bihen the grid measure of general self-esteem bias used as the criterion 1 
variable in regression analyses, it bias apparent that the links between this 
measure and virtually all the other variables in the study become weaker 
with age. Thus, for Class 3, the only variable to predict the grid measure
from the same repertory grid (which probably means that the relationship 
between the two variables is somewhat inflated anyway). In other words, 
the grid measure of general self-esteem proved of very little value with 
the oldest group, not being related to other important variables as pre­
dicted.
The most likely explanation for this puzzling finding is that the 
repertory grids were too small for the older children to express the 
complexity of their views about themselves. It will be remembered that 
the grids for all groups consisted of eight constructs and ten elements.
This size bias determined by the capacity of the youngest group to articu­
late their personal constructs. UJe know that the older children get, the 
more constructs they can report, but it bias felt that all the grids 
needed to be of the same size if meaningful comparisons between the groups 
were to be made. However, it seems likely that the 8 x 10 grids were too 
constricting for the older children. The Silber and Tippett study mentioned 
earlier bias based upon an older group (seventeen to twenty-one year olds) 
and used a much larger grid format (20 x 20), enabling far subtler dis­
criminations to be made. Arguably, the twelve and thirteen year olds in 
the present study were capable of subtler discriminations than they had 
scope for. Further research is needed to establish whether larger grids 
used biith this age group will yield more useful measures of general self­
esteem.
The corresponding measure on the academic grid (academic self-esteem) 
does not suffer from this limitation because the children's academic 
construct systems are less complex than their general construct systems.
Two facts indicate this. First, the children's general descriptions of 
their classmates yielded far more constructs than did their academic des- 
crptions of them, the means for the whole sample being 45*3 and 18*9 
respectively. Second, the variance accounted for by the first principal 
component bias considerably less on average for the general grid than for 
the academic grid, the respective means for the whole sample being 59*0% 
and 75*4/b. It seems probable, therefore, that the 8 x 10 grid format bias 
better suited to the narrower focus of the academic grid than to the broader: 
scope of the general grid. Certainly, there is much clearer evidence of 
the -construct validity of the grid measure of academic self-esteem than
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this study contains more variables of relevance to academic self-esteem 
than to general self-esteem. Nevertheless, this measure of academic self­
esteem performed quite impressively, correlating significantly with academic 
variables such as reading attainment (0*40, p<^0*00l), self rank (0*46, 
p < O O O l )  and class rank (0*45, p<^0*00l) as well as with the two measures 
of general self-esteem (0*39 with SEI scores, 0*49 with the grid measure). 
Moreover, i n .the factor analyses, academic self-esteem figures increasingly 
strongly in the first factors for each age group, the only one of the three 
self-esteem measures to do so.
There are other signs that the 8 x 10 format suited the academic grid
better than the general grid. In testing certain of the hypotheses, similar 
analyses were performed on both grids and in every instance the results from 
the academic grid were more marked than those obtained from the general grid. 
Thus, for Hypothesis 2 (which predicted that older children would have more 
complex personal' construct systems), Hypothesis 4 (which predicted that the 
correlation between self and ideal self would decrease with age) and 
Hypothesis 28 (which predicted that field independence would be related to 
the average distance of self from others on the repertory grids), the 
predicted trends were evident in both grids but were statistically signifi­
cant in the case of the academic grid only. Thus, there are a number of 
reasons for thinking that for the older'children at least, the 8 x 10 grid 
format did not adequately reflect their general construct systems. As a 
result, the various measures derived from the general repertory grids 
(especially the grid measure of general self-esteem) did not function as
well as expected whereas the results obtained for the measures derived 
from the academic grid were much more encouraging.
This needs to be kept in mind when comparing the three measures of 
self-esteem. One of the important issues here is whether there is a 
greater congruity between the two measures which share the same content 
(thatis, the two measures of general self-esteem) or between the two 
measures which share the same approach (that is, the two grid measures).
The answer depends partly upon the age of the group being considered.
For the youngest group, all three measures correlate at statistically 
significant levels, with the correlation between the two grid measures 
(0*72, p<^0*00l) being marginally greater than that between the two
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the only statistically significant correlation occurs between the two 
grid measures (0*42, p<^0*05) while for the oldest group the only 
statistically significant correlation occurs between the two measures 
which share neither content or form, the SEI and academic self-esteem 
(0*57, p<[0*00l). For the whole sample, the correlation between the two 
grid measures (0*49, p<^0*00l) is greater than that between the two measures 
of general self-esteem (0*33, p<^0*00l). The difference could have been 
even greater still had the grid measure of general self-esteem functioned 
more convincingly with the older groups.
In short, there is greater agreement'between measures that share the 
same approach than between measures which purport to share the same content. 
This is not the way it ought to be. Although we would expect some agree­
ment between measures of general and specific self-esteem, we would expect 
an even greater agreement between different measures of general self­
esteem (or between different measures of specific self-esteem). Yet'the 
tbio measures of general self-esteem used -in the present • study only corre­
lated significantly with each other in the case of the youngest group. With 
the older groups, the two measures diverge to such an extent that it is 
clear that they are not measuring the same construct. The most, likely 
explanation for this unwelcome finding is that neither of the measures 
functions as a true index of general self-esteem for the eleven and thirteen 
year olds. For these children, the SEI acts more as a measure of academic 
than of general self-esteem while the effectiveness of the grid measure 
is undermined by the methodological problems referred to above.
There is another explanation for the above results which deserves 
consideration. It may be that general self-esteem is a useful concept 
only biith those (such as young children) whose thought processes are 
relatively undifferentiated. With older children and adults, behaviour 
might be more readily explained (and predicted) in terms of specific self- 
esteems. Further research will be needed before this question can be 
satisfactorily settled.
The usefulness of the three measures of academic self-concept will now 
be considered.
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All three measures of academic self-concept used in the present study 
required the children to rank themselves against their classmates. The 
simplest' of these bias the self rank measure which required the children 
•to rank themselves against all others in the class according to how clever 
they were. The other two measures (average distance of ’self1 from success­
ful and from unsuccessful classmates) were both derived from the academic 
grid and complement each other without being mere opposites. The results 
shobi that the correlations between these three measures increase with age, 
with self rank correlating just as highly with the tbio grid measures as 
these do with each other. This increase indicates that children’s self- 
concepts become more stable and consistent with age.
When bie consider the correlations between academic self— concept and 
other theoretically relevant variables, an encouraging level of agreement 
between the three measures is evident.- Moreover, all of the correlations 
were of the. expected size and direction. Thus, the correlations between 
the measures of academic self-concept and the two measures of general self­
esteem averaged around 0*30 (ranging between 0*26 and 0*36) while the corre­
lations biith academic self-esteem were naturally higher, averaging around 
0*55 (ranging between 0*46 and 0*66). For class rank, the .average corre­
lations was about 0*65 (varying from 0*59 to 0*68), somewhat higher than 
the average for teacher rank which bias about 0*40 (varying between 0*33 
and 0*42). Finally, the three measures o f ’academic self-concept also 
predicted actual attainments, the average correlation with attainment rank 
being of the order of 0*55, the actual correlations ranging from 0*41 to 
0*69. In short, there is good evidence for the construct validity of all 
three measures of academic self-concept.
4.2.4 Conclusions
The grid measures of self-esteem and academic self-concept considered 
above were all devised especially for the present study. In general, the 
results indicate that such grid measures can be used as valid represent­
ations of. self— processes. The measures of academic self-esteem and the 
two grid measures of academic self-concept all performed well, although 
less satisfactory results were obtained with the grid measure of general
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the size of the grids used.
When all the measures used are considered together, a clear pattern 
emerges : the more general the quality being measured, the more doubt 
there is about the construct validity of the particular measure. Thus, 
the present study offers only meagre support for the construct validity
I
of the measures of general self-esteem, but provides reasonable support 
for the more narrowly-focussed academic self-esteem measure and even a 
stronger support for the measures of academic self-concept, the most 
specific variable of the three. This finding should by no means be taken 
as a final verdict on attempts to measure general self-esteem but should 
be seen as a reflection of the kind of variables included in the study.
In order to assess the validity of any measure, one needs to compare 
scores on that measure eitherewith behavioural indices of a comparable 
degree of generality (construct validity) or with other measures of the 
same construct (convergent validity). Although the latter comparison was 
possible in the present study, the former bias n o t . • In other words, all 
of the variables to which general self-esteem might be related were 
relatively specific, none being broadly enough conceived to act as a 
behavioural index of general self-esteem. • (Indeed, one wonders quite 
what such an index would consist of - perhaps ratings by others of a 
person’s manifest self-confidence in a variety of situations?).
‘ The importance of matching self-report measures and behavioural 
criteria has been demonstrated in studies by Epstein (1979) and Rosenberg 
(1968). The latter found that adolescents* school attainments correlated 
significantly with their estimates of themselves as good students in 
school (0*52) and as intelligent (0*40) but not with their estimates of 
their general knowledge (0*15) or whether they saw themselves as imagin­
ative and original in their thinking (0*08). Epstein (1979) offers 
further evidence on this point. He summarises one of his own studies thus 
"When self-report items that were highly specific in wording were compared 
with corresponding objective criteria, correlations in the vicinity of 
•60 were obtained. When the self-report items were worded in a more 
diffuse manner, - the correlations fell to about *50. When standard 
personality inventories were used that described much broader styles 
of functioning than the behavioural criteria to which they were compared, 
the correlations were, on average, about •40" (p.1123). In the present 
study, the measures of self-esteem defined much broader styles of 
functioning than the behavioural criteria (such as academic attainments 
and academic self-concepts) with which they were correlated. Thus, we
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Thp methodological implications of this analysis will be discussed 
in a latpr section. Next, developmental trends observed in the present 
study will be discussed.
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4.3.1 Introduction
Although the present study bias cross-sectional rather than longit­
udinal in design, no rigorous attempt bias made to match the three age 
groups. This bias because the primary focus bias to be on biithin-group 
rather than on between-group analyses. Because the age groups were 
only approximately matched, caution is needed when interpreting differences 
between them.
Despite this caveat, a number of developmental trends were pre­
dicted, some of them well-known. In looking for such trends, the intention 
bias to establish whether the present samples might at least be regarded 
as comparable to those previously studied.
The present section begins with a consideration of the results bearing 
upon the various developmental trends that were predicted. Detailed 
attention will then be given to two trends of particular interest, the 
tendency for children’s academic self-concepts to become more accurate 
with age and the tendency for their personal construct systems to become 
more complex with age.
4.3.2 Developmental trends : predictions and results
In the present study, developmental trends were predicted in locus of 
control and field independence as well as in the children’s descriptions 
of their peers and their perceptions of themselves. In keeping with 
earlier research, there was clear evidence of increases in internal locus 
of control (as measured by the Crandall et al.. IAR Scale) and in field 
independence (as measures by the Children's Embedded Figures Test).
Also on the basis of previous research (discussed in section 1.5.1), 
certain developmental changes in children’s descriptions of others were 
predicted. Thus, it bias expected that, when describing their classmates, 
older children would tend to (a) use more constructs overall, (b) use a 
greater proportion of abstract constructs, (c) use a smaller proportion 
of egocentric constructs, and (d) be more likely to attribute both good 
and bad qualities to others.
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in all the above ways except the last (for which no significant differences 
were found).
Since the children did not describe themselves directly, it is not 
possible to check whether their perceptions of themselves developed in 
the same way as their perceptions of others. Nevertheless, certain 
developmental changes in children’s personal construct systems were pre­
dicted. Thus, it bias expected that, with age, there would be (a) a de­
crease in the correlation between grid ratings of self and ideal self,
(b) an increase in the accuracy of academic self-concepts, and (c) an 
increase in the cognitive complexity of the children’s personal construct 
systems. Evidence for all three of these developmental trends was found 
in the present study. Detailed consideration will now be given to the 
evidence for the increase in the accuracy of children’s academic self- 
concepts (a finding of particular interest) as well as the evidence for ■ 
the increase in cognitive complexity (where the results seem somewhat 
equivocal at first sight).
The question of the accuracy of academic self-concepts will be 
considered first.
4.3.3 Developmental changes in the accuracy of children’s
academic self-concepts
As indicated above, the present study provides clear evidence that 
children’s academic self-concepts become more accurate with age. Thus, 
there bias increasing congruence between the children's self ranks and 
their attainment ranks, confirming the findings of earlier studies 
(Clifford, 1975, 1978; Cooper, 1978; Kifer, 1975); There bias also 
increasing congruence between the children's self ranks and both class 
ranks and (less convincingly) teacher ranks, again as found in earlier 
research (Nicholls, 1979; Phillips, 1963). Furthermore, there bias 
evidence of a progressive increase in the size of the correlations 
between the three measures of academic self-concept, suggesting that 
children's academic self-concepts become more consistent and stable with 
age as well as more accurate.
In addition, the present study throws light on the kind of errors
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school children tend to overestimate their relative standing in class, a 
finding also reported by Nicholls (1979). This bias true whatever criterion 
of accuracy bias used. The secondary school children were not only more 
accurate but were also less willing to lay claim to being clever or 
good at schoolwork, as if there bias some taboo against anything that 
might be construed as boasting. For all three age groups, academic self- 
concepts were more highly correlated with the more visible indices of 
achievement (such as progress in the Fletcher maths series) than with the 
less visible indices (such as reading attainment). This is consistent with 
Wylie’s (1979) prediction that self-favourability biases will decrease as 
the availability of realistic knowledge about one’s attainments increases. 
It is also consistent with the idea, proposed by Jones (1973), that self- 
favourability biases are less evident when people know that their successes 
and failures will be made public.
However, the present study cannot adjudicate between the .(partly) 
rival merits of self-consistency and self-enhancement theories. This is 
because no attempt was made to manipulate the conditions under which the 
evaluations of others were gathered, so that we cannot tell which conditions 
will cause the children to modify their views of themselves. However, 
as noted in the first chapter (section 1.2.3) we do not need to think of 
self-consistency and self-enhancement as contradictory tendencies. Jones 
(1973) has suggested that we are more likely to accept positive evaluations 
from others or take the credit for our achievement when we do not expect to 
have to live up to these evaluations or standards in the future or to be 
subjected to public scrutiny. In partial support of this proposal, the 
present study found that self-estimates were most accurate (that is, 
congruent with both the estimates of others as well as with actual attain­
ments) among the secondary school children where progress bias subjected 
to greater public evaluation than in the two junior school classes. Hobi- 
ever, it is likely that the increase in the accuracy of academic self- 
concepts is also a function of chronological and/or mental age. All these 
variables (that is, chronological age, mental age, and amount of public 
evaluation) are confounded in the present study, making it impossible to 
establish which contributes most to the increasing accuracy of self­
estimates.
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group, the self-estimates of the academically successful children tend to 
be more accurate than those of their less successful classmates. Thus, 
those who are accurate are those who can afford to be accurate or even to 
modestly underestimate their attainments. It is the children who are 
relative failures who tend to overestimate. Similarly, Peck (1972) 
has found that successful pupils tend to underestimate how hard they work 
whereas unsuccessful students overestimate. In fact, the ability to set 
realistic goals for oneself seems to be one of the key factors separating 
successful from unsuccessful students (Covington and Beery, 1976; Robbins 
and Harway, 1977). At any rate, the fact that failing students tend to 
overestimate their achievements suggests that academic success is seen as 
a desirable goal by most of the children. This is in keeping with 
Coopersmith's (.1967) suggestion, discussed in the first chapter (section 
1.2.2), that o n e ’s Values are usually those of the community to which one 
belongs. (These findings are also in keeping with Coopersmith’s argument 
that failure according to these socially defined norms is more likely to 
result in an inflated estimate of one’s performance rather than a rejection 
of the norms themselves)*
Some of these findings have important implications for educational 
practice. These will be discussed in a later section. In the meantime, 
we turn to a consideration of the results concerning cognitive complexity.
'4.3.4 Developmental changes in cognitive complexity
Although cognitive complexity was not one of the major variables to 
be included in this study, it is worth taking a closer look at the results 
because of the wider issues raised. Although the evidence for increases 
in cognitive complexity (as measured here) is not particularly convincing, 
there is evidence of progressive cognitive differentiation.
Two measures of what has been called cognitive complexity were used 
in the present study. The first measure, following-Crockett (1965), de­
fined cognitive complexity in terms of the number of constructs a person 
uses in describing others. Using this approach, Delia et al. (1974) 
found that cognitively complex people described others in terms of 
psychological characteristics to a greater extent than did those who were 
less cognitively complex. The results for this measure were more or less
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describing their classmates generally and when analysing their academic 
progress. However, this tendency was statistically significant for the 
academic constructs only.
The second measure, following Bieri (1955), defined cognitive 
complexity in terms of the percentage of variance accounted for by the 
first principal component on the repertory grids. The results for this 
measure were less convincing than'for the first : the oldest group tended 
to have more complex grids than the two younger groups, but the difference 
was not greatjagain reaching statistical significance in the case of the 
academic grids only. It might be wondered whether the grid format was too 
small to allow for sufficient variation in the size of the principal 
components. However, as the variance ranged from 30/o to nearly 90% for 
the general grids and from 45^ to 96% for the academic grids, this cannot 
be so. However, the results do raise questions about the meaning of this 
measure of cognitive complexity. Slater (1977) has pointed out that grids 
with low variance most nearly approximate ’quasis’, his term for randomly 
generated grids. Thus, the opposite of simplicity seems to be disorganis­
ation and incoherence rather than complexity. Moreover, this is only one 
of a number of measures which might have been derived from repertory grids 
(Landfield, 1971; Smith and Leach, 1972; Vacc and Vacc, 1973). Studies 
comparing these different approaches (Honess, 1976; Reker, 1974; Seaman 
and Koenig, 1974) have found that the correlations between them are low 
and there is no consensus on which is the best measure.
This problem is not exclusive to measures derived from repertory grids. 
According to Triandis (1978), there are at least five schools of thought 
concerning cognitive complexity, each using different measurement technique 
and each ignoring the work of the others. In view of the distinct air of 
uncertainty surrounding this topic, it would be surprising if the present 
study had found no support for the predicted trend towards greater cognitive 
complexity. As it is, both measures show that the academic construct systems 
of the older children tend to be more ’cognitively complex’ than those of 
the younger children. Concerning their general construct systems, the 
evidence is more equivocal.
However, when we consider the results of the study as a whole, there 
is clear evidence of increases in cognitive differentiation. Thus, a 
comparison of the factor analyses for the different age groups indicates 
that there is a progressive differentiation between academic and other
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first factor accounting for 52/'- of the variance. Loading significant.ly on 
this factor were academic variables (such as class rank, teacher rank and 
reading attainment) as well as non-academic variables (such as general 
self-esteem, popularity and distance of self from others). This suggests 
that the mental and emotional worlds of children of this age are. character­
ised by a relative lack of differntiation. For the oldest group, the first 
factor is not'quite so strong (accounting for 44% of the variance) but 
shows much greater consistency. All the variables loading significantly 
on this factor are academic, with the single exception of Coopersmith1s 
SEI. Moreover, the variables which define this first factor all have 
loadings greater than 0*6, making this a particularly coherent factor.
These results suggest that young children think about themselves and 
evaluate themselves in a relatively global and undifferentiated way, 
whereas older children make sharper distinctions between different aspects 
of themselves, perceiving and evaluating their educational prowess separately 
from other aspects of their functioning.
This developmental trend has already been noted in the previous section 
where it was suggested that the notions of global self-esteem and global 
self-concept might only be appropriate.for young children. Once children 
begin to differentiate between the various aspects of their world, they 
cease to make global evaluations of themselves and instead make separate 
evaluations of their functioning in different areas. Thus, global self­
esteem becomes broken down into academic self-esteem, social self-esteem 
and so on. If it is true that self-esteem becomes progressively different­
iated in this fashion, then the value of a concept of general self-esteem 
is called into question. Lie will return to this important issue later.
Lie have seen that there is modest support for the prediction that 
children’s personal construct systems will became more cognitively complex 
with age, at least as far as their academic construct systems are concerned. 
In addition, there is clear evidence of increases in cognitive different­
iation, with the older children making separate judgements of their 
functioning in different areas whereas the younger children tend to make 
global evaluations of themselves.
4.3.5 Conclusions
In this section, we have been considering the differences that were
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for most of the predicted developmental trends. Thus, as they grew 
older, the children’s descriptions of others as well as their perceptions 
of themselves changed in ways that were consistent with previous research 
as well as intuitively plausible. This bias despite the fact that the 
three age groups were only loosely matched. Thus, although age differences 
in cross-sectional studies ought to be interpreted cautiously, the results 
suggest that the present samples can at least be considered as comparable 
to previous samples that have been studied.
The results of the present study go beyond those of previous studies 
in tbio areas, clarifying our understanding of the development of children’s 
academic self-concepts and of the progressive differentiation of self- 
processes. Academic self-concepts have been shown to become more consistent 
as well as more accurate with age. Younger children have been shown to vary 
more in their self-estimates and to tend to overestimate their attainments. 
In addition, children's academic self-concepts have been shown to be more 
accurate (in the sense of congruent both with their actual attainments 
and with the opinions of others) when their progress is publically evaluated 
and bihen they are relatively successful academically. The educational 
implications of these findings will be discussed in the final chapter.
The other area illuminated by the present study concerns the way • 
children progressively differentiate.between various aspects of their world 
as they grow older. In particular, it has been shown that, whereas young 
children tend to evaluate themselves in a global fashion, older children 
make distinct evaluations of their functioning in different areas. In a 
later section, we will consider the implications of this finding for the 
notion of general self-esteem.
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4.4.1 Introduction
In the first chapter, it bias argued that our thoughts and feelings 
about ourselves are derived from three main sources : our observations 
of how others behave towards us, of how we ourselves behave and of how 
our behaviour compares with others. These represent useful distinctions 
rather than absolute categories. : If we focus on a particular area, such 
as hobi children form ideas about their own academic abilities, we can see 
that these three sources overlap to a considerable extent and cannot be 
definitely separated. . Thus, it is obvious that children’s academic self- 
concepts will be influenced by what their teachers!, their peers and their 
parents say of their work and their ability. It should also be obvious 
that children can observe how well they are coping with the: tasks reauired 
of them in school and can draw their own conclusions about their progress. 
Whether they decide they are succeeding or failing will depend in part upon 
how their achievements compare with those of their classmates. All those 
who comment upon the children's performances have access to much the same 
information as the children themselves, being able to observe their attempts 
to cope biith the work and to compare these efforts with those of their peers. 
Teachers can draw on a wider knowledge of typical children's performances 
than can their pupils, but their judgements are likely to diverge greatly 
from those made by the children themselves on the basis of classroom 
observations.
Because of the way these three sources overlap, it is not possible to 
devise truly independent measures of each source nor to establish the 
relative contribution each makes to the development of self-concept and 
self-esteem. Nevertheless, some of the hypotheses relate to specific 
sources and for the sake of convenience the results pertaining to each 
source will be considered in turn. In the final section, the combined 
influence of all three sources will be considered.
4.4.2 Opninions of others
In the first chapter (section 1.4.2), we considered the arguments 
for and against the symbolic interactionist view that we see ourselves 
as others see us. It bias argued that self-concept and self-esteem
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a single source such as the opinions of others. Nevertheless, it bias 
acknowledged that what others said about us had some influence. Accordingly, 
it bias hypothesized that children's self-concepts and self-esteem would 
be related to the opinions held of them by their teachers and their class- 
mates. In addition, it bias hypothesized that the relative influence of 
the opinions of peers and adults biould change as children get older.
• As predicted, the results showed that both self-esteem and academic 
self-concept were influenced by the opinions of others. The average 
correlation between the various measures of self-esteem and opinions of 
teachers and classmates bias 0*35 (p<^0*00l) while the corresponding figure 
for measures of academic self-concept bias 0*41 (p<[0*00l).. As one would 
expect, the correlations are higher for measures of academic self-concept 
because the opinions sampled relate more or less directly to academic 
progress. When the three age groups were compared, a developmental trend 
became apparent with academic self-concepts becoming increasingly congruent 
with the opinions of others. The actual correlations were 0*32 (n.s.),
0*46 (p<^0*0l) and 0*56 (p<C0*00l) far Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Even for the oldest group, the correlations were relatively modest and there 
is no question of academic self-concepts being totally determined by the 
opinions of others.
.What of the relative impact of the opinions of teachers and classmates 
on the children's self-esteem and academic self-concepts? It bias hypo­
thesized that teachers' opinions would matter more for the younger children 
but that the older groups would be more influenced by what their class­
mates thought. In fact, at each age level, both the self-esteem and the 
academic self-concepts of the children were more closely linked with their 
classmates' opinions than with those of their teachers. For the three 
measures of self-esteem, the average correlations with class rank and 
teacher rank were 0*42 (p-<0'00l) and 0*29 (p<^O0l) respectively. For 
the three measures of academic seif-concept, the corresponding correlations 
were 0*52 (p<^0*00l) and 0*27 (p<^0*0l). Thus, class rank accounts for four 
times as much of the variance in children's academic self-concepts as does 
teacher rank. Another way of illustrating this difference is to examine 
the level of agreement between the various sets of ranks. For self rank, 
class rank and attainment.rank, the coefficients of concordance (W) were 
0*69, 0*86 and 0*85 for Classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively (p<^0*0Dl for
the coefficients of concordance were 0#63 ( p < 0 #001), 0*44 (n.s.) and 
0*61 (p<^0*0l) respectively.
These results suggest that children’s academic self-concepts derive 
more from their classmates’ opinions than from their teachers' opinions.
It may be that this unexpected result is largely due to differences in the
way the tuo sets of opinions were measured. The method used for sampling
teachers’ opinions of their pupils bias subject to a good deal of individual 
interpretation. This bias partly the intention, of course. The repertory 
grid technique bias chosen in the hope that, by allowing the teachers to 
choose the terms in which they rated their pupils, a more accurate index 
of their actual behaviour towards them would emerge. It is a measure that 
encourages the expression both of teacher biases (that is, expectations 
based on non-academic grounds) and of teacher expectations (a distinction 
discussed in section 1.4.2). However, it was assumed that the constructs 
chosen biould be primarily academic, an assumption which proved to be only 
partly justified. All the teachers used some non-academic constructs in 
their ratings, and the resulting teacher ranks are thus based on a broader 
range of characteristics than either the pupils’ ratings of themselves or 
each other. It would seem likely that greater agreement between teachers’ 
and pupils’ ratings would have been found had they all been asked to rank
the class according to cleverness.
Support for this supposition comes from studies by Nash (1973) and 
Nicholls (1979) as well as from the present study. Nash asked three junior 
school teachers to rank their pupils’ attainments in reading, writing and 
number work, and compared these with the children’s self-estimates. The 
correlations between average teacher rank and average self-rank were 0*85 
for eight year olds, 0*46 for ten year olds and 0*82 for eleven year olds. 
For two of the classes, these correlations are considerably higher than 
those found in the present study, though the same variability between 
classes is evident. It would seem that some teachers make it clearer 
to their pupils how they are progressing than others do. Further evidence 
comes from the study by Nicholls (1979) referred to previously (section 
1.4.4). Nicholls compared teachers’ gradings of their pupil's reading 
attainments with the children's estimates of the class rank in reading.
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twelve year olds being 0*38, 0*47 and 0*66 respectively. Both these 
studies suggest that, for the older children at least, higher correlations 
between self rank and teacher rank might have been found in the present 
study had teachers1 opinions been more narrowly focussed. For Class 3, 
this can be tested by substituting academic report (which deals with academic 
progress only) for teacher rank. The correlation between self rank and 
academic report is 0*70 (p<^0*00l), compared with a correlation of 0*41 
(p<^0*05) between self rank and teacher rank. The difference between the 
two correlations is statistically significant (p<^0#05), thereby supporting 
the idea that the link between children's academic self-concepts and their 
teachers’ opinions of them has been underestimated in the present study.
Despite this, the present study offers'clear evidence that both self­
esteem and academic self-concept vary according to the opinions of others. 
Moreover, as one would expect, academic ratings of teachers and peers are 
more congruent with academic self-concept than with self-esteem. This is 
in keeping with the rule, noted earlier, that correlations are highest 
between measures matched in generality.
The next section deals with the second source of self-concept and 
self-esteem, our observations of our own behaviour and performances.
4.4.3 Self-observations
According to theories discussed in the first chapter (section 1.4.3), 
observations of our own behaviour and performances form the basis for our 
sense of personal efficacy and competence, this sense of competence serving 
in turn as a major source of self-esteem. In the present study, it was 
hoped that intelligence test scores might function as measures of the 
children's sense of competence (as defined in section 1.4.3). It bias 
partly on the basis of this assumption (as well as on the basis of 
previous research) that it bias predicted that children's academic self- 
concepts would become more closely linked with intelligence test scores and 
less closely linked with actual attainment as they got older.
This did not prove to be the case. Instead, for each successive 
group, academic self-concepts were more closely linked with both intelli­
gence and attainments, the relationship between academic self-concept and 
attainment being the stronger one at each age level. This relationship
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Wylie (1979) says is consistent with the findings of previous researcn. 
However, when attainment level bias held constant, the correlation 
between academic self-concept and ability bias dramatically reduced. Wylie 
(1979) could find no previous studies which had examined the relationship 
between academic self-concept and ability while controlling for level of 
attainment. The present study shows that the tendency for ability to 
become more closely linked with academic self-concept can be explained 
entirely in terms of the increasing accuracy of academic self-concepts.
As bias acknowledged in the previous chapter (section 3.7), intelligence 
test scores may not function, as adequate indices of sense of competence for 
pre-adolescent children. The failure of the children in the present sample 
to distinguish clearly between,being good at schoolwork and being intelli­
gent supports this interpretation. Furthermore, the prediction that 
intelligence would become more closely linked with academic self-concepts 
bias based upon a particular longitudinal study of adolescents (Brookover 
et al., 1962, 1965, 1967). In that study, the correlations between 
academic self—concepts and attainments remained constant between the aqes 
of twelve and seventeen suggesting that academic self-concepts stabilize 
in adolescence. Meanwhile, the correlations between academic self-concept 
and ability increased from 0*47 at the age of twelve to 0*53 at fifteen 
and to 0*60 at seventeen. From Brookover et al.'s data, it is possible 
to calculate- the partial correlations between academic self-concepts and 
ability when attainments are held constant. These are 0*17, 0*34 and 0*43 
at the ages of twelve, fifteen and seventeen respectively. This confirms 
that intelligence only begins to make an independent contribution to 
academic self-concept in .later adolescence.
If this conclusion is valid, then it seems likely that sense of 
competence may not be fully developed till late adolescence as well.
This does not mean that the .children in the present study did not rely 
on self-observations in forming their ideas about themselves, but it 
does suggest that their self-observations had not consolidated sufficiently 
to act as an independent source of academic self-concept. Instead, their 
observations of themselves are still inextricably bound up with their 
observations of (and comparisons with) others. LJe will now consider 
what light the present study throws on the third source of self-concept 
and self-esteem, the comparisons children make with others.
-233-
It has been argued that self-concepts and self-esteem are derived 
partly from our observations of how we compare with our peers. This 
argument is based on the notions that the constructs we form about our­
selves are the same as those we form about others (see section l.4.l) 
and that each personal construct constitutes a dimension on which we 
compare ourselves with others (see section 1.4.4). As far as theory is 
concerned, the most effective advocate of the above ideas is George Kelly 
(1955), support for Kelly’s arguments coming from the work of Livesley and 
Bromley (1973) which shows that the development of children’s constructs 
about themselves and others are reciprocal processes, each facilitating 
the other. As for the present study, support for the above assumptions 
comes from an observation that has been noted already (section 2.2.2).
When the children were describing their classmates, they were asked to 
say in what way the particular children being described were different 
from them. This question was asked towards the end of each description 
with the aim of eliciting constructs of greatest self-relevance. In fact, 
only rarely did this prompting lead to new constructs being produced.
Instead, most of the children answered the question by repeating constructs 
used previously in their descriptions, thus- demonstrating that the constructs 
they used in describing others applied to themselves as well.
As stated above, Kelly(l955) maintains that each personal Oonstruct 
constitutes a dimension on which we compare ourselves with others. In 
keeping with this idea, both Bloom (1974) and Naoh (1973) claim that 
children’s knowledge of their academic abilities is derived inevitably 
from comparisons with their peers.
On this assumption, it bias decided to limit the present study to 
whole classes of children.
The results provide ample justification for this approach. One of 
the most striking findings bias how clearly children of all ages were 
aware of how their work compared with that of their classmates, even 
uihen they were given little indication by their teachers. None of the 
correlations between class rank and the various attainment measures bias 
less than 0*60, the average correlation for both Classes 1 and 2 being 
0*66 (p<0*00l) bihile the average correlation for Class 3 bias 0*85 
(p<^0*00l)• Thus, even in the junior school where no formal reporting
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of the relative academic standing of each child in the class. Cnee 
formal reports became available, this picture became startingly accurate. 
For the secondary school group, the correlation between class rank and 
academic report was 0*94 (p<^OOOl). How is such accuracy possible?
It is as if each child had seen every other.child's school report (which 
they would not have done) and mentally computed his or her relative
i
standing in the class (which they, could not have done). Moreover, it 
will be remembered that the index of attainment derived from the children’s 
school reports was based upon the ratings of the teachers of ’academic’ 
subjects only, not on the combined ratings of all teachers. An alternative 
index derived from the ratings of art and craft teachers only bore little 
relation to class rank (r = 0*18, n.s.). Clearly, these children had a 
definite (if narrow) idea of what bias meant by cleverness as well as of 
bihat schools required of them. In estimating their classmates’ relative 
cleverness, they took into account only their performance in ’academic’ 
subjects, disregarding their abilities and attainments in the ’art’ 
subjects (which included music, needlework, craft and design, as well 
as art itself).
The accuracy of children's ratings of themselves and each other would 
seem to support Nash's claim, quoted earlier, that "schools teach hier­
archical levels of personal worth more successfully than anything else", 
(Nash, 1973, p.16). One might take exception to the implied accusation 
that schools are not very successful in their primary task of passing on 
a certain body of knowledge and a certain set of values to their charges. 
More to the point, one can object to the suggestion that schools teach 
children their places in the academic hierarchy. Presumably Nash means 
that schools do this unintentionally, as Bloom (1974) has suggested in 
his more subtle account of this same process (see section 1.4.4). Never­
theless, Nash’s statement is somewhat misleading. It is not the case that 
schools set out to teach children how they rate academically, or even that 
children learn incidentally where they stand in relation to their peers. 
Instead, children actively seek to compare themselves with others in order 
to build up a clearer picture of their own capabilities, in order to know 
biho they are.
The present study offers some evidence for this assertion. In neither 
of the schools involved bias any attempt made to rank the children according
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school concerned issued formal reports on each child, but only used a five- 
point scale in giving separate ratings of the children’s attitudes, attain­
ments and potential in each subject. The junior school did not report 
formally on the children nor bias their work marked, written comments being 
preferred. Furthermore, the teacher for Class 2 believed as a matter of 
principle that schools should play down competition between pupils as 
much as possible. In her own teaching practice, she strove to capitalize 
upon the children’s individual strengths, each child competing against 
his or her own standards rather against those set by other children. This 
approach bias reflected in the constructs she chose in her repertory grid 
rating of the children. These were discussed in the previous chapter 
(section 3.6) where it bias noted that this particular teacher appeared 
to value certain general qualities in her pupils rather than purely 
academic ones. As a result, the correlations between teacher rank and both 
self rank and class rank were unusually low (0*11 and 0*34 respectively) 
for this class, whereas the correlation between self rank and class rank 
bias unusually high (0#8l). The reason for this discrepancy bias suggested 
in the last chapter where it bias argued that, because the teacher’s 
evaluations tended to be couched in non-academic terms, the children in 
this class had become unusually dependent upon each others’ opinions in 
estimating their own progress. This should not be taken as a criticism 
of the teacher concerned. She was (and is) a highly exoerienced, sensitive 
and dedicated teacher who has thought deeply about her work. The point 
being made is that it is a natural part of the process whereby children 
learn who they are for them to compare themselves with peers. They will 
seek to do this whether encouraged by their parents and teachers or not.
4.4.5 Conclusions
The present study provides clear evidence that children’s self-concepts 
and self-esteem are derived partly from the opinions held of them by their 
teachers and peers and partly from observations of how they compare with 
their classmates. There is also evidence, albeit indirect, that children's 
self-concepts and self-esteem are partly based upon observations of their 
obin behaviour and performances. It bias argued that, for pre-adolescents 
at least, such self-observations are inextricably bound up with observ­
ations of hobi they compare with their classmates. Only in adolescence do 
repeated self-observations yield a stable sense of competence which acts
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If it is accepted that self-concept and self-esteem are principally 
derived from the three main sources dealt with in this section, there is 
still the question of how these sources relate to one another. This 
issue is taken up in the next section which focusses on the role of 
academic self-concepts in relation to the opinions of others and actual
i
attainments.
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4.5.1 Introduction
One of the major ouestions tackled in the present study is whether 
self-processes (such as sslf-concept, self-esteem, locus of control) act 
•as intervening variables between environmental influences and actual 
behaviour. One of the specific hypotheses tested was that academic self- 
concepts would mediate between the opinions of others- and academic attain­
ments. According to this hypothesis, academic self-concepts play an 
active role, on the one hand selecting from the opinions of others whatever
is consonant with self-consistency and self-enhancement needs, and on the
other hand establishing expectations for achievement that would determine 
how much effort is made. This is in contrast to the view of academic self- 
concepts as having a passive role, being no more than faithful reflections 
of the opinions of others and of one's actual achievements. Lefcourt (1976) 
has raised this same question of an active versus a passive role with respect 
to locus of control. He noted that research has shown that locus of control 
is linked with both intelligence and achievement. This raises the poss­
ibility that locus of control might be no more than an epiphenomenon, ”a 
mere diagnostic indicator of a person’s natural capacities for achievement; 
that is, the more intelligent and achieving a person is, the more likely he 
will perceive himself as an active, effective person” (Lefcourt, 1976, p.66).
•Before we consider what light the present study throws on this issue,
we need to clarify certain ambiguities about the exact role of the academic
self-concept. Thus, academic self-concepts may be seen as intervening 
between the perceived opinions of others and one's pdrceived attainments 
or between the actual opinions of others and one’s actual attainments. 
Previous research has not always been consistent on this point.
4.5.2 Academic self-concept and the perception of reality
An important issue in self theory is how to conceptualise the relation­
ship between our perceptions of reality and ’reality’ itself. For example, 
what is the realtionship between what others think of us, what we think 
others think of us, and what we think of ourselves? Brrokover and his 
colleagues (1967) adopt the symbolic interactionist view that what others 
think of us is irrelevant, the only thing that matters being what we think 
of us. Accordingly, in their study of adolescents' academic self-concepts 
they made no attept to measure what teachers actually thought of their 
pupils, concentrating instead on what the pupils thought their teachers 
thought of them. The adolescents’ perceptions of the opinions of others
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(rather than perceived attainments). In the present study, the aim bias 
to relate children's self-processes to the reality of classroom life, 
with attainments and opinions of others being sampled directly. It bias 
assumed that any distortions involved in the children’s perception-of that 
reality would be reflected in their self-concepts.
Because no attempt bias made !to sample children’s perceptions of the 
opinions of others, it is not possible to compare the merits of the two 
approaches. However, the present study does provide an opportunity . for 
comparing children’s perceptions of their abilities and attainments with 
their actual abilities and attainments. Perceptions of ability are given 
by the correlation between the element ’self1 and the construct ’clever' 
on the academic grid, while perceptions of attainment are given by the 
correlations between ’self' and ’good at schoolwork’ on the same grid. 
Using these two measures, one can explore the relationships between 
academic self-concept (or self-esteem), perceived ability (or attainment), 
and actual ability (or attainment).
Tbio specific hypotheses were tested in this study. It bias predicted 
that self-esteem would be more closely linked with perceived ability than 
with actual ability (as measured by the English Picture Vocabulary Test). 
Similarly, it bias predicted that self-esteem would be more closely linked 
with perceived attainment than with actual attainment (as given by attain­
ment rank). The results were generally in line with these hypotheses.
For the two older groups at least, self-esteem tended to be more closely 
linked with perceived ability and attainment than with actual attainment. 
These calculations were then repeated, substituting academic self-concept
ekYent
for self-esteem. To an even greater^than for self-esteem, academic self- 
concepts were found to be more closely linked with perceived ability and 
attainment than with actual ability and attainment.
Although intuitively plausible, these findings are not as helpful 
as they may seem at first sight. What they establish is that two closely- 
related self-reports (academic self-concept and perceived ability/attain­
ment) correlate more highly with each other than either of them does with 
objective measures of what they report. For Classes 2 and 3, the corre­
lations between academic self-concepts and both perceived ability and 
perceived attainment are very high, ranging from 0*82 to 0*87. In fact, 
these are as high as the correlations between the different measures of 
academic self-concepts, which indicates that the grid measures of per-
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self-concept. This can be seen from the way they become more accurate 
with age. The correlations between perceived attainment and actual attain­
ment are 0*33 (n.s.), 0*56 (p<^0*0l) and 0*65 (p<^0*00l) for Classes 1, 2 
and 3 respectively, while the corresponding correlations between perceived 
ability and actual ability are 0*11 (n.s.), 0*32 (n.s.) and 0*47 (p<^0#0l). 
Perceived attainment sould seem to ba a more powerful index of academic 
self-concept than perceived ability for this age range.
Thus, we may conclude that the notions of perceived attainment and 
perceived ability are essentially synonymous with the notion of academic 
self-concept. This raises the Question of whether the same might also be 
true of the perceived opinions of others. According to Burns (1979), it 
has been repeatedly shown that there are close similarities between people’s 
self-perceptions and their'perceptions of how others view them. Following 
Cooley (1902), Burns takes this as evidence that out interpretations of 
the opinions of others contribute significantly to our self—perceptions.
As suggested above, a more parsimonious explanation is that self-perceptions 
and perceptions of the opinions of others are merely variations on a theme 
and are similar enough to be regarded as synonymous. It seems doubtful 
that young children (such as those in the present study) differentiate 
clearly between what they think of themselves and what they think others 
think of them, although older children and adults might do so in some 
instances. At any rate, the above results would seem to justify the 
decision to sample both attainments and the opinions of others directly.
Having clarified this issue, we can return to the auestion of the
role played by academic self-concept in behaviour.
4.5.3 Academic self-concepts as intervening variables
The results of the present study do not give us sufficient grounds 
for deciding whether academic self-concepts should be properly viewed as 
playing an active or a passive role with respect to behaviour. The 
hypothesis, derived from the Brookover study described above, that academic
self-concepts act as intervening variables between the opinions of others
and actual attainments, was not supported by the evidence. One possible 
reason for the failure to replicate the findings of Brookover and his 
colleagues has been mentioned already : they measured the students’
perceptions of the opinions of others whereas the present study sampled
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used much younger children whose academic self-concepts were presumably 
not as clear or stable as those of the adolescents in the Brookover study.
A rival hypothesis, proposed by Calsyn and Kenny (1977) bias also 
tested. Their suggestion bias that both academic self-concepts and the 
opinions of others were based principally upon actual attainments. This 
hypothesis received partial support from the present study, being true for 
the opinions of teachers but not for the opinions of classmates. However, 
as we have seen, there are grounds for thinking that the particular technique 
used for sampling teachers’ opinions did not reflect their true impact.
Had a more narrow measure of the teachers’ ratings of their pupils been 
used, it is likely that the Calsyn and Kenny hypothesis would also have 
received little support.
UJe should not be too puzzled by the lack of evidence for these two 
hypotheses as they do not cover all the ways in which the variables con­
cerned might be related to one another. Setting aside the issue of whether 
the perceived or actual opinions of others are sampled, one can object to 
the above hypotheses on the grounds that they only allow for unidirectional
casual relationships between the variables, each depicting academic self-
a.
concept as springing from single source rather than from several. Thus,
A
Brookover et el. (1967, p.140) view academic self-concept as being completely 
determined by the student’s perception of the evaluations significant others 
hold‘of his or her ability. Academic self-concept in turn determines the 
level of academic achievement attempted by the student (though not, of 
course, the student’s actual achievements). Against this, Calsyn and 
Kenny (1977) propose that students’ academic achievements determine both 
their academic self-concepts and their perceptions of the.evaluations of 
others.
But there is no need to limit ourselves to a choice between a view 
of academic self-concept as determining the amount of effort put into a 
task or as determined by the level of success achieved. The relationship 
between these two variables is much more likely to be a reciprocal one, 
each influencing and being influenced by the other. Nor is there any need 
to limit ourselves to a view of academic self-concepts as being primarily 
or wholly determined by the opinions of others or by one’s actual achieve­
ments. As has already been argued at length, academic self-concepts arise
-241-
actions between these three sources is unlikely to be as simple as in 
the models proposed by Brookover and his colleagues or by Calsyn and 
Kenny. This can be illustrated diagrammatically. If we restrict our­
selves to a consideration of academic self-concept and its relationship 
to the opinions of others and to comparative attainments, the hypotheses 
discussed above can be represented as in figure 4.1,
i
figure 4.1 Rival models of the role of academic self-concept 
(a) According to Brookover et al. (1967) :
effort expendedopinions of others academic self-concept
(b) According to Calsyn and Kenny (1977) :
opinions of others
level of achievement
academic self-concept
Both the models given in figure 4.1 are too simple. A more complex 
model of the way the above variables might relate to one another is given 
in figure 4.2.
figure 4.2 Proposed model of the relationship between academic 
self-concept, opinions of others and actual attainments
opinions -of•others
relative attainmentacademic self-concept
In the model presented in figure 4,2, academic self-concept is seen 
as more than just determining, or being determined by, actual attainments. 
Instead, the relationship between these two variables is envisaged as 
being reciprocal. Thus, although children’s academic self-concepts limit 
the goals they aim for (and thereby help determine what they actually 
achieve) these same self-concepts are partly determined by the children’s
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Classmates and teachers are also in a position to observe each child’s 
relative progress, and the opinions they form on the basis of these 
observations have an important influence on academic self-concepts as 
well. Through this kind of continual exchange, any major inaccuracies 
in the children’s self-estimates tend to get ironed out with the result 
that academic self-concepts become more accurate with age.
What emerges from the continuous interaction between academic self- 
concepts, opinions of others and actual attainments is a consensus as to 
each child’s academic standing in relation to his or her classmates. In 
the present study, the strength of this consensus can be gauged by the 
level of agreement between self rank, teacher rank and attainment rank, 
for the whole sample, the average Kendall coefficient of concordance (lii) 
between these four sets of ranks bias 0*70 (p<^0*00l). This is high enough 
to offer some support for interpersonal congruency theory (Secord, 1977) 
which is based on ”a consistency principle requiring compatibility between 
self-concept, behaviour and reflected views and actions of other persons”
(p.47). However, the level of agreement between these various factors is 
not as high as to suggest that children’s academic self-concepts are 
completely determined by the other variables. There is still room for 
children to misconstrue or to deliberately disagree with others’ estimates 
of their ability and attainments, as well as for them to believe themselves 
capable of higher achievements despite relatively poor progress. So, 
despite the evidence for some self-consistency, there is still scope for 
self-favourability biases (self-enhancement).
4.5.4 Conclusions
Although the present study found little evidence for the view that 
academic self-concepts act as intervening variables between the opinions 
of others and actual attainments, this does not mean that academic self- 
concepts have no role to play in children’s behaviour in academic situations. 
On the contrary, the study clearly shouts that academic self-concepts are 
related to both attainments and opinions of others independently of such 
factors as intelligence. What the results suggest is that the relation­
ships betuieen these variables are reciprocal rather than unidirectional, 
academic self-concepts being influenced by, as well as influencing, both 
actual attainments and the opinions of others. As a result of the con­
tinuous interactions betuieen the opinions of others, actual attainments 
and academic self-concepts, the latter become increasingly accurate and a
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This concensus is not so complete as to rule out all idiosyncratic self- 
perceptions, however.
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4.6.1 Introduction
The nature of the link between self-esteem and achievement bias 
discussed in the first chapter (section 1.6). As noted there, Wylie 
(1979) has argued that the link between self-esteem and both ability 
and attainment is not a direct one but is mediated by one's perceptions 
of one's abilities and attainments.(that is, by one's academic self- 
concept). This means that there are at least two reasons why there is 
not an exact correspondence between self-esteem and level of attainment. 
First, our perceptions of our abilities are subject to distortion. Second, 
academic self-concepts do not match self-esteem exactly, being more narrowly 
based. (A third reason, to be dealt with in a later section, is that 
achievement value mediates between academic self-concept and self-esteem).
Two predictions follow from this line of argument. First, academic 
self-concept will be more closely linked with attainment than will self­
esteem. Second, academic self-concept will act as an intervening variable 
between attainment and self-esteem. The results pertaining to these pre­
dictions will now be discussed.
4.6.2 Predictions and findings
As just stated, the first hypothesis tested predicted that self-esteem 
would not be as closely related to attainment level as would academic self­
esteem. Previous research, summarized by Torshen (1969), suggests that 
the correlation between self-esteem and attainment is generally of the 
order of 0*25 while the correlation between academic self-concept and 
attainment averages around 0*50. In the present study, the corresponding 
correlations were 0*35 (p<^0*0l) and 0*47 (p<^0*00l). Thus, as predicted, 
attainment level had a greater impact on academic self-concept than on self­
esteem. This differential remained, albeit somewhat reduced, when ability 
was held constant. The resulting partial correlation between self-esteem 
and attainment was 0»32 (p<^0*0l) while the corresponding correlation 
for academic self-concept and attainment bias 0*39 (p<^0*00l).
The second hypothesis tested predicted that academic self-concept 
would act as an intervening variable between self-esteem and attainment. 
Earlier research by Brookover et al. (1967) had shown this to be true for 
adolescents, but there appear to have been no previous studies testing 
this hypothesis with pre-adolescents. In fact, the results of the present
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olds but not of children as young as eight. When academic self-concepts 
were held constant, there bias a dramatic reduction in the correlations 
between measures of self-esteem and attainment, but only in the case of : 
the two older groups. The most likely reason why there bias not a similar 
reduction in the case of the youngest group is that, as shown earlier in 
'this chapter, the eight year olds had not yet developed stable and consistent 
academic self-concepts. 1
These results indicate that measures of general self-esteem are not 
as effective as measures of academic self-concept in predicting the 
academic achievements of children of eleven or more. For younger children, 
general self-esteem is as least as effective as academic self-concept in 
predicting academic achievement. In addition, the results indicate that,
/once children have formed clear and consistent ideas about their abilities 
and attainments, their self-esteem will no longer directly influence (or 
be influenced by) their actual attainments. The relationship between 
general self-esteem and academic behaviour thus becomes increasingly indirect, 
being channelled through the child's academic self-concepts. Thus, per­
sistent academic failure will not result in a lowering of self-esteem 
unless the child perceives that he or she is failing and adjusts his or 
her academic self-concept accordingly. (As will be discussed in a later 
section£ this involves the child attributing failure to internal causes, 
such as lack of ability). Similarly, favourable general self-esteem will 
not result in a confident approach to schoolwork if the child's academic 
self-concept is not positive as well.
The results have important implications concerning the structure of 
self-processes.
4.6.3 The structure of self—processes
What these results imply is that self-processes are related to one 
another in a hierarchical fashion, with higher-order processes (such as 
general self-esteem and general self-concept) summarizing a number of 
more specific lower-order processes (such as academic self-concept, social 
self-concept and so on). A number of theorists have viewed the relation­
ship between general self-concept and specific self-concepts as being 
hierarchical (Epstein, 1973; Horrocks and Dackson, 1972; Kelly, 1955;
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Webster and Sobieszek, 1974; Wylie, 1968). Empirical support for 
this view has come from studies by Rogers et al. (1977), Shavelson 
et al. (1976) and Winne et al. (1977). According to Wylie (1979), the 
significant feature of higher-order processes such as general self-concept 
is that they yield weaker predictions of specific behaviours (for example,
.academic achievement) than to lower-order processes such as academic self- 
concept.
Although no measure of general self-concept bias used in the present 
study, the relationship between general self-esteem and academic self­
esteem seems to conform to the above hierarchical model. With this kind 
of model, one can expect lower-order processes to correlate highly with 
relevant behaviours but not at all with irrelevant behaviours, while the 
higher-order processes correlate moderately with a wide range of behaviours. 
Thus, in the present study, academic self-esteem should correlate highly 
with academic achievement but not at all with popularity, while general 
self-esteem should correlate moderately with both academic achievement and 
popularity.
The actual results are consistent with these expectations. Thus, on 
average, academic self-esteem correlated with attainment rank at 0*42 
(p<^0*00l) but was not related to popularity at all, while general self­
esteem correlated biith attainment rank at 0*31 (p<.0*0l) and with popularity 
at 0».19 (p<^0 05). However, the pattern bias not a consistent one. For, 
example, scores on the SEI correlated more highly with both class rank 
(0*50, p<^OOOl) and teacher rank (0*31, p<^OOl) than did academic self­
esteem (for bihich the corresponding correlations were (0*45, p-<0*00l)
•and (0*21, p<^0 05) respectively). These inconsistencies are undoubtedly 
due to the academic bias of the SEI and do not seriously challenge the 
conclusion that the results of 'the present study indicate that self- 
processes are hierarchically ordered.
4.6.4 Conclusions
In this section, we have been discussing what light the present study 
throws on the relationship between self-esteem and achievement. It has 
been shown that general self-esteem is directly linked with academic 
achievement in the case of the youngest group only. With children over
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between self-esteem and achievement. It bias argued that this is the result 
of the developmental tendencies for children’s academic self-concepts to 
become more clearer and more consistent with age and for academic matters 
to become differentiated from more general concerns.
In addition to the specific hypotheses tested, the present study has 
confirmed earlier ideas about the relationships between different self­
processes. Previous studies have shown that self-concepts are ordered 
hierarchically and the present study indicates that self-esteem also 
can be thought of as having general and specific aspects. It would 
appear that this differentiation of specific aspects of self-esteem is a 
developmental phenomenon occurring between the ages of eight and eleven.
The above results raises questions about the usefulness of the 
construct of general self-esteem. If measures of general self-esteem 
do not predict specific behaviours such as academic achievement, what . 
kind of behaviours can they predict? This is an important question to 
which bie will return.
The next section deals with the relationships between self-processes 
and both intelligence and achievement value.
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4.7.1 Introduction
Measures of achievement value and intelligence were included in the 
present study because there were both theoretical and empirical grounds 
for thinking that these two variables might mediate between self-processes 
and achievement. In the case of achievement value, it bias predicted that 
the relationship between self-esteem and achievement would depend in part 
on the value the particular child placed upon being successful academically. 
In the case of intelligence, there bias the possibility that the relation­
ship between academic self-concept and achievement might depend upon their 
common link with intelligence.
The results pertaining to intelligence will be discussed first.
4.7.2 Self-processes and intelligence
Measures of intelligence were included in the present study because 
of the obvious relevance of this variable for a study focussing on self­
processes and attainment. There bias always the possibility that any 
relationships observed between such variables as academic self-concept 
and attainment might be due to a common link with intelligence. Previous 
studies in this area have usually failed to explore this possibility. In 
the present study, the average correlation between verbal ability and 
attainment rank was 0*51 (p<^0*00l), slightly greater than the average 
correlation between academic self-concept and attainment rank (0»47, •
p<[0*00l). Thus, there is a distinct possibility that some of the 
observed relationships between self-processes and attainments might be 
wholly or partly explained in terms of variations in verbal ability.
The relationships most likely to', be affected by variations in ability 
were those between attainment and both self-esteem and academic self- 
concept. In fact, bihen verbal ability bias held constant, the average 
correlation between measures of self-esteem and attainment bias reduced 
only slightly (from 0*35, p<^0#001 to 0*32, p<^0«0l) whereas a greater 
(but still not statistically significant) reduction bias observed in the 
correlation between academic self-concept and attainment (from 0*47 to 
0*39, both p<^O#O0l). This suggests that, for the present age group, the 
relationships between self-processes and attainment cannot be explained
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In addition to exploring the possible role played by.ability, three 
specific hypotheses were tested, first, it was found that, as predicted, 
both self-esteem and academic self-concept were more closely linked with 
perceived ability than with measured ability. The implications of this 
finding have been discussed already (section 4.5.2). Second, it was pre-
i
dieted that as they grew older, children’s academic self-concepts would 
become more closely linked with intelligence test scores and less closely 
linked with actual attainments. This did not prove to be the case for 
reasons that have been discussed previously (section 4.4.3). The third 
hypothesis tested predicted that the correlation between verbal ability 
and academic self-concept would be reduced significantly when attainments 
were held constant. This hypothesis received strong support, suggesting 
that the academic self-concepts of the present age group are based primarily 
on their actual, attainments.
Overall, these results indicate that verbal ability makes little or n 
no independent contribution to the self-esteem or academic self-concepts 
of children and young adolescents. Further support for this conclusion 
is provided by the regression analyses : verbal ability did not act as 
a statistically significant predictor of any of the measures of self­
esteem or academic self-concept at any age level. However, as discussed 
earlier, there are reasons for thinking that, for older asolescents and 
adults, ability might function as an independent source of academic self- 
concept at least.
The second variable to be considered in this section is achievement 
value.
4.7.3 Self-processes and achievement value
As discussed in the first chapter (section 1.2.2), the notion of 
achievement (or attainment) value has been proposed by several theorists 
(McMichael, 1977; Phares, 1976; Rosenberg, 1965; Stein and Bailey, 1973). 
The clearest formulation of the role played by achievement values is 
provided by Rosenberg (1965) who distinguished between self-estimates 
(academic self-concepts), self-values (achievement value) and self-esteem.
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study. It bias predicted that achievement value would act as an inter­
vening variable between self-esteem and academic self-concept, that 
achievement value would act as an intervening variable between self­
esteem and achievement and that those who were successful academically 
would value such success more highly than those who were relatively 
unsuccessful.
i
The prediction that achievement value would act as an intervening 
variable between self-esteem and academic self-concept bias based on • 
previous research by Rosenberg (1965). In his study, Rosenberg found 
that for adolescents who valued academic achievement, those who thought , 
they were doing well (that is, those who had favourable academic self- 
concepts) had high self-esteem whereas those who saw themselves as 
failing had low self-esteem. This effect bias much more marked than bias 
the case for adolescents who did not value academic achievement. Despite 
the fact that Rosenberg’s sample bias much older (fifteen to eighteen year 
olds) than the present sample, this result bias confirmed in the present 
study. It would seem, therefore, that achievement value partly acts as 
an intervening variable between academic self-concept and self-esteem. 
Thus, perceived success (or failure) in any sphere is likely to make one 
feel good (or bad) about oneself, but this effect is magnified if one 
places a high value on success in the particular sphere. As one would 
expect, the present results suggest that this is more true of academic 
self-esteem than of general self-esteem (although still true for the 
latter).
The second hypothesis tested predicted that the same would apply to 
actual attainments, that is, that achievement value would partly act as 
an intervening variable between self-esteem and actual attainments.
Thus, it was anticipated that actual success (or failure) in schoolwork 
would lead children to evaluate themselves more (or less) favourably 
and that this effect would be most marked for those children who partic­
ularly valued being good at schoolwork and/or being clever. As pointed 
out in the last chapter (section 3.8.2), although it is plausible that 
achievement value would prove to be an important link between self­
esteem and achievement, no previous study has addressed itself to this 
question directly. The results of the present study, revealed the 
expected link between self-esteem and actual achievement but indicated 
that, contrary to prediction, this link bias stronger for those children
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on being clever. Thus, there was no support for the hypothesis that 
achievement value acts as an intervening variable between self-esteem 
and academic achievement.
The third hypothesis tested predicted that children who valued being 
academically successful and/or clever would be more successful than those
i
who did not. This hypothesis bias based on studies reviewed by Stein and 
Bailey (1973) which showed that, for girls at least, the value placed 
upon being successful in a particular area bias related to both persistence 
and competence at tasks in that area. This bias not found to be the case 
in the present study. The results did not reveal any consistent tendency 
for those who valued being good at schoolwork and/or clever to be any 
better at their work than those who did not share these values.
Thus, only one of the hypotheses tested received any support. The 
failure to find support for the second hypothesis is not so surprising in 
view of bihat has been learned in the present study about the relationship 
between self-esteem and attainment. As discussed earlier in this chapter 
(section 4.6.2), the link between self-esteem and achievement is not a 
direct one but is mediated by academic self-concept. In the circumstances, 
achievement value, could hardly be expected to act as an intervening 
variable between the two variables which are only indirectly related to 
one another.
The failure to find support for the third hypothesis is more 
surprising and calls into question the validity of the method used for 
measuring achievement value. It will be remembered (from section 
2.3.10) that a repertory grid measure devised by Ryle and Breen (1972) 
bias used. The measure gives an indication of how extreme a view the 
person has of a particular element or construct. This is given by the 
product of the loading of the element or construct on the principal 
component and the percentage of the variance accounted for by the 
component. For the general grid, the relevant construct bias ’good at 
work’, bihile for the academic grid the construct used bias ’clever’.
It bias assumed that high scores would indicate that the child in question 
valued being good at work.and clever. However, the confusing results 
obtained with this measure suggest that there is some ambiguity about the 
meaning of high scores. PerhaDS this ambiguity lies in the fact that
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’clever’ may indeed reflect the high value placed upon these qualities 
but may also result from negative valuations. It would seem less likely 
that a quality such as cleverness would be regarded as undesirable but 
it is possible.
If this is so, then the failure of the hypotheses concerning achieve­
ment value is due more to problems of measurement than to bleaknesses in 
the theory. Nevertheless, the fact that evidence bias found for one of 
the propositions concerning achievement value suggests that the measure 
used has some validity. On the basis of the present study, all that can 
be concluded is that achievement value partly acts as an intervening 
variable between academic self-concept and self-esteem (but not between 
attainment and self-esteem).
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4.8.1 Introduction
A measure of locus of control bias included in the present study 
because it bias assumed that the way children explained their intellectual 
successes and failures would be intimately bound up with their academic 
self-concepts and self-esteem. The Crandall et al. (1965) Intellectual 
Achievement Responsibility Scale (IAR) bias chosen because -it focussed 
on locus of control in intellectual and academic situations. Despite 
the theoretical relevance of the locus of control construct and the 
academic focus of the IAR itself, previous research results had not 
always yielded consistent results. Accordingly the hypotheses con­
cerning locus of control and other self-processes were somewhat tentative.
4.8.2 Discussion of results
As it happens, only one of the hypotheses concerning locus of control 
received unequivocal support from the data. As found in numerous earlier 
studies, internal locus of control responses increased 'with age. Thus, 
older children were more prepared to take responsibility for both their 
successes and failures than were younger children. Perhaps not sur­
prisingly, children of all ages were more prepared to take responsibility 
for their successes than for their failures. There bias a negative corre­
lation between the two subscales although this bias less marked for Class 3 
(-0*12, n.s.) than for Class 1 (-0*49, p<0*05) and Class 2 (-0*51, p<^0*0l). 
Thus, junior school children who took credit for their successes tended to 
deny responsibility for their failures, bihile those who accepted the blame 
for their failures tended to attribute any success to circumstances beyond 
their control. This suggests that younger children view academic events 
in relatively simple terms. The secondary school children, on the other 
hand, differentiate more between success and failure, their explanations 
of success not merely complementing their explanations of failure. Further 
evidence that the younger children have relatively simple views on academic 
matters can be found by examining the relationship between cognitive 
complexity and locus of control. The correlations between scores on the 
Success subscale of the IAR and cognitive complexity on the academic grid 
were -0*52 (p<^0*0l), -0*47 (p<[0*05) and -0*23 (n.s.) for Classes 1, 2 and 
3 respectively. Again, the correlations are stronger for the two younger 
groups.
These results are consistent, with other age differences described
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attainments and for older children to view themselves and others in more 
complex, differentiated ways). However, despite this, locus of control 
bias not consistently related to any of the major academic variables. On 
average, the correlations between IAR scores and the various attainment 
measures were low, only reaching statistical significance in the case of 
the youngest group. For this group, the average correlation between level 
of attainment and internality on the Success subscale of the IAR bias 0*40 
(p<^0*05). For the two older groups, the correlations were much lower.
This would seem to confirm the doubts expressed by at least one reviewer 
(Lefcourt, 1976) about the link between IAR scores and attainment. As 
found by Holloway (1978), verbal ability proved much more effective at 
predicting academic achievement than did locus of control.
In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the links between 
locus of control (as measured by the IAR) and both academic self-concept 
and self-esteem should be weak. IAR scores were not related in any con­
sistent biay with either general or academic self-esteem (although there 
were some statistically significant correlations). Locus of control scores 
were more closely related to measures of academic self-concept (as one 
would expect) and tended to follow the same pattern as for measures of 
attainment. Thus, the highest correlations were found for the youngest 
group where the average correlation betGieen internality on the Success 
subscale of the IAR and the various measures of academic self-concept 
bias 0*44 (p</0«05). Thus, for the eight year olds, there was a modest 
tendency for those children who attributed their success to their own 
efforts and abilities both to be more successful and to have more favourable 
self-concepts. This bias much as predicted. However, the same relation­
ships were not found for the eleven and thirteen year olds.
Despite these inconsistent results, the regression analyses showed 
that, in some instances at least, IAR scores could predict both self­
esteem and academic self-concept to a significant extent. Thus, for 
Class 1, both the Success and Failure subscales predicted scores on the 
grid measure of general self-esteem, accounting for 17/ and 3/ of the 
variance respectively. For Class 2, both scales predicted academic self­
esteem scores (accounting for 5% and 18/ of the variance) bihile for Class 
3, scores on the Success subscale predicted self rank (accounting for 
11/). However, the lack of any consistent pattern to these results makes 
them difficult to interpret.
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the IAR itself or to limitations in the theory underlying the scale.
The measurement of locus of control certainly presents problems. One 
puzzling feature of the locus of control research discussed in the first 
chapter (section 1,8,2) is that measures of general locus of control seem 
to correlate more highly with measures of academic achievement than do 
scores on the IAR scale. Yet this scale was designed specifically to 
measure children's expectations of control in academic situations and, 
because of this narrower focus, should .correlate with academic achieve­
ments more highly than do scales which measure children's expectations 
of control in a wider range of situations. Moreover, it appears that 
correlations between different measures of locus of control are not 
always as high as one would expect. Reimanis (1973) compared the IAR 
with two other locus of control measures devised for children and found 
only bieak correlations between them when used with a group of nine to 
twelve year olds.
Further problems with the IAR scale have been highlighted by recent 
developments in attribution theory.
4.8.3 Recent developments in attribution theory
As mentioned in the first chapter (section 1.8.1), Weiner et a l . ’s 
(1971) original proposal bias that attributions about success and failure 
could be understood in terms of the two dimensions of stability and locus 
of control. Evidence supporting this formulation has been cited already, 
although there are some studies which suggest that the situation is more 
complex. The usual approach has been to get people to explain their 
successes and failures in terms of four possible causes (ability, effort, 
luck and ease of task). The results are less clear-cut when a longer list 
is used. Thus, in a study of ten and eleven year olds, 8ar-Tal and Darom 
(1979) offered eight possible causes. They found that children of this 
age attributed success in exams to factors such as good teaching, favour­
able home conditions, ease of subject matter, ease of actual exam ouestions, 
and interest in the subject (all but one of these being external causes), 
bihile exam failure bias explained in terms of .low ability, lack of effort, 
difficulty of subject matter, and difficulty of the actual exam questions 
(two of these being internal and two external).
To accomodate such findings, Weiner (.1979) has recently proposed that
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inensions : locus of causality, stability and intentionality. Locus of 
causality is the freouently described internal-external dimension 
Heider, 1958; Rotter, .1966; de Charms, 1968; Deci, 1975).
UJeiner does not use Rotter's label of locus of control, maintaining 
that the concepts of locus (internal vs. external) and control (controll­
able vs. uncontrollable) need to be distinguished. The stability di­
mension defines causes as stable (unchanging) vs. unstable (changing), 
bihile the intentionality dimension categorises causes as controllable 
vs, uncontrollable, Weiner maintains that each of these dimensions of 
causality has certain implications for thought and action. Thus, the 
locus of causality dimension has implications for self-esteem, the stability 
dimension is linked with the magnitude of expectancy change following 
success or failure, and the intentionality dimension is related to helping, 
evaluation and liking.
Weiner sees the locus of causality dimension as being linked with the 
emotional reactions to success and failure. He identifies three sources 
of affect in achievement situations. First, there are the immediate re­
actions to actual outcomes : we feel good when we succeed and bad when 
we fail, regardless of the reason for the result. Secondly, accompanying 
these general feelings are more distinct emotions, such as gratitude or 
hostility (if the outcome is seen as due to others) or surprise (if the 
outcome is seen as due to luck). Third, the feelings that are associated 
biith self-esteem (such as competence, pride and shame) depend upon whether 
one sees the results as being due to one's own ability or efforts (these 
being the two most dominant internal attributions) or to outside factors. 
Weiner suggests that these feelings have the greatest longevity and the 
most significance for the individual. (The stability dimension is also 
relevant for our emotional reaction to success and failure : the evidence 
suggests that feelings of depression, helplessness, and apathy result when 
failure is attributed to causes that are both internal and stable, such as 
lack of ability, lack of typical effort or some personality defect).
Weiner sees the stability dimension as having implications for 
future expectations of success and failure. Thus, when success (or 
failure) is seen as resulting from stable factors (such as ability or 
ease of task), then continued success (or failure) will be anticipated 
with greater certainty than if the outcome is seen as resulting from 
unstable factors (such as effort or luck). Similarly, changes in 
expectations for success and failure are greater when outcomes are 
attributed to stable rather than unstable causes. Weiner points out that
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people with high opinions of their ability are more likely to attribute 
failure to unstable causes and success to stable causes, whereas those 
with low opinions of their ability will do the reverse.
4,8.4 Implications for the study of self-processes
i
Some evidence to support this detailed attributional analysis of 
achievement situations is available already (Weiner, Russell and Lerman, 
1978, 1979). Assuming that further studies support Weiner's model, there 
are important implications for the study of self-esteem and academic self- 
concepts. Weiner suggests that it is the locus of causality dimension 
which has most impact on self-esteem bihile the stability dimension has 
most relevance for academic self-concepts. Unfortunately, the locus 
of control measure used in the present study confounds these two dimensions. 
Although IAR scores distinguish between internal and external causes, they 
do not distinguish between stable and unstable attributions. Thus, it is 
unlikely that IAR scores will be closely linked with academic self-concepts 
at least, although Weiner's analysis suggests that there should be some 
implications for self-esteem. However, the confounding of the locus of 
causality and stability dimensions probably weakens the link between self­
esteem as well. According to Weiner, our self-esteem is higher when we 
can attribute our successes to factors which are internal but stable (such 
as ability) rather than unstable (such as uncharacteristic effort). 
Similarly, self-esteem is lower when failures are attributable to stable, 
internal factors (such as lack of ability) rather than unstable internal 
factors (such as uncharacteristic lack of effort). However, the IAR 
fails to distinguish between stable and unstable attributions, whether 
internal or external, and^this may be the reason why it has not proved 
very effective in predicting self-esteem.
What Weiner's model implies is that attributions mediate between 
actual performances and both self-concept and self-esteem. The fact 
that the present study has not provided any support for this idea is 
probably due to bleaknesses in the method used to measure locus of control. 
Confirmation of Weiner's proposals must await the development of more 
precise ways of measuring attributions in academic situations.
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4 . y  U I rltn K L b U L  I b
4.9.1 . Introduction
The major focus of this study has been on the relationship between 
self-processes and attainment. Several additional variables were included 
in order to explore their possible or presumed contribution to this relation­
ship. In this section, the results pertaining to three of these variables 
(popularity, sex differences and field independence) will be considered in 
turn.
4.9.2 Popularity
A measure of sociometric status bias included in the present study with­
out any specific predictions being made about the relationship between 
popularity and self-processes. Earlier research (reviewed in- section 1.4.5) 
does not suggest any consistent link between self-esteem and popularity, 
although no previous study has used a repertory grid measure of self­
esteem in this context. As far as intelligence and academic achievements 
are concerned, a recent review by Hartup (1978) concludes that these are 
not consistently related to competencies in social relations. Nevertheless, 
there are some studies (for example, Coopersmith, 1959; Cohen, 1972) 
bihich have reported statistically significant correlations between popularity 
and academic achievement.
The present study found modest correlations between sociometric status 
and both self-esteem and academic self-concepts for the youngest group only. 
General self-esteem bias not reliably related to sociometric status for the 
tbio older groups. However, for academic self-esteem and academic self- 
concept, there bias'a curvilinear relationship with sociometric status.
Thus, to think well of one's academic progress is associated with popularity 
among the eight year olds but with unpopularity among both the eleven year 
olds and (to a lesser extent) the thirteen year olds. As far as other 
variables were concerned, sociometric status correlated reasonably with 
class rank, teacher rank and attainment rank for the youngest group only. 
Sociometric status correlated modestly with teacher rank for the middle 
group but with none of the academic variables for the oldest group. Thus, 
the present study suggests thatjbiith age, there is a progressive different­
iation between popularity and academic success.
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this pattern. Tor the youngest group, high sociometric status predicts 
scores on the grid measure of general self-esteem but only accounts for 
a modest 3/ of the variance. for the middle group, low sociometric 
status predicts both academic self-esteem and self rank, accounting for 
around 7/ of the variance in both cases. In the factor analyses, popu­
larity is included in the first factor for Class 1 only and does not load 
significantly on any of the first three factors for Class 3 or for the 
whole sample. In addition, the commonality of the popularity measure 
bias extremely low in the latter analyses.
This suggests that, for the. oldest group at .least, sociometric status 
shares little common variance with other variables. There are two possible 
reasons for this. One has been suggested already : popularity becomes 
increasingly differentiated from academic success and, since most of the 
variables in this study deal directly or indirectly with success, popularity 
becomes increasingly independent of the other variables. The other poss­
ibility is that the measure itself is less reliable with the older groups. 
Although the terms popularity and sociometric status have been used inter­
changeably, they are not necessarily identical. As measured in the present 
study, sociometric status refers to intergration within the classroom, 
whereas popularity refers to acceptance by a wider peer group. As 
Salmon (1979) has pointed out, the term peer group is often used very 
loosely, the arbitrary definitions imposed by investigators often violating 
the children's own sense of the similarities and differences between them­
selves and others. Hartup (1978) makes a similar point and suggests that 
children's peers should be regarded as those who are equivalent in 
development and social status (and who may or may not be of the same age 
and sex). By limiting the measure of sociometric status to the immediate 
classroom, the present study may well have obtained an imperfect picture 
of the children's true standing within their peer group. This is probably 
most true of the secondary school children since the younger children 
are more likely to have drawn their friends from their immediate class­
room. If true, this would explain why popularity (as measured in the 
present study) is so weakly linked with other variables for this group.
To summarize, sociometric status bias found to be linked with self- • 
esteem, academic self-concepts and various academic variables for the
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was less reliable with the older children, the results suggest that, with 
age, sociometric status becomes increasingly differentiated from academic 
progress.
4.9.3 Sex differences
As discussed in the first chapter (section 1.9), there is evidence 
that, although sex role stereotypes exist among college students at least, 
there is no evidence that these result in self-esteem differences between 
the sexes. A recent study by Hanes, Prawat and Grissom (1979) shows that 
this applies to adolescents as well. They got twelve to eighteen year 
olds to complete Coopersmith's SEI (short form) twice, once for themselves 
and once according to how they felt peers of the opposite sex would re­
spond. Although there were no sex differences in actual self-esteem, boys 
credited girls with less self-esteem than themselves bihile girls credited 
boys biith more self-esteem than themselves. Such sex role stereotypes were 
not measured directly in the present study. However, in keeping with the 
above studies, no sex differences were found for any of the measures of 
self-esteem.
Although sex differences in self-esteem were not predicted, differences 
in academic self-concepts were. Moreover,, it bias predicted that adherance 
to sex role expectations would sometimes result in discrepancies between 
academic self-concepts and actual'achievements. Thus, boys were expected 
to rate themselves more favourably than girls regardless of their relative 
attainments while the older girls were expected to rate themselves less 
favourably than their male peers, again regardless of their relative 
attainments. Neither of these proposals were supported by the evidence.
Boys showed no greater tendency to overestimate their attainments than 
girls, and, although the older girls did compare themselves unfavourably 
biith their male peers, they had good cause to do so as their attainments 
were inferior. In fact, as has been pointed out already, increases in the 
accuracy of the children's academic self-concepts seemed to counteract any 
tendencies to adopt culturally-assigned sex roles concerning achievement.
It can be argued that the present study does not provide appropriate 
grounds for testing the two hypotheses just discussed. Although the 
children's academic self-concepts generally conform to the hypothetical
evidence contradicts the above hypotheses in one instance only : the boys 
in the youngest group did not rate themselves more favourably than their 
female classmates. However, this may not constitute a true test as these 
children are probably too young to be affected by the relevant sex role 
stereotypes. Thus, Douvan (1979) claims that "It is only in adolescence 
that gender takes on normative prescriptions and the qualities of a role 
in the social system" (p.82). Moreover, it is normal for girls to do 
somewhat better than boys at junior school level so that the attainments 
of the boys in the present sample did not run counter to any cultural ex­
pectations.
This bias also true of the thirteen year old girls. Of course, it may 
be that their relatively poor academic performances were the result of 
their deliberately inhibiting their efforts in order to conform to cultural 
expectations, but this cannot be established from the present evidence.
Douvan (1979) claims that "at adolescence girls confront serious conflict 
between sex role norms and the culture values of individual achievement 
and success" (p.92). However, the culture to which she is referring is 
that of the American high school and the corresponding sex role norms in 
English society seem less rigid. Moreover, as Hutt (1978) has pointed out, 
sex role stereotypes are partly based on real biological differences be­
tween the sexes. Although these differences cannot be held responsible 
for the kind of conflict described by Douvan, their existence does suggest 
that sex role stereotypes are not entirely arbitrary or artificial.
To summarize, the present study found no clear evidence of sex 
differences in self-processes. Instead, it seemed that the increasing 
accuracy of the'children’s academic self-concepts counteracted any tendency 
they might have to overestimate (in the case of the boys) or underestimate 
(in the case of the girls) their abilities. However, it bias suggested that 
the present study did not provide a true test of the hypothesized tendency 
for adolescent girls to depreciate (or even inhibit) their academic progress. 
Only a longitudinal study could compare the possible distorting effect of 
sex role stereotypes biith the tendency for academic self-concepts to become 
more accurate biith age.
4.9.4 Field independence
Measures of field independence were included in the present study
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self-processes. In the most recent statement of this theory (Witkin et al., 
1979), psychological differentiation is described as "a major formal pro­
perty of an organismic system" (p.1127). One of the properties of a 
relatively differentiated system is "greater self-nonself segregation, 
signifying definite boundaries between an inner core of attributes, feelings 
and needs identified as the self, and the outer world, particularly other 
people" (p.1127). Psychological differntiation is much broader than the 
cognitive style known as field independence. Nevertheless, Uiitkin and 
his colleagues (1979, p.1138) explicitly identify the field independence 
construct with the kind of self-nonself segregation just described. It 
seemed reasonable, therefore, to use a measure of field independence to 
assess the degree of self-nonself segregation and to relate this to 
relevant measures already being used in the present study.
There bias no particular reason for thinking that field independence 
would be related in any systematic way to either self-esteem or academic 
self-concepts. However, certain of the measures derived from repertory 
grids seemed to sample something akin to self-nonself segregation. These 
were the measures that dealt biith the average distance of self from others.
It bias hypothesized that children who were relatively field independent 
would perceive themselves as being less like their peers than would those 
who were relatively field dependent. As it happens, the repertory grid 
measures did not function in as straightforward a way as expected. Thus, 
it bias expected that the average distance of self from others would increase 
with age, just as field independence does. However, it bias found that 
whether distance of self from others increased or decreased biith age depended 
upon whether the others in question were liked or disliked, successful or 
unsuccessful. As children got older, they saw themselves as less similar 
to those they liked or whom they saw as academically successful, and more 
like those they disliked or whom they saw as unsuccessful.
As argued in the last chapter, these apparently contradictory results 
can be interpreted as consistent biith the psychological differentiation 
hypothesis. Within the constraints imposed by ranked repertory grids, the 
older children placed as much distance between themselves and others as 
they could. Nevertheless, the superficial inconsistency of these grid 
measures*appears to have led to a reduction in the size of the corre­
lations biith the measures of field independence. The correlations are 
highest in the case of the youngest group (who have the simplest personal
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than general grids). As in some previous analysis, this raises the 
possibility that the 8 x 10 grid format bias too small to convey adequately 
all the subtleties of the older children’s personal construct system. 
Further research biith varying grid formats is needed in order to clarify 
this point.
i •
As stated above, the field dependence-independence dimension is seen 
as "an expression of the self-nonself aspect of differentiation” (Witkin 
and Goodenough, 1977, p.662). Those who experience themselves as separate 
and distinct from others are thought to rely more on internal than on 
external referents. Thus, field independent people are likely to base 
their academic self-concepts more on self-observations than on the opinions 
of others. On this assumption, it bias hypothesized that field dependent 
children’s self ranks would correlate more highly biith their class ranks 
than would those of their field independent classmates. This prediction 
bias not fulfilled. For the two younger groups, there were no significant 
differences between the field dependent and field independent children, 
bihile for the oldest group, it bias the field independent children whose 
self ranks were more congruent biith their class ranks. As was argued in 
the last chapter (section 3.12.3), these apparently contradictory results 
could have been predicted on the basis of earlier findings. Greater 
agreement between self ranks and class ranks had been found for those who 
were more intelligent as well as more successful academically, both 
qualities associated biith field independence. But the key factor appears 
to be the amount of public knowledge available about the children’s 
relative attainments. As Witkin and Goodenough (1977) acknowledge, field 
dependent people make more use of information provided by others only when 
the situation is ambiguous. When the facts are clear (as in the present 
case), field dependent people do not differ from field independent people 
in their response to the opinions of others. In fact, the present study 
suggests that, in academic situations at least, the field independent 
people might agree more with the opinions of others than will field 
dependent people. This is because field independence is associated biith 
higher intelligence and attainments and those who are more intelligent 
and successful are also more accurate in their self-estimates.
To summarize, the only hypothesis concerning field independence 
bihich received unequivocal support in the present study bias that field
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independence would increase with age. However, it was argued that some 
of the other results, although not conforming to the specific predictions 
made, can be interpreted as supporting the underlying hypothesis (namely, 
that relatively independent children would perceive themselves as less 
similar to others than would relatively field dependent children). Such 
•an interpretation is rather speculative, however, and the hypothesis needs 
to be re-tested using a less ambiguous measure of perceived dissimilarity 
to others (such as a repertory grid based on ratings rather than rankings). 
What the present results suggest is that whether children see themselves 
as similar or dissimilar to their classmates depends upon whether the 
classmates in question are liked or disliked, successful or unsuccessful.
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5.1.1 Introduction
As stated at the beginning of the last chapter, there are two major 
questions to be asked about self-processes : first, are they of any import­
ance as far as our behaviour is concerned, -and second, how can they best be
i
conceptualized? These Questions complement one another in that answering 
one inevitably involves answering the other. Concerning the role played 
by self-processes, the obvious subjective validity of our thoughts and 
feelings about ourselves was acknowledged in the first chapter (section 
1.1.1). However, as pointed out by Uiylie (1974), the fact that we have 
such thoughts and feelings does not mean that they should be included 
necessarily in a scientific theory of personality. First, it must be 
demonstrated that knowing people’s thoughts and feelings about themselves 
enables us to understand and predict their behaviour more effectively. To 
put this proposition to the test, we must first decide on the most useful 
ways of conceptualizing (and measuring) self-processes. Yet the useful­
ness of any psychological construct is determined by its ability to predict 
behaviour. Thus, any discussion of ways of conceptualizing self-processes 
inevitably involves discussing the importance of self-processes for be­
haviour.
In the present section, we will be taking a final look at these two 
related questions in the light of the results of the present study. Of 
the different ways of conceptualizing self-processes, the notion of general 
self-esteem is the most problematical and this will be considered first. 
Later, the constructs of academic self-concept and academic self-esteem 
will be evaluated.
5.1.2 The construct of general self-esteem
General self-esteem is a hypothetical construct, a process which 
psychologists, both lay and professional, invoke in order to make sense 
of human behaviour. To establish the usefulness of this hypothetical 
construct, we need to know how stable the process of evaluating oneself 
is. There are two kinds of stability involved, temporal and situational. 
First, we need to ask whether people make global evaluations of themselves 
which persist through time. If we can establish that global self-evalu­
ations are indeed characteristic of human behaviour, then we must ask
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of situations. The second question is the crucial one since it deals with 
the translation of internal processes into external behaviours. The fact 
that people report characteristic levels of self-esteem is not of much 
interest unless their behaviour is affected accordingly.
There seems no doubt about the temporal stability of our self- 
theories. Both Block (1979) and Mischel (1968) have reviewed the relevant 
evidence and conclude that our theories about ourselves and those around us 
are very stable and tend to be resistant to change. However, it has not 
been so easy to demonstrate the situational stability of self-processes 
and Fdschel (1968) has suggested that our theories about ourselves may be 
more enduring than the behaviours to which they refer. If this is so, then 
knowing people’s thoughts and feelings about themselves will not enable us 
to predict their behaviour biith any great accuracy.
This problem is not unique to self-concepts and self-esteem but is 
common to every hypothetical construct which has been used to explain human 
behaviour. In fact, the usefulness of generalized traits and dispositions 
in predicting behaviour has been a perennial subject of debate in psychology. 
Contributors to this debate can be divided into three groups : those who 
believe that traits are useful in explaining behaviour (such as Gormly and 
Edelberg, 1974; McGowan and Gormly, 1976), those who believe that behaviour 
is largely determined by the characteristics of particular situations 
(fiischel, 1968; lilolpe, 1978), and those who believe that behaviour is a 
product of some sort of interaction (or transaction) between the person 
and the situation (Bowers, 1973, 1977; Endler and Magnusson, 1976;
Mischel, 1973).
If bie consider the results of the present study in the.above terms, it 
would seem that they offer some support for the interactionist position 
(in that the relationship between academic self-concepts and achievement 
has been shown to be reciprocal rather than unidirectional) but little 
support for the trait position (in that general self-esteem failed to 
predict achievement independently of academic self-concept). These results 
appear to justify those who have criticized the notion of global self­
esteem (Bern, 1972; Gergen, 1971; Samuels, 1977; Uylie, 1968, 1974).
However, there are reasons for thinking that the present study does not 
provide a true test of the construct of general self-esteem.
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positions as mutually exclusive, even though this is what is implied in 
the above account. As Epstein (1979) has pointed out, all three approaches 
are valid in that "they identify not three different solutions to the same 
problem but three different problems. The interactionist wishes to study 
the behaviour of people biith certain attributes in situations biith certain 
attributes. The trait theorist wishes to study consistent behavioural 
tendencies in individuals over a sample of situations. The situationist 
is concerned biith the general effects of situations over a sample of 
individuals" (Epstein, 1979, p.1104). Thus, we can hypothesize the 
operation of broad dispositions or traits without denying that situations 
often exert a strong influence on behaviour.
In Epstein’s account, there are important conditions which must be 
met before the validity of a broadly-conceived hypothetical construct 
such as general self-esteem can be established : the construct in question 
must be studied in a number of -different situations and on a number of 
different occasions. Epstein is critical of research practice in this . 
field, pointing out that much of it has been based on single observations 
of the behaviour in question. Yet when findings are derived from single 
observations, measurement error is apt to be high and temporal reliability 
(or replicability) low. He argues that this fact is sufficient to explain 
most of the low correlations obtained in trait studies.
As a solution, he proposes the following hypothesis: "Stability can
be demonstrated over a wide range of variables so long as the behaviour in 
question is averaged over a sufficient number of occurences. This applies 
equally to data derived from direct measurement of objective behaviour, 
from self-reports and from ratings by others" (Epstein, 1979, p.1105). 
Epstein cites various studies by himself and by others to support this 
contention. In one such study, university students kept daily records for 
a month o f _their emotional responses to pleasant and unpleasant experiences. 
When any single day’s ratings were compared‘with another’s, the correlation 
coefficients were usually below 0*30. When the mean of all the odd days bias 
correlated biith the mean of all the even days, the coefficients were usually 
above 0*70, some being as high as 0*90. Epstein argues that this sub­
stantial increase is due to the fact that.averaging a number of separate 
observations reduces measurement error. All four of the studies he des­
cribes shobi the same effect, enabling him to conclude that "there is enough
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about individual behaviour can be made without having to specify the 
eliciting situations" (p.1122). In other words, traits have some validity.
The present study does not meet the conditions described by Epstein 
as necessary for establishing the validity of a hypothetical construct such 
as general self-esteem. For a start, the childrens self-evaluations were 
not sampled on a sufficient number of occasions. Moreover, the focus of the 
study was relatively narrow, being restricted to academic functioning within 
the classroom. This meant that it was not possible to match the children’s 
general self-esteem scores against their behaviour in a number of .different 
situations. Because of its focus on academic achievement, the present study 
is only suitable for establishing the usefulness of more narrowly-conceived 
hypothetical constructs such as academic self-esteem and academic self- 
concept. However, even these were not sampled on a sufficient number of 
occasions to meet Epstein’s conditions.
Thus, as far as the present study is concerned, the usefulness of the 
construct of general self-esteem remains unproven. However, the results 
do highlight a point that is often neglected in studies of self-concept and 
self-esteem, and that is the need to match variables according to their level 
of generality. As discussed in the last chapter (section 4.2.4), corre­
lations are highest when self-reports are matched against behaviours of a 
comparable level of generality. Thus, in the present study, the average 
correlation between measures of academic achievement and measures of academic 
self-concept was around 0*55, while the corresponding correlations with 
measures of academic self-esteem and general self-esteem were around 0*40 
and 0*25 respectively.
This point can.be summarized as follows. Knowledge of a person's 
general self-esteem will not enable us to predict with any accuracy that 
person’s behaviour in a particular situation, such as his or her perform­
ance in an important examination. More accurate predictions are possible 
if we know the person's academic self-concept or academic self-esteem, and 
we can make quite precise predictions if we know the person’s feelings and 
expectations about the particular examination. liJhat general self-esteem 
can usefully predict is a person’s average behaviour over a wide range 
gf situatigns. UJhat academic self-esteem and academic self—concept can
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feelings and expectations about particular situations are useful for pre­
dicting his or her behaviour in those situations only.
These distinctions should be obvious but are, in fact, frequently 
neglected in research. As in the present instance, most studies using 
measures of general self-esteem have failed to sample people’s behaviour 
over a sufficiently wide range of situations. Thus, as argued already, 
the present study does not provide a true test of the notion of general self­
esteem. However, there seems no reason to doubt that research along the 
lines indicated by Epstein will ultimately demonstrate that this construct 
has its uses. (Conclusions concerning the measurement of general self­
esteem are dealt with in the next section).
Ue will now consider what conclusions can be drawn about the constructs 
of academic self-concept and academic self-esteem.
5.1.3 The constructs of academic self-concept and 
• academic self-esteem
The general problems involved in establishing the validity of 
hypothetical constructs has been discussed above. Reference has been made 
already to the purported ability of the constructs of academic self-concept 
and academic self-esteem to predict a person’s average behaviour-in academic 
situations. It has also been noted that neither academic self-concept nor 
academic self-esteem were sampled on a sufficient number of occasions to 
meet the conditions specified by Epstein (1979) as necessary for establishing 
the validity of hypothetical constructs.
Despite this, the present study has shown clearly that both academic 
self-concept and academic self-esteem can predict children’s average 
behaviour (that is, their attainments) in academic situations. The evidence 
(which has been discussed in the previous chapter) indicates that academic 
self-concept predicts children’s attainments somewhat more effectively than 
does academic self-esteem. Because of this, the rest of this discussion 
will focus on academic self-concept.
Besides demonstrating that children’s academic self-concepts can 
effectively predict their academic attainments, the present study also
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with academic self-concepts. Two contrasting theories concerning the 
principal source of academic self-concept were tested. One predicted 
that children’s academic self-concepts were determined by the opinions 
held of them by others, while the other hypothesis predicted that academic 
self-concepts were principally determined by children’s observations of 
their actual attainments. Both these hypotheses proved to be too simple.
It was argued that; the causal links between the variables concerned were 
not unidirectional (as suggested by these hypotheses) but reciprocal.
One of the reasons why academic self-concepts become more accurate with 
age is because of the continual feedback that occurs between children’s 
academic self-concepts and their observations of both their actual attain­
ments and the opinions of others.
A simple diagrammatic representation of the relationships which 
pertain between academic self-concepts, opinions of others and actual 
attainments has been given already (Figure 4.2, p.242). A more detailed 
version will now be provided, incorporating Weiner’s (1979) attributional 
analysis of the same process and indicating how feelings of self-esteem 
might be involved. In Figure 5,1 (on next page), the feelings which 
Weiner suggests are associated with each successive stage are given in 
the bottom half of each box.
Several features of the relationships depicted in Figure 5.1 should 
be noted. First, there is a repeated cycle of events, beginning at the 
general level (academic self-concept), proceeding through the specific 
(performance on a particular task) and returning to the general. Thus, 
overall academic self-concept is translated into a specific prediction 
or expectation of how well one will perform on a particular task. Depending 
upon this expectation, one will feel either anxious or confident when anti­
cipating the task and will be either tense or relaxed when actually tackling 
the task. Once the task is completed, one’s initial response will be of 
pleasure or disappointment according to whether one has succeeded or failed. 
This is regardless of one’s previous expectations or subseguent attributions. 
In the more leisurely post-mortem that follows, one’s performance is inter­
preted in terms of such factors as ability, effort and ease of task, with 
feelings of pride or guilt being associated with attributions to stable 
qualities in oneself. If these attributions are consistent with one’s 
existing academic self-concept, then this will be confirmed; if they are 
inconsistent, one's academic self-concept may be modified slightly, major
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Figure 5.1 Hypothetical relationships betmeen academic self-concept
and other key variables
GENERAL
SELF-ESTEEM
t
Achievement value
/N
OF OTHERS
OPINIONS
SELF-CONCEPT
SELF-ESTEEM
ACADEMIC
Actual performance 
on particular task
tension/relaxatio
Explanation of 
perceived perf­
ormance on task
pride/guilt
Expectations of 
success on part­
icular task
anxiety/confidence
Perceived p e r f r -  
orraance on task
pleasure/disappointment
changes being dependent upon repeated experiences of success (or failure). 
Changes in academic self-concept and academic self-esteem may lead to mod­
ifications in general self-esteem, but only if academic achievement is 
valued by the person concerned.
As indicated by Figure 5.1, this sequence of events does not occur 
in a vacuum but is subject to continual influence from others mho are in 
a position to observe and comment upon one’s performance. Although this 
has not been indicated in the diagram, others may be biassed in their
-273-
may become somemhat distorted as a result. Normally, however, feedback 
from others serves as a useful corrective for our own biasses.
Finally, it should be noted that the most important feature of the 
process depicted in Figure 5.1 is that the relationships between the key 
variables are complex and reciprocal rather than simple and unidirectional.
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liihat conclusions can be drawn from the present study about the 
different approaches to measuring self-esteem? Of the three approaches 
described in the first chapter, only two were involved in the present 
study. The two measures of general self-esteem used are examples of 
the explicit and implicit derived evaluation approaches to measuring 
self-esteem and are both based upon the assumption that general self­
esteem represents an average of one’s evaluations of oneself in diff­
erent spheres. This implies that general self-esteem is structured 
hierarchically and that we can usefully talk of specific areas of self­
esteem such as academic self-esteem, social self-esteem and so on. The 
direct evaluation approach (which bias not used in the present study) is 
based on the assumption that general self-esteem represents a global 
evaluation of oneself. This approach does not imply any particular 
structure for general self-esteem.
On the whole, the results of the present study suggest that there is 
greater justification for treating general self-esteem as an average of 
specific self-evaluations than there is for. the assumption that people 
can (and do) make global evaluations of themselves. Only the eight year 
olds in the present sample evaluated themselves in an undifferntiated 
fashion, whereas the older children made distinct evaluations of their 
functioning in different areas. Thus, there is a developmental trend for 
self-processes such as self-esteem to become increasingly differentiated, 
with the result that general self-esteem does not mean the same thing for 
young children as it does for older children.
This point about general self-esteem being an average of specific 
self-evaluations was made in the last section. In its ability to predict 
average behaviour, general self-esteem is akin to another widely-used 
summary variable, intelligence, which has a proven usefulness in predicting 
general academic achievement but which is less accurate when predicting 
specific attainments. The comparison with intelligence is an instructive 
one which has important implications for the measurement of self-esteem. 
Intelligence tests are compound measures reouiring the child to tackle a 
variety of tasks which are not always obviously related to one another.
The resulting index is a sum of the child’s performances on these tasks.
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as Coopersmith’s SCI which sums the child’s responses to a large number 
of questions whose relation to one another is not always clear. Inter­
estingly enough, intelligence tests have been subjected to exactly the 
same criticism as have questionnaires like the SCI : although they may 
measure something reliably, we are none the wiser as to what that some­
thing is.
i .
When it comes to measuring general self-esteem, therefore, what we 
shouldbe doing is obtaining an average of a number of self-feelings and 
self-evaluations. Despite the criticisms levelled at Coopersmith’s SEI 
in this study and despite the (unsuccessful) attempts to derive more pre­
cisely formulated factor scores from the children’s responses, it does at 
least have the virtue of averaging a large number of self-evaluations.
This is not the only way one can go about the business of averaging self- 
reports. As we have seen, Epstein (1979) has suggested a longitudinal 
rather than a cross-sectional approach.
To be convinced of the importance of averaging observations when a 
summary index is wanted we need look no further than the present study. 
Undoubtedly the most consistent and striking findings in the present study 
concerned class rank, which bias an average of all the children’s estimates 
of each other’s abilities. The strength of this measure comes from com­
bining the scores of twenty or more children, thereby cancelling out 
individual inaccuracies. If we compare the class rankings of individual 
children, a great,deal of variation is apparent, with some children making 
some very odd judgements about the abilities of their peers. These 
idiosyncratic judgements are smoothed out when all the children’s rankings 
are combined, the result being a powerful index of average academic attain­
ment. This bias particularly so for the eldest group where a very high 
correlation (0*94) bias found between class rank and academic report (which 
bias an average of gradings by six teachers). Being a summary measure, class 
rank should predict average attainment better than it does specific attain­
ment. This proved to be the case, the correlation between class rank and 
reading attainment for this group being 0*65.
To summarize, the key to obtaining an accurate index of a broad 
quality such as self-esteem is to average a large number of self-evaluations 
in a variety of situations. To obtain an accurate index of a more specific
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large number of self-estimates in a variety of academic situations. The 
more general the quality, the greater the number of repeated measures 
needed. A longitudinal approach as suggested by Epstein (1979) may be 
preferrable to asking people to give a number of self-evaluations or 
self-estimates at a single point in time. In validating such measures, 
the same averaging approach is needed. Thus, when matching measures of
' . i
academic self-concepts against the opinions of teachers or peers, one 
needs to average the opinions of a reasonable sample of peers or teachers. 
Similarly, when correlating measures of general self-esteem with objective 
behaviour, one needs to take an average of a large number of instances of 
behaviour.
Some credence has been given to Epstein’s claim that self-evaluations 
sampled at different points in time will yield more potent indices of self­
esteem. Valuable as such an approach might be, it is likely to be very 
time-consuming. To achieve correlations between trait scores and behaviour 
of around 0*80 or 0*90, Epstein suggests that samples over at least fourteen 
days (or occasions) are needed. This kind of extensive sampling will not 
be practicable in many studies. Where such sampling is not possible, the 
repertory grid measures used in the present study have much to commend them. 
As argued in the second chapter, this approach to measuring children’s ideas 
and feelings about themselves has the great advantage of allowing them to 
describe themselves in their own terms. The present study provided evidence 
of the construct validity of the measures of academic self-esteem and 
academic self-concept derived from the children’s repertory grids. The 
grid measure of general self-esteem did not perform as convincingly, but 
it bias argued that this bias because the grid format used bias too small to 
adequately describe the personal construct systems of the older children. 
Further research comparing different grid formats is needed.
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Among other issues, the present study has looked at the influence 
teachers’ opinions have upon their pupils’ self-estimates. The results 
have implications for the way teachers report upon their pupils’ progress, 
that is, for the way they let their pupils know how they (the pupils) are 
progressing. This is a perennial problem in educational practice. One 
solution is to set clear goals for all pupils to achieve, encouraging the 
children to compete with each other in striving for these goals and re­
warding the most successful. A contrasting approach is to try and set 
individual goals for each child, encouraging children to improve on their 
own past performances. Current educational practice in England tends to 
be biased towards the latter approach. Over the last decade or so, there.
has been a swing away from reporting children’s progress in terms of 
percentages or ranks in class. Many junior schools do no formal reporting 
at all, preferring general comments on how the child is progressing.
Secondary schools typically report more fully than this, but often use no 
more than a five-point scale to indicate the child’s attainments in any 
one subject. In the case of the secondary school involved in the present 
study, the subject teachers rated each child three times according to the 
child’s attitudes, attainments and potential in the particular subject.
Despite this prevailing lobi-key approach to reporting children’s 
progress, the results of the present study indicate that children are well 
aware of their relative attainments. Indeed, it was argued that they 
actively seek to compare themselves with their peers, using whatever 
evidence of attainment is available.
For the two junior school classes, the most salient index of achieve­
ment bias the progress made by each child through set texts such as the 
Fletcher Mathematics books. The children drew heavily upon such signs of 
achievement in forming ideas about themselves and their classmates, 
especially when given few cues by their teachers. For the secondary school 
class, the most salient index of achievement bias each child’s school report. 
As discussed previously, the children in this class displayed what seemed 
like a startling familiarity with the content of each other’s school reports.
What conclusions can be drawn from these findings? It is clear that 
children seek to compare their academic progress with that of their class­
mates whether their teachers encourage them to do so or not. Even if
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teachers try as a matter of policy to play down the element of competition 
between their pupils, the children will still seek to match themselves 
against their peers. Children principally base their academic self-concepts 
on a combination of observations of their own performances, the per­
formances of their peers and the opinions of others. When teachers 
deliberately eschew formal assessment procedures (thereby depriving their 
pupils of an important source of information), children twill rely more 
heavily on the opinions of their classmates when forming their academic 
self-concepts.
It is important to be clear about what is being argued here* It is 
not being claimed that children inevitably compete with their.peers, just 
that they naturally seek to compare themselves with their classmates.
Whether the information thus obtained acts as a spur for the children to 
try and out-do one another will depend upon the tone set by teachers and 
parents (and ultimately upon the prevailing ethos of society itself). Thus, 
the evidence of the present study in no way discredits the current education­
al practice of reporting .children1s progress in relatively informal terms.
However, the results do imply that the kind of feedback children 
receive from their teachers is important. In particular, teachers need to 
help their pupils develop accurate academic self-concepts. The present study 
has demonstrated that academic self-concepts become both more accurate and 
more stable with age but has also shown that, for each age group, it is the 
less successful children whose academic self-concepts are most inaccurate.
This confirms the results of earlier studies (Covington and Beery, 1976; 
Heckhausen, 1967; Robbins and Harway, 1977) which have shown that academic­
ally successful children set moderate, realistic goals for themselves where­
as their less successful peers are inclined to be more erratic, often aiming 
impossibly high.
Paradoxically, setting extremely high goals for oneself may serve a 
defensive purpose. Children who have experienced a lot of failure may 
actually fear success because of the obligation this would create to succeed 
again, an obligation which they feel unable to meet. Holt (1969) has 
graphically described the tension this can create in children : there is a 
"peculiar kind of relief, a lessening of tension, when you make a mistake.
For when you make one, you no longer have to worry whether you are going to 
make one. Walking a tightrope, you worry about falling off; once fallen 
off, you don’t have to worry. Children, to whom making mistakes is extremely
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(p.52). This strain is so great, in fact, that some children may opt for 
continual failure as a strategy for coping with school.
Whether one accepts this argument or not, the fact that academic 
failure is associated with the setting of unrealistic goals highlights the 
need for teachers to be helping all their pupils to set realistic goals 
for themselves (and thereby developing accurate academic self-concepts).
This involves giving the children some idea of their immediate past achieve­
ments, without which accurate projections are not possible. Thus, feedback 
from the teacher needs to be explicit, giving the child a precise idea of 
what to aim for next, otherwise self-favourability biases are likely 
(Wylie, 1979). (Although teacher evaluations may need to be reasonably 
explicit, there is no need for them to be public, that is, broadcast to 
the whole class).
It should be noted that the approach just recommended involves 
facing children with their failures as well as giving them due credit 
for their successes. A diet of undiluted praise and encouragement is not 
likely to help failing children gain confidence in themselves, both because 
it does not breed trust in the teacher and because it does not provide a 
sound basis for developing realistic goals. This may be one reason why 
remedial programmes aimed at improving children’s self-esteem have not been 
very successful (Zirkel, 1972). Another reason why such programmes fail 
is that, as shown in the present study, the relationship between self­
esteem and actual attainment is not a direct one but is mediated by academic 
self-concept. As suggested above, failing children can best be taught by 
helping them to set realistic goals for themselves and thus to develop 
accurate academic self-concepts. Assuming that the children concerned 
value academic achievement, more favourable self-esteem will eventually 
result as both actual attainments and academic self-concepts improve, but 
bolstering self-esteem should not be the primary aim of any remedial pro­
gramme.
To summarize, what has been suggested in this final section is that 
teachers can become more effective by helping their pupils set more realistic 
goals for themselves in particular tasks, thereby developing more accurate 
academic self-concepts overall. What this implies is that the more accurate 
one’s self-perceptions are the more effectively one can act. Two quotations
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u i i u  serve as a TinaL 1 l Lustration or this point. The first is from 
the Belgian dramatist and essayist Maurice Maeterlinck who in 1896 
observed that "It is far more important that one’s life should be per­
ceived than that it should be transformed; for no sooner has it been 
perceived, than it transforms itself of its own accord". The second 
quotation comes from Robin Chapman’s novel The Duchess’s Diary (1980) 
in which Cervantes figures as a character. At one point, Chapman has 
Cervantes say : "When I was neither young nor old, in what people call 
the prime of life, I always assumed I could do better than I did at 
everything. I was in a perpetual impatience with myself, my aspirations 
flew ahead of my abilities, like a covey of partridges whirring away 
over a cornfield out of range of a careless sportsman. But now, now 
I expect less of myself, and I do what I can do" (p,89.)
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